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Creating a Culture of Compliance: Why
Departmentalization May Not Be the
Answer
Michele DeStefano*
Over the past few decades, as corporate criminal liability rules,
sentencing guidelines, and settlement incentives have changed, there
has been increased emphasis on and resources devoted to the
compliance function at large publicly held companies. In this article,
Professor DeStefano traces the development of the compliance
function at large corporations and questions the recent mandate by
certain governmental entities that malfeasant corporations designate
a chief compliance officer and separate the compliance gatekeeping
function from the legal department so that this chief compliance
officer does not report to the general counsel. She categorizes the
types of arguments made for and against departmentalization and
then analyzes them from the perspective of the public's objectives to
increase detection, monitoring, and prevention of corporate
misconduct. By examining secondary literature, surveys, and
interviews she conducted with 70 general counsels and chief
compliance officers, she hypothesizes that preemptive
departmentalization may not be in the public's best interest. It may
not increase transparency into compliance transgressions at
corporations, actual compliance by corporations, or the commitment
by corporations to a culture of compliance and ethics. Further, such
structural reorganization of the compliance function may generate
consequences that offset the potential benefits of departmentalization
and create a sense of false complacency that distracts from
substantive cultural change that is integrated throughout the
organization. Ultimately, she concludes that a focus on culture and
informal norms may have more potential to meet the public's
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objectives than a focus on organizational structure. Therefore, she
proposes the government revise its current focus on the external
manifestations of compliance to in ward, cultural change. Specifically,
she suggests that the government reward corporations that take an
inward look at how work is actually being done within the company
and at the networks and organizational culture that exists beneath the
surface of the organization chart, the mission statement, and code of
conduct. Such focus, she believes, could enable compliance structures
and programs that promote public access to information about
compliance transgressions, actual compliance by corporations, and a
culture of compliance and ethics within a corporation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades, as corporate criminal liability rules,
sentencing guidelines, and settlement incentives have changed,' there
has been increased emphasis on and resources devoted to the
compliance function at large publicly held companies.2 What might
have been thought of twenty years ago as a basic corporate
governance 3 function is now being ceded to compliance departments.
These compliance departments are generally in charge of monitoring
and ensuring compliance with legal obligations and ethical standards
1. Sec Leonard Orland, The Transformation of Corporate Ciminal Law, I BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 45, 45 (2006) (tracing the "profound change" in corporate criminal law
and the federal government's increase in the use of deferred prosecution or nonprosecution
agreements); Christine Parker, The Ethics of Advising on Regulatory Compliance: Autonomy
or Interdependence?, 28 J. BUS. ETHICS, 339, 339 (2000) ; Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for
Organizational Integrity, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 106, 109; see infra Part II.A.
(providing a brief review of corporate criminal liability rules, sentencing guidelines, and
settlement incentives that emphasize the importance of corporate compliance initiatives).
2. See Cristic Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate
Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 694 (2009) ("Over the last few decades there has been
tremendous growth in the importance of corporate compliance and ethics programs in criminal
and civil liability."); id. at 680 (explaining that in response to corporate wrongdoing, the federal
government has required corporations to create enhanced compliance programs as part of
deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreements); cf Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic
Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L. 0. 487, 500-11 (2003)
(reviewing the many instances in which corporate law mitigates liability based on the
corporation's ability to demonstrate that it has put into place enhanced or effective internal
compliance structures like conduct codes and compliance programs and contending that this
legal stance is based on a belief that such internal compliance structures reduce corporate
misconduct). See also infra Part II.
3. TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDuCr: How
LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 9 (2011) ("'Corporate
governance' is a broad concept that much of the legal literature has given a narrow definition
... . But corporate governance may refer more broadly to any system of incentives and
constraints operating within a firm ... designed to constrain bad acts on the part of corporations
and their managers.").
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beyond those legally required. This transition, along with the current
regulatory environment and corporate structure, raises questions
about the compliance function in large, U.S. publicly traded
corporations. What purpose does and should it serve? Should the
compliance function be within or outside the purview of the legal
department? Who should fill the role of chief compliance officer, to
who should the chief compliance officer report, and what role should
the chief compliance officer play?
Today there is little uniformity to how corporations implement
their compliance function,' the person the organization selects to
actively run compliance, or the titles of those playing compliance
roles.6 However, historically, in large publicly traded corporations,'
issues of prevention and compliance have been within the purview of
the legal department and the individual in charge of compliance has
4. Corporate compliance programs have evolved to focus on issues of compliance and
ethics. See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. Generally, when this Article refers to the
compliance program or function, it includes in that the ethics function as further described in
Part 11. Moreover, this Article focuses on the need for corporations to create a culture of
compliance. This is similar to what Benjamin W. Heineman calls "a culture of integrity," which
includes robust "adherence to the spirit and letter of the formal rules" (i.e., compliance),
"adoption of ethical standards beyond the formal rules that bind" (i.e, ethics), and creation of
an "employee population that exemplifies the fundamental values of honesty, fairness, candor,
trustworthiness and reliability." Ben W. Heineman Jr., Only the Right CEO Can Create a
Cultare of Integrity, CORP. COUNS., (June 5, 2013), http:www.law.com/corporatecounsel/Pub
ArticleCC.jsp?id=1202603019169; see also BEN W. HEINEMAN JR., HIGH PERFORMANCE WITH
HIGH INTEGRITY 1-2 (2008). As discussed in Part V, the ethics and values component is
integral to creating a culture of compliance.
5. Paine, supra note 1, at 110-11 (demonstrating that some utilize an "integrity-based"
approach that focuses on values and empowerment while others take a "compliance based"
approach that is based on punishment for transgressions); sec also John Hasnas, Managing the
Risks of Legal Compliance: Conflicting Demands of Law and Ethics, 39 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 507,
516 (2008) ("Research demonstrates that there are two distinct approaches to reducing the level
of criminal activity among a firm's employees: "the command and control" approach and the
"self-regulatory" approach."); Darren Sinclair, Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control?
Beyond False Dichotomies, 19 L. & POL'Y 529 (1997) (evaluating the two approaches); Mark
Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches, 20 ACAD. MGMT.
REv. 571 (1995) (describing the two approaches). See inkra note 92 and accompanying text.
6. It is impossible to identify all the different variations of organization structure that exist
across large publicly held corporations in the United States. For a broad overview based on
trade surveys, secondary literature, and the interviews conducted in the Compliance Study, see
Part II; see also Ford & Hess, supra note 2, at 693; see infra notes 56 and 121 and accompanying
text.
7. This Article focuses on large publicly traded corporations.
8. Robert E. Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and
Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L. J. 479,487 (1989) [hereinafter Rosen, Inside Counsc/
(reporting that overseeing regulation and compliance was central to the in-house lawyers role in
1989); sce also infra note 125 and accompanying text. See also Boehme, infra note 174
(indicating that in both the banking and health care industries, the CCO was historically
subordinate to the GC, although this is changing).
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often reported to the general counsel9 and sometimes has actually
been the general counsel.o Over the past few years however, in the
wake of the corporate scandals that have spanned a range of
industries (including pharmaceutical, insurance, financial services,
health care, consumer products), 1 there is a trend to separate the
compliance function from the legal department and create
independent compliance departments largely comprised of people
with legal training.12 These compliance departments are focused on
monitoring compliance with the law and ethical obligations."
Although regulatory bodies and governmental agencies do not
require that corporations separate the compliance and legal functions,
their unofficial stance appears to be that they should. Indeed,
recently, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")14
and the Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS"),
9. Although, at some companies, the highest ranking legal officer is the chief legal officer
(to whom a general counsel may report), for the purposes of this Article, the title "general
counsel" will be used to denote the highest-ranking legal officer at a company.
10. See, e.g., ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE COUNSEL & CORPEDIA, INC., 2010
COMPLIANCE PROGRAM AND RISK ASSESSMENT BENCHMARKING 4 (2010) (reporting that
twenty-seven percent of corporate survey respondents have a chief compliance officer and thirty
percent claimed that compliance was either ultimately overseen by the general counsel). In a
survey of over 800 private and public companies and nonprofits among a database of Health
Care Compliance Association and Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics, fifteen percent
reported that the general counsel was also the chief compliance officer. SOC'Y OF CORP.
COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS & HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE ASS'N, SHOULD COMPLIANCE
REPORT TO THE GENERAL COUNSEL? A SURVEY BY THE SOCIETY OF CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS AND THE HEALTHCARE COMPLIANCE ASSOCIATION 6 (2013),
available at http://www.corporatecompliance.org/Resources/View/Articleld/909/Should-
Compliance-Report-to-the-General-Counsel.aspx [hereinafter SCCE Study March 2013]; see
also Ford & Hess, supra note 2, at 693; see infra notes 110-116 and accompanying text.
11. Lori A. Richards, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, U.S. Sec.
and Exch. Comm'n, Compliance Programs: Our Shared Mission (Feb. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch0228051ar.htm (discussing the emergence of corporate
misconduct across large and small industries and the need for change in how "we all think about
compliance"); see infra note 128.
12. See infra notes 125-126 and accompanying text. This appears to be especially true in
the healthcare and financial industries. See, e.g., Boehme, infra note 174; see also infra Part
III.A.
13. See infra Part II.
14. The Office of Inspector General of the SEC is an independent office in the SEC "that
conducts, supervises, and coordinates audits and investigations of the programs and operations
of the SEC." Office of the InSpector General ("OIG'", U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://
www.sec.gov/aboutloffices/inspector-general.shtml (last visited Sept. 30, 2013).
15. The Office of Inspector General of the HHS is responsible for "protectling] the
integrity of [HHS] programs as well as the health and welfare of the program beneficiaries."
Office of the Inspector General, About Us, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.
http://oig.hhs.gov/organization.asp (last visited Sept. 30, 2013); see also The Enforcement of the
Crinminal Laws Against Medicare and Medicaid Fraud: Hearing Before the 1H Judiciary
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security (2010) (statement of Timothy Menke,
Deputy Inspector General for Investigations, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services).
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each through its Office of Inspector General ("OIG"), have required
corporations that misbehaved to develop a distinct compliance
department and designate a chief compliance officer that does not
report to the general counsel and that has direct access to the board."
Concurrently, corporations (not directly pressured by these agencies
but prompted by the prospect of leniency) have preemptively
buttressed their compliance and ethics programs and, in some cases,
reorganized to separate the legal and compliance functions so that the
chief compliance officer does not report to the general counsel."
These moves have added to what has been identified as a "simmering
debate" about compliance oversight and the legal department's
potential to be the gatekeeper" of compliance.' 9
16. Sec infra Part Ill. These mandates (included in consent decrees and deferred
prosecution and non-prosecution agreements) do not just require that the corporation must
have a standalone compliance department led by a high-ranking official, designated the CCO,
who has direct access to or reports to the board, they also explicitly state that the CCO actually
cannot report to the general counsel. Id.
17. Paine, supra note 5, at 106 (arguing that companies are motivated, in part, by sentencing
guidelines that "base fines partly on the extent to which companies have taken steps to prevent
that misconduct"); cf Parker, Ethics of Advising, supra note 1, at 339 (discussing the incentives
for corporations in various industries to voluntarily create compliance and ethics programs);
Christine Parker & Sharon Gil ad, Internal Corporate Compliance Management, in
EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE 170 (Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nelson, eds., 2011);
ASEEM PRAKASH & MATTHEW POTOSKI, THE VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTALISTS: GREEN
CLUBS, ISO 14001, AND VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 1-3 (2006) (making
same point). WalMart reported on its website that it created a distinct compliance department
along with implementing other compliance programs and procedures. See Key Events in
Walmart Anti-Corruption Compliance, WALMART, http://ncws.walmart.com/key-events-in-
walmart-anti-corruption-compliance-2012 (last visited Sept. 30, 2013). These changes were
implemented before the recent WalMart scandal. Walmart Global Compliance Action Steps,
WALMART, http://news.walmart.com/walmart-global-compliance-action-steps. (last updated
July 8, 2013). Interestingly, legal scholars and the compliance profession (which includes
lawyers and nonlawyers) appear to embrace the presumption that adding resources to build
internal compliance structures will deter corporate misconduct and/or liability. Krawiec, supra
note 2, at 489-90 (citing articles arguing in favor of corporate liability mitigation provisions or
other incentives that are based on a corporation enhancing internal compliance structures); see
also Lori Richards, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, U.S. Sec. and
Exch. Comm'n, Instilling Lasting and Meaningful Changes in Compliance, (Oct. 28, 2004),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spchl028041r.htm [hereinaftcr Richards, Instilling];
Lori Richards, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, U.S. Sec. and Exch.
Comm'n, The New Compliance Rule: An Opportunity for Change (June 28, 2004), available at
www. sec.gov/news/speech/spch0630041ar.htm [hereinafter Richards, New Compliance Rulej.
18. See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 2 (2006) (stating that a gatekeeper is an "agent who acts as a reputational
intermediary to assure investors as to the quality of the 'signal' sent by the corporate issuer");
Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatckeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enlorcement Strategy, 2
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53 (1986) (arguing that a gatekeeper is "able to disrupt misconduct by
withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers" and can be held liable for failing to do so);
Sung hui Kim, Lawyer Exceptionalism, 63 SMU L. Rev. 73, 73 (declaring that gatekeepers are
"private intermediaries who can prevent harm to the capital markets by disrupting the
misconduct of their client representatives").
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On the one hand, departmentalizing compliance is consistent
with changes in corporate liability rules, sentencing guidelines, and
best practices developed by governmental and nongovernmental
entities that emphasize the importance of a robust compliance
program.20 On the other hand, however, departmentalization is not
consistent with the history and the organization of the compliance
function at many large, publicly traded corporations. 2 1 It is
inconsistent with the view taken by the SEC,22 and the American Bar
Association ("ABA"), 23 both of which have developed rules that
place general counsels in charge of the compliance function and in the
role of compliance gatekeepers.
The primary purpose of this Article is to analyze whether large
publicly traded corporations should preemptively departmentalize the
compliance function from the legal department so that the chief
compliance officer does not report to the general counsel.2 4
19. Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-housc La wyers, Enterprise Risk
and the Financial Crisis, 2012 Wis. L. REV. 495, 500, 502, 518 (explaining that he is not trying "to
resolve the question of whether "legal" and "ethics/compliance" should be separated in an
organization" and contending that the answer "depends on the particular firm's history,
incentives, and culture." He asks whether there is "something to the claim that lawyers
predictably frustrate focus on ethics beyond minimal legal compliance" and suggests research to
determine "whether there something in the language, training, socialization, personality and/or
professional identity of lawyers that has this effect"); see generally Tanina Rostain, General
Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Preliminary Findings and New Research Ouestions, 21 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 469 (2008) (questioning whether compliance should be "considered a part
of the legal function" or "located outside a corporation's legal department"); see, e.g. Jeff
Kaplan, Should the CECO Report to the General Counsel, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (July
19, 2010), http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/should-the-ceco-report-to-the-general-
counsel/; Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr., Don't Divorce the GC and Compliance Officer, CORP.
COUN., Jan. 2011, at 48,48-49; SCCE Study March 2013, supra note 10, at 2. Scholars disagree
about whether and in what circumstances lawyers should play a gatekeeping role. See Kim,
supra note 18, at 76 (describing the debates around the SEC's efforts to obligate lawyers to
gatekeep as "gatekeeping wars"). Although the ABA has established rules that put the lawyer
in the role of gatekeeper, in the past it has opposed outside regulation that requires lawyers to
serve as gatekeepers or whistleblowers. Id. See infra Part Ill.B.2.
20. See infra Part III. See also supra note 1 and accompanying text. Further, the
government's focus on organizational structure and the chain of command is consistent with
corporate law's focus on organizational structure. Robert E. Rosen, Risk Management and
Corporate Governance: The Case of Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV., 1157,1160 (2003).
21. See infra Part II.
22. Id.
23. Admittedly, the ABA is a lawyer's trade association, so it may have a built-in bias
towards having lawyers in charge (as long as it is self-mandated). However,
departmentalization may actually increase the number of jobs for legally trained individuals.
24. This article solely focuses on the debate over departmentalization of the compliance
function from the legal department so that the chief compliance officer does not report to the
general counsel. Although some might also debate whether there is a need for a "compliance
department" or a person with the chief compliance officer title, this article starts with the
presumption that large publicly traded corporations have (or should have) personnel to oversee
compliance. See infra note 43. The question analyzed is: Assuming that the corporation does or
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Although there is a great deal of secondary material on
compliance (including many surveys conducted by compliance
organizations), there has been only minimal scholarly qualitative
research done on general counsels and chief compliance officers in
the United States about the compliance function in corporations.25
will have personnel to oversee compliance, should those people be part of a department that is
entirely separate from the legal department and oversight by the general counsel? Moreover,
this Article will not describe in depth the role that chief compliance officer's play at their
companies or address whether a person trained in law as opposed to a nonlawyer better fills the
chief compliance officer role. A second article, Creating a Culture of Compliance:
Conceptualizing the Role of the Corporate Compliance Officer (on file with Author)
[hereinafter Conceptualizing the Role], describes how compliance is managed and positioned
within some large publicly traded corporations within the U.S. There, through the voices of the
Compliance Study interviewees, the different roles compliance officers can play are identified.
See infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. The roles are evaluated and the questions posed
at the end of this Article are examined: Who should oversee compliance at large publicly traded
corporations, and how? What type of training and skills should these compliance officers have
and what roles shouldcompliance officers play to effectuate compliance?
25. The following lists the scholarship detailing qualitative empirical work on the
compliance function at large U.S. corporations based on a Westlaw search on August 24, 2013.
Christine Parker has conducted interviews of U.S. corporations as part of a larger empirical
project on compliance and self regulation in Australia. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 1, at 339-51
(using interviews of thirty-six Australian and U.S. compliance practitioners to examine the
ethical role that should be played by lawyers and compliance professionals and demonstrate
that a "superior conceptualization [sic] of the compliance advisor's role is emerging" that
"recognizes the interdependence between compliance advisor and corporate client"); Christine
Parker, THE OPEN CORPORATION, EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION AND DEMOCRACY (2002)
(proposing that corporations self-regulate and reporting findings from eighty interviews with
regulators and corporate compliance professionals in Europe, the U.S., and Australia). Tanina
Rostain has conducted ten interviews with general counsels. Rostain, supra note 19 (exploring
in-house lawyers' role in compliance based on these interviews). Additionally, qualitative
empirical research has been conducted on regulations and the impact of voluntary compliance
programs in the environmental arena in the United States. See, e.g., Carey Coglianese, Beyond
Compliance: Explaining Busincss Participation in Voluntary Environmental Programs, in
EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION (Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen
and Christine Parker, eds. (2011). Lastly, I found one recent qualitative research study on
corporate monitorships resulting from settlement agreements. The authors analyze this
research in two articles. See Cristic Ford & David Hess, Corporate Monitorships and New
Governance Regulation: In Theory, in Practice, and in Context, 33 L. & POL'Y 509 (2011)
(utilizing twenty telephone interviews in 2008 with individuals who have served as monitors in
the United States and Canada to "shed light on the sociological and institutional forces that
contributed to the underambitious nature of corporate monitorship" and recommend a new
governance approach to monitorship); see Ford & Hess., supra note 2 (investigating the
effectiveness of corporate monitorship based on twenty telephone interviews in 2008 with
individuals who have served as monitors in the United States and Canada). Both qualitative
and quantitative research has been conducted on the compliance function in corporations
outside the United States. See, e.g., Robert E. Rosen et al., The Framing Effects of
Professionalism: Is there a Lawyer Cast of Mind? Lessons From Compliance Programs, 40
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 101 (2013); see also, Parker et al., The Two Faces ofLawyers: Professional
Ethics and Business Compliance with Regulation, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 201 (2009)
(utilizing qualitative interviews and surveys to examine the compliance function at Australian
companies). Further, there has been some qualitative research on the compliance function at
U.S. law firms. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role ofEthics
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Therefore, to generate hypotheses about the consequences of
departmentalization and the effects of lawyers as gatekeepers of
compliance, seventy general counsels and compliance officers of S&P
500 corporations across a variety of industries including banking,
pharmaceutical, and petroleum were interviewed [hereinafter "the
Compliance Study"].2 This interview data was used in combination
with secondary material and other studies on compliance to create a
case that complicates conventional wisdom about the value of
departmentalization. Further, the interview data, quotes, and stories
of respondents have been highlighted to better understand how some
compliance professionals and lawyers believe the compliance function
is both currently and ideally managed2 7 as well as to animate the
potential issues that may result from removing the general counsel
from the role of compliance gatekeeper.28
There is a range of different arguments for and against
departmentalization.2 Proponents of departmentalization argue that
there is a conflict of interest between the general counsel's role and
the compliance officer's role.30 By separating the two departments, a
chief compliance officer will have the autonomy she needs to uncover
and report misconduct thereby increasing the level of transparency
into corporate conduct (by the board of directors and, in the case of
investigations, also by the government).3 1 Opponents counter that
the benefits of transparency may be offset by the inefficiencies that
are created by having a separate and independent compliance
function.32 Communication flow will decrease and costs will increase
Advisors, General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firm, 44 ARIz. L.
REv. 559, 563-66 (2002) [hereinafter Chambliss & Wilkins, Complianc Specialists] (conducting
three focus groups that included ten to fifteen lawyers each across thirty-two firms and a few
follow-up interviews); see also Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective
Ethical Infrastructure in Large Law Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 691, 694 (2002)[hereinafter Chambliss & Wilkins, Ethical Infrastructure] (proposing "a
research agenda for the study of ethical infrastructure in large law firms").
26. Included in this are interviews with some former general counsels, a chief ethics officer,
a former chair of the ACC's Compliance and Ethics Committee, and a former member of the
SEC. For a full description of the interviews and methodology, see infra Appendix.
27. As discussed infra, the subjects are biased and the interview data is not generalizable
given the sample size and format of the empirical work. See infra Appendix, describing
methodology and limitations of the interview data. This interview data is also relied on in one
other article: Creating a Corporate Culture of Compliance: Conceptualizing the Role of the
Corporate Compliance Officer (on file with Author). For a description, see supra note 24.
28. Because the interviews were conducted in a systematic and open manner that promised
anonymity and included seventy-one subjects from large publicly traded corporations, the
quotes are more than simply stories from random people that the author may have met at a
conference. Therefore, the methodology deserves explanation. See infra Appendix.
29. See infra discussion reviewing and analyzing the arguments at Part IV.
30. See infra notes 225-226 and accompanying text.
31. Id.; see also Part IV.B.
32. Sec Part IV.C.
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because of turf wars and the necessity of having duplicate expertise in
two departments." Further, they argue, general counsels currently
serve as independent counselors to their corporate clients and are
accustomed to managing conflicts of interest between their role as an
advocate and their role as a keeper of the public trust.3 4
In addition to a range of different arguments, there is a range of
different stakeholders affected by this debate, including chief
compliance officers, general counsels, the legal profession as a whole,
the government, and the public. Arguably, the goals and motivations
of each stakeholder can vary.35 For example, the government may
require departmentalization of malfeasant corporations because it
wants to prevent future noncompliance but also because it wants to
demonstrate to the public that it has forced these corporations to
change a prior corporate structure that enabled noncompliance. A
corporation, on the other hand, may decide to voluntarily
departmentalize because such organizational structure can be used to
defend against certain types of liability or mitigate repercussions for
future misconduct. Compliance professionals may desire
33. Sec Part IV.B.
34. See infra notes 350-357 and accompanying text.
35. Parker & Gilad, supra note 17, at 24 ("IDlifferent actors within (and outsidc) the
corporation might also have different purposes in implementing compliance structures.").
36. According to other compliance scholars, the government's emphasis on internal
compliance structural changes is based on the presumption that these changes will reduce
noncompliance by corporations. Krawiec, supra note 2, at 491; id. at 511; Parker & Gilad, supra
note 17, at 7. Further, it may be that the focus on infrastructure and processes rather than
outcomes is easier to measure and not subject to concerns of alternate explanations for bad
outcomes. The SEC and the OIG state that they are looking to increase the likelihood that non-
compliance will be uncovered and monitored and that a culture of compliance will be created.
Sutherland Asbill & Brennan LLP, LegalAlert: Rulc 38a-l and Rule 206(4)-7Imp/cmentation-
Phase 2 SOUTHERLAND, 7-8 (Nov. 1, 2004), http://www.sutherland.com/portalresource/lookup
/poid/Z1tOl9NPIuKPtDNIqLMRV56Pab6TfzcRXncKbDtRr9tObDdEu83DqO!/fileUpload.name
=/LegalAlertFS1110045%B15%D.pdf [hereinafter Rule 38a-l Legal Alert] ("The SEC will
evaluate the compliance culture in the enterprise by assessing whether there are adequate
checks and balances, internal controls and supervisory structure that make it more likely that
ethical behavior will be the norm within the enterprise . . . . SEC officials have stated that a
culture of compliance begins with senior management and that the SEC staff will inquire about
the role of the board, senior management and other key executives in setting compliance
strategy and holding supervisors responsible for compliance.").
37. Parker & Gilad, supra note 17, at 3 ("[Cjompliance systems will often be designed to
manage risk and to set up grounds for management to negotiate with regulators that they have
tried to do the right thing, rather than the compliance system being designed purely to eliminate
noncompliance."); see also Robert E. Rosen, Risk Management and Corporate Governance:
The Case of Enron, 35 CONN. L. REv. 1157, 1157-84 (2003); Dove Izraeli & Mark Schwartz,
What Can We Learn From the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational Ethics?,
17 J. BUS. ETHICS 1045 (1998) (claiming that the primary motivation behind implementing
internal compliance structures is to mitigate damages rather than to deter misconduct); Marie
McKendall et al., Ethical Compliance Programs and Corporate Illegality: Testing the
Assumptions of the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, 37 J. BUS. ETHICS 367, 379 (2002)
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departmentalization (and legal professionals oppose
departmentalization) in order to increase their power and influence
within an organization.3 Further, each constituent may have a
different level of risk tolerance and a different definition of
noncompliance."
The range of arguments and stakeholders' perspectives involved
make it difficult to analyze the strength of the arguments and reach
an overall conclusion about departmentalization. The presumption
by the government (and other proponents) appears to be that
departmentalization is in the public's interest and will increase: 1)
access to information about noncompliance so that some "right"
balance of criminal prosecution can be pursued; 2) actual compliance
with the law; and 3) a corporation's normative commitment to
compliance and building an ethical culture 40 that may not be required
(explaining that "a growing number of researchers have charged that the purpose of corporate
ethical practices is not foremost and genuinely to promote ethical behavior"); see supra note 17.
38. Cf Krawiec, supra note 2, at 529 ("[Ljegal compliance professionals may value
incompleteness in the law because, as the first-line interpreters of legal policy, they are able to
fill any gaps in incomplete law with terms that enhance the welfare of the legal compliance
profession"); but see Boehme, infra note 173 (contending that compliance professionals are "the
least political, power-hungry folks at the company holiday party").
39. Parker & Gilad, supra note 17, at 3 (making similar point as between a regulator and
corporate managers).
40. The word culture is used here as other compliance scholars have used it: to refer to the
informal control systems that involve morals, values, and expectations that affect day-to-day
interaction and behavior (as opposed to the structural formal systems and policies). See Parker
& Gilad, supra note 17, at 3; id. at 10. Cf Paine, supra note 5, at 106 (defining an unethical
culture as one where "unethical business practice involves tacit, if not explicit, cooperation of
others and reflects the values, attitudes, beliefs, language, and behavioral patterns that define an
organization's operating culture"). See EDGAR SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND
LEADERSHIP 13-22 (4th ed. 2010); Charles O'Reilly, Corporations, Culture, and Commitment:
Motivation and Social Control in Organizations, CAL. MGMT. REV., Summer 1989, at 9; sce also
Hess & Ford, supra note 25, at 3. For a more detailed discussion of the importance of informal
norms (as opposed to formal changes), see infra Part V.
There is much support by scholars, compliance professionals, and even government
officials for the claim that a culture of compliance is an important ingredient to preventing
noncompliance and one of the stated goals of requiring departmentalization. See supra note 36;
infra note 369 and accompanying text. See also Paine, supra note 5, at 107-09 (reviewing recent
corporate misconduct and demonstrating the importance of an organization's ethical culture to
employee compliance with the law and ethical behavior); id. at 109-10 (contending that a
compliance based approach as opposed to one that is based on integrity and instilling an ethical
culture is inadequate and providing examples of unethical but legal behavior by corporations
that that lead to a "serious crisis of confidence among employees, creditors, shareholders, and
customers," executives being "forced to resign, having lost the moral authority to lead," and
billions of dollars in company losses). Parker & Gilad, supra note 17, at 9-13; Krawiec, supra
note 2, at 492-93 (defining an organization with a "genuine commitment to legal compliance,"
as one in which "top management[ I lisj dedicate[ed] to ethical corporate behavior" and that has
"a corporate culture that reflects that commitment, and an incentive structure that is compatible
with and reinforces the goal of legal compliance."); ETHICS RESOURCES CENTER, NATIONAL
BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY 26 (2007), available at www.ethics.org/files/u5/The 2007_National_
BusinessEthicsSurvey.pdf ("Ethical culture is the single biggest factor determining the
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by the letter of the law. 41  This Article seeks to add value to the
debate by analyzing the strength of the presumptions and arguments
in favor of departmentalization from the perspective of the public. 4 2
Specifically, this Article attempts to identify consequences of
departmentalization that are not emphasized in the literature and that
may offset the potential benefits of departmentalization.43
amount of misconduct in lan] organization."); Jeff Allen & Duane Davis, Assessing Some
Determinant Effects of Ethical Consulting Behavior The Case of Personal and Professional
Values, J. Bus. ETHICS 1993, at 449, 456 (finding that corporate culture was more effective at
impacting employee behavior than ethics codes); Thomas Tyler et al., The Ethical Commitment
to Compliance: Building Value-Based Cultures, CAL. MGMT. REV., Fe. 2008, at 31. (showing
that failure to look at culture results in less effective compliance programs); Gary R. Weaver et
al., Integrated and Decoupled Corporate Social Performance: Managerial Commitments,
External Pressurs, Corporate Ethical Practices, ACAD. MGMT. J., Oct. 1999, at 539, 547 (1999)
(finding that sentencing guidelines that promote formal changes like ethics codes are not
integrated into the culture of the organization and not as effective as the support of top
management); Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, supra note 127, at 122 (noting that adopting formal
ethics programs may have little effect unless they reflect the values of the organization); see also
Heineman, supra note 19 (referring to a culture of integrity as opposed to a culture of
compliance, which in his view includes robust adherence to the spirit and letter of the formal
rules, adoption of global standards beyond what the rules requires ie., ethics and adoption of
critical values like honesty, candor, fairness, reliability and trustworthiness); see supra note 4.
In analyzing this objective, I acknowledge that no one regulatory initiative will directly lead to
the creation of a corporate culture of compliance within the organization. Parker & Gilad,
supra note 17, at 11-13. Further, in addition to the three objectives analyzed here, the public
might have other objectives, for example around product innovation and development, that are
not related to enhancing compliance and that might be in tension with these three objectives.
41. These objectives are arguably also the objectives behind the government's emphasis on
internal compliance structural changes including departmentalization. See supra note 36. The
government, in dealing with corporate impropriety, appears to favor departmentalization as an
offensive measure to prevent future misconduct. For instance, when Schering-Plough pled
guilty to providing kickbacks to two HMOs, in addition to paying out more than $290 million in
settlement, it entered into a five-year corporate integrity agreement with the government. As
part of the agreement, Schering-Plough would have to designate a chief compliance officer who
would report directly to the chairman, chief executive officer, and president of the company.
Additionally, the chief compliance officer could not be or report to either the general counsel or
chief financial officer. See in/ra Part Ill (A)(1).
42. Cf Parker & Gilad, supra note 17, at 24 (suggesting that to analyze the effectiveness of
compliance structures, one needs to look at the purposes for which they are employed). This
analysis could be conducted from one of the other interested constituency's perspectives;
however, the interests of the public will be the primary focus in this Article.
43. This is not to say that enhancing internal compliance structures does not aid in meeting
these objectives. This is also not an argument against the designation of a high-ranking chief
compliance officer specifically. Indeed, this Article starts with the presumption that the
corporation has a designated chief compliance officer. See supra note 24. Moreover, research
suggests that having a designated chief compliance officer may have a positive impact on
compliance procedures and culture. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Compliance Specialists, supra
note 25, at 560 n. 1; see also Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, The Legal Environments
of Organizations, 23 ANN. REV. SOC. 479, 498-501 (1997); see also Lauren B. Edelman et al.,
Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 47, 74-79 (1992) (arguing that compliance specialists are motivated professionally
to promote compliance procedures even when no legal threat exists); cf David P. McCaffrey &
Sue R. Faerman, Shared Regulation in the United States Securities Industry, ADMIN. & Soc.,
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Analysis leads to the conclusion that preemptive
departmentalization may not work to preserve the public's
objectives."
First, departmentalization may not enable the chief compliance
officer to have the support, power, and clout needed to fill the role.
A compliance officer needs a certain level of political power and
influence to be able to utilize an understanding of the law,
corporations, and individual motivation to play both an independent
and dependent role-acting in both the interest of the public and the
corporation. 45 General counsels have that political power. In the last
thirty years, they have moved from second-class citizens to being
considered one of the highest ranking corporate executives at large
publicly traded corporations.46 Separating the compliance
department from the legal department creates a risk that the
compliance personnel (whether trained as lawyers or not) will be
1994, at 204, 227-28 (contending that "Islelf-regulation seems to work well when self-regulatory
"officials" have an identity and power base" and explaining that "Itihe links between
government regulators and industry's regulatory/compliance professionals are stronger in the
securities industry); but sec Margaret Raymond, The Professionalization of Ethics, 33
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 153, 154-60 (2006) (arguing that designating a person as the chief
compliance officer of a firm may have a negative impact); sce infra note 351. Further, this is not
to say that there are not benefits to developing a compliance and ethics department, but it is not
clear that this department needs to be independent from general counsel oversight. Rostain,
supra note 19, at 493 (reporting that one general counsel made this point). The argument in this
Article is that departmentalizing the compliance function from general counsel oversight,
specifically, may present negative consequences that outweigh the benefits derived from
departmentalization. See infra note 58. Lastly, this Article is not attempting to empirically
evaluate the effects of departmentalization. Others have tried to evaluate the effectiveness of
formal compliance systems. See infra note 371 and accompanying text. Cf Parker & Gilad,
supra note 17, at 23-29 (reviewing the empirical evaluation of formal compliance systems,
concluding it is difficult to do, and suggesting ways to enhance evaluation). See infra note 466.
44. For a discussion of the dangers of the current legal regime that provides very favorable
legal treatment to corporations that adopt formal compliance structures (such as codes of
conduct and other compliance programs) see generally, Krawiec, supra note 2 (arguing that
internal compliance structures are inefficient and ineffective as they enhance a corporation's
"market legitimacy" and reduce corporate legal liability without actually leading to increased
deterrence of corporate misconduct).
45. Parker, supra note 1, at 345-46; Rosen, Inside Counsel Movement, supra note 8, at 503.
46. Sec generally, Rosen, Inside Counsel Movement, supra note 8; see also BEN W.
HEINEMAN, JR., THE GENERAL COUNSEL AS LAWYER-STATESMAN, 5 (2010), http://www.law.
harvard.edu/programs/plp/pdf/GeneralCounselasLawyer-Statesman.pdf (stating that in the
past twenty five years, general counsels have been able to take on a "powerful, affirmative
leadership role"); sec also Deborah A. DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 958-61 (2005) (describing how in the late nineteenth century to the
1930s, general counsels were high-ranking officials. Then they eventually lost their power in the
1940s to marketing and finance types, but ultimately in the 1970s the role began its rise to power
once again due to a high demand for in-house legal teams and a wider scope of responsibility);
Pam Jenoff, Going Native: Incentive, Identity, and the Inherent Ethical Problem of In-House
Counsel, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 725, 729 (2012); Rostain, supra note 19, at 470-73 (tracing the rise
of in-house counsel to senior managers at corporations); see also infra note 222.
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viewed as another cost center or worse-as "outsiders," (as in-house
counsel once were). As a result, compliance officers may lose their
ability to be, what, Christine Parker calls, "persuasively relevant." 47
Thus, instead of empowering, such a move may disempower the
compliance officer and the compliance department.
Second, the emphasis on compliance departments' independence
runs counter to collaboration and interdependency that is crucial to
innovation and creative problem solving. To be sure, collaboration
can occur between separate and independent departments. However,
departmentalizing compliance prizes independence and autonomy
and might entrench competition between departments, impeding
open communication and the type of interaction that is essential to
effective compliance.
Third, a separate and divided reporting structure does not
guarantee that the right type of professional with the right skills will
lead compliance, and also may result in less substantive expertise
devoted to compliance.
Fourth, a uniform mandate may not necessarily increase
transparency or uncover more noncompliance. Counter-intuitively,
departmentalization may increase the amount of information shielded
by the attorney-client privilege once a corporation is involved in an
investigation.
Fifth, it is not clear that departmentalization will necessarily
increase actual compliance or nurture a culture of ethics within
corporations. Because a different department will be the keeper of
the corporate conscience, there is a risk that the legal department will
become disconnected from the ethical responsibilities of the
corporation. If the general counsel no longer monitors ethics or
morals,48 it is possible that a demarcation in reporting lines could
create a world in which it is acceptable for lawyers in the legal
department to play the role of legal technician-telling clients what
they "can" do within the letter of the law and not what they "should"
do based on the spirit of the law, ethics, and considerations beyond
law. Of course, this is consistent with some aspects of corporate
practice and with the agency model of the lawyer-client relationship.49
47. Parker, supra note 1, at 349 (explaining that compliance people need to be
"persuasively relevant" and "sufficiently committed to ethical and legal responsibilities with the
stature and clout for people to listen when they suggest different ways of doing things or put
their foot down. The most effective change agent is an insider").
48. Id.
49. David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney-
Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 2067, 2075 (2010) [hereinafter Wilkins, Rivals ("By
characterizing the relationship between corporate lawyers and their clients as fundamentally
one of agency, the standard account systematically marginalizes, and indeed delegitimizes, a
lawyer's allegiance to this broader public role."); David B. Wilkins, Do Clients Have Ethical
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However, it is inconsistent with much of the U.S. legal profession's
history, which, since 1820, has portrayed the lawyer's role as a dual
one: client advocate and public servant."
Lastly, if the goal is to create a culture of ethics that is ingrained
in everyday life of the organization," then the current government's
focus on the formal exemplifications of a commitment to compliance
may be misplaced. The new organizational structure may create a
false sense of complacency about compliance. When dealing with
routine check-the-box processes, noncompliance with these
requirements is easy to uncover, and compliance is easy to motivate.
However, when the choice involves, nonroutine, complex,
multifaceted choices about ethics, morals, or personal preferences,
malfeasance is much harder to control. Rather, to find critical gaps to
ensure the right values are integrated, focus and attention might be
better placed on the internal aspects of an organization-how people
actually interact and work together, how they form networks, and
how they are motivated and make ethical decisions.
Thus, the main hypothesis of this Article is that preemptively
departmentalizing compliance may (instead of being best practice)
elevate form over function.52 Such a move may in some
circumstances support embedded compliance programs but it
(perhaps along with other trappings of a compliance and ethics
program like a code of conduct, an annual audit, and an ethics
training program) may not necessarily be an effective compliance
mechanism itself.53  Instead, departmentalization may generate
Obligations to Lawyers? Some Lessons from the Diversity Wars, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS,
855, 855-56 (1998) [hereinafter Wilkins, Diversity Wars] ("The agency model of the lawyer's
role assumes that all ethical obligations flow from the lawyer-agent to the client-principal.").
50. Wilkins, Rivals, supra note 49, at 2073-75 (tracing this dual obligation from 1820 to
today and arguing that the agency model and market conditions make it difficult for lawyers to
play a gatekeeping role).
51. Parker, supra note 1, at 346.
52. According to leading researchers on organizational theory, sometimes organizational
structure is a result of "the myths of their institutional environments instead of the demands of
their work activity." John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalied Organizations: Formal
Structure as Myth and Ceremony, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1983). Others contend that
homogenization in organizational structure, culture, and output across industries is not
necessarily "driven by competition or by the need for efficiency." Id. at 63-64. Instead, such
bureaucratization stems from "individual efforts to deal rationally with uncertainty and
constraint." Id. at 64. For an argument that formal compliance structures are merely window
dressing without real substantive change, see generally Krawiec, supra note 2; see also infra note
58.
53. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 1 at 346; cf Krawiec, supra note 2, at 487-544; see also
Parker & Gilad, supra note 17, at 3 ("[Rjesearch shows that implementation of compliance
management systems often does not and cannot achieve idealistic policy purposes because
corporate managements implement them partially and halfheartedly for the purposes of
external impression management of 'window dressing' without making the necessary
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consequences that subvert the potential benefits of
departmentalization and create a sense of false complacency that
distracts from substantive cultural change.
Ultimately, the analysis indicates that departmentalization is the
wrong answer because the right question is not about independence
but instead about connectivity, informal norms, ethics, and
motivation.5 4 If that is true, the more im ortant question (one that is
left for another day and another article) may be: Regardless of the
organizational structure, who should oversee compliance? What
expertise and skills should these compliance officers have, should
they have legal or management or other training? And what roles
should compliance officers fill to best execute the compliance
function?
This Article is divided into four parts. Part II, provides a context
for the rest of the Article, beginning with a brief overview of the
regulatory and case history behind compliance oversight and
continuing with a short description of the compliance function at
large publicly traded corporations based on trade surveys, secondary
literature, and interview data from the Compliance Study.
Part III, discusses examples of corporations that have been
identified by governmental agencies as failing to adhere to
compliance guidelines. This Article examines the agreements that
these corporations have entered into with the OIG of the SEC and
DHHS and identify commonalities across them5 6 (one of which is that
compliance should be managed by a separate department that is
independent from general counsel oversight). The Article then
compares this position to recommendations by the United States
Sentencing Commission, the SEC, and the ABA, which support
general counsels having compliance gatekeeping responsibilities.
substantive changes to achieve external policy goals."). See also infra note 58 (reviewing
arguments by other scholars that trappings of compliance programs, such as ethics codes and
high ranking officers, can support but are not sufficient to create substantive sustainable
compliant culture in a corporation).
54. In other words, the right question is not whether compliance should be independent
from the legal department.
55. Sce supra note 24
56. It is true that defining what is compliance is difficult to do and that the compliance
function varies by corporation and industry. Jose A. Tabuena, The ChiefdCompliance Officer vs
the Gencral Counsel: Friend or Foc, Soc'Y OF CORP. COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS, 3 (2006),
available at www.corporatecompliance.org/Portals/1 /PDF/Resources/past-handouts/CEl/2008
/601-3.pdf ("Most people can articulate what a lawyer or auditor does for a living, but the
average employee may have difficulty defining 'compliance."'). However, this Article is written
with the assumption that the reader has a basic understanding of the compliance function at
large corporations. It focuses solely on the question of departmentalization. For a more
thorough description of the compliance function at large publicly traded corporations, see
Conceptualizing the Role, supra note 24 (on file with Author) and sources cited supra in note
25.
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Part IV outlines the common arguments for and against
departmentalization. Because it is sometimes unclear in the literature
for what purpose and for which constituency's benefit
departmentalization is being proposed, the article proceeds by
categorizing the arguments into three types: 1) autonomy and
independence; 2) transparency and efficiency; and, 3) role
arguments.57 Utilizing this typology, the article examines the strength
of the arguments for departmentalization from a public interest
perspective. In so doing, this Article attempts to uncover potential
drawbacks of departmentalization that have yet to be emphasized in
the literature and that may-instead of preserving-subvert the
potential benefits of departmentalization.
Ultimately, this analysis leads to the hypothesis that
preemptively adopting this particular organizational structure for
compliance may not actually be in the best interest of the public.
Instead of leading to an increase in transparency, enhanced
compliance, or a stronger commitment to compliant and ethical
behavior, departmentalization could make things worse.
Utilizing research on internal norms, networks, ethical decision-
making, and motivation, Part V, suggests that the government is
focused on the wrong proxies for creating a culture of compliance and
that such proxies may lead to a false sense that the problems in
corporate compliance are fixed." Therefore, this Article proposes
that instead of emphasizing departmentalization (or other compliance
trappings), the government should reward corporations that take an
57. Unsurprisingly, these three types of arguments are commonly utilized in debates about
the ideology of the legal profession and the rules governing lawyers' conduct. Cf David B.
Wilkins, Everyday Practice is the Troubling Case: Confronting Context in Legal Ethics, in
EVERYDAY PRACTlCES AND TROUBLE CASEs 68, 70-75 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998)
(analyzing assumptions that underlie the image and ideology of the legal profession and how
these assumptions affect lawyers' conduct); see generally Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as
Professionals. Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTs. 1 (1975) (analyzing professional roles, including
the role of lawyer, on moral rights and obligations).
58. For example, if a law school's response to changing needs of law students was to hire
four more administrative assistants for each professor, it might not make legal education worse
but it might make the law school think it solved the problem when it did not. This is not to say
that formal compliance structures do not affect compliance at all or help construct
organizational culture but, instead, that they are not sufficient on their own. See Paine, supra
note 5, at 112 ("A glossy code of conduct, a high-ranking ethics officer, a training program, an
annual ethics audit-these trappings of an ethics program do not necessarily add up to a
responsible, law abiding organization whose espoused values match its action. A formal ethics
program can serve as a catalyst and a support system but organizational integrity depends on
the integration of the company's values into the driving systems."); see also Parker & Gilad,
supra note 17, at 5. However, as others have noted, it is extremely difficult to determine if
compliance structures are adopted as symbolic calculated responses to reputation and liability
risk or to help develop a sustainable commitment to public goals and values. Id. at 28. See
supra note 52.
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inward look at how work is actually being accomplished within the
company and that attempt to affect change based on the networks
and organizational culture that exists beneath the surface of the
organization chart, the mission statement, and code of conduct. Such
focus could enable an organization to effectively implement
compliance structures, policies, and norms that become integrated
throughout the organization and create a culture of compliance.
II. OVERVIEW: THE REGULATORY HISTORY OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE COMPLIANCE
FUNCTION AT LARGE PUBLICLY TRADED
CORPORATIONS
In the past fifteen years in the wake of the corporate scandals
that spanned industries (pharmaceutical, insurance, financial services,
health care, consumer products), the compliance function at large,
publicly traded corporations has received a great deal of attention-
both from the press and from Congress.5 9 As will be demonstrated in
this Part (and the following Part), changes in corporate liability rules,
federal sentencing guidelines, and the way the government has
negotiated presettlement and consent decree agreements have
supported the move by corporations to reorganize and buttress their
compliance initiatives. This Part begins by providing a brief
overview of the regulatory history behind corporate governance as it
relates to compliance 6' and a general description of the compliance
function at large publicly traded corporations.62
A. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE REGULATORY HISTORY BEHIND
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE
Today, the compliance function at large, publicly traded
corporations includes creating and managing policies and procedures
around ethics and compliance to uncover and prevent misconduct.
Corporate compliance programs developed over time in response to
liability rule changes, sentencing guidelines, settlement incentives,
59. See, e.g., Orland, supra note 1, at 50 (explaining that "Ijxtraordinary and
unprecedented episodes of corporate wrongdoing burst upon the national scene in 2002" and
tracing the history of criminal corporate law and introduction of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of
2002); see also supra note 11 and infra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
60. See in/ra Part Ill. See also supra note 1 and accompanying text.
61. This overview is intended to serve as a brief synopsis and is written with the assumption
that the reader has a familiarity with corporate law and the compliance regulatory environment.
62. For a more detailed description, see DeStefano, Conceptualizing the Role, supra note
24 (on file with Author).
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and prosecution agreements.63 In the 1960s, the government
prosecuted a grou2 of heavy electric equipment companies forantitrust violations. General Electric argued that the strength of its
compliance program should be considered as part of its criminal
defense.65 In response, other companies bulwarked their compliance
departments as a defensive measure.66 Similarly, in the 1970s, the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 incented corporations to
develop more robust compliance programs in response to its
requirement that corporations develop internal controls to prevent
corruption. 67  In the 1980s, after a whistle-blower uncovered
fraudulent acts by government defense contractors, the Department
of Defense required contractors to adopt a written code of conduct
and develop training programs and compliance procedures.' Then,in the early 1990s, the United States Sentencing Commission passed
the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines ("OSGs"). 69  The OSGs
mitigated corporate criminal penalties if organizations could show
they had an "effective" compliance program-which could be
demonstrated by the adoption of internal compliance structures.70
63. Ford & Hess, supra note 2, at 689. Parker, supra note 1, at 339; see also Ashoke S.
Talukdar, The Voice of Reason: The Corporate Compliance Officer and the Regulated
Corporate Environment, 6 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L. J. 3, § 1 (2005), available at http://blj.ucdavis.
edu/archives/vol-6-no-17The-Voice-of-Reason.html. The development of the compliance
function is obviously related to the criminal law applied to corporate entities. For a history of
American corporate criminal law and Congress's response to corporate liability (in the form of
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the Organization Guidelines in 1991, and the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002), see Orland, supra note 1, at 46-52.
64. See, e.g., Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and
Criminal Liability A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1578
(1990); see also Ford & Hess, supra note 2, at 689.
65. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 64. Ford & Hess, supra note 2, at 689.
66. See, e.g., Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 64. See also Ford & Hess, supra note 2, at
689.
67. Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 64, at 1580-82; Marika Maris & Erika Singer, Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 575, 578, 582-90 (2006).
68. DEF. INDUS. INITIATIVE ON Bus. ETHICS AND CONDUCT, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 27-28
(2000). See also Origins and Development of the Defense Industry Initiative, DEF. INDUS.
INITATIVE, available at http://www.dii.org/annual/2000/origins.html. See Ford & Hess, supra
note 2, at 689 (citing Nancy B. Kurland, The Defense Industry Initiative: Ethics, Self-
Regulation, and Accountability, 12 J. BUS. ETHICS 137 (1993)); Krawiec, supra note 2, at n.29
(explaining that DII was later copied by other troubled industries, including the health care
industry, which has been plagued repeatedly by Medicare fraud and drug company kickback
scandals). This agreement was termed the Def. Indus. Initiative. For a description of the
organization and its goals, see DEF. INDUST. INITIATIVE, http://www.dii.org (last visited May 15,
2013).
69. Paula Desio, An Overview of the Organizational Guidelines, U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/OrganizationalGuidelines/ORGOVER
VIEW.pdf.
70. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §8C2.5 (2001) (detailing other culpability
factors that could mitigate sentencing); see also infra note 79; Diana E. Murphy, The Federal
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The promulgation of the sentencing guidelines was partnered with the
now well-known In re Caremark case,' interpreted by the Delaware
Supreme Court in Stone v. Ritter.72 The guidelines require the board
to adopt compliance programs to receive mitigation in sentencing."
Then, in the early 2000s, in response to corporate scandals like Enron,
Arthur Anderson, and Tyco, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, which in addition to applying penalties to individuals, also
addressed the corporate governance function for entities.74 This
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A Decade of Promoting Compliance and Ethics, 87
IOWA L. Rev. 697, 702-03 (2002). The United States Sentencing Commission promulgated the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Sec 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (Supp. III 2003). In 1987, it instituted
mandatory guidelines for individuals. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUEL § 2-7 (1987).
These guidelines were then applied to organizations in 1991. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUEL § 8 (1991); see Orland, supra note 1, at n.21 (explaining the difference in purpose
between the individual and the organizational guidelines); see also JED S. RAKOFF ET AL.,
CORPORATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMPLIANCE AND MITIGATION § 1.04121 (2005). The
Supreme Court eventually ruled that these mandatory guidelines were unconstitutional. United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 220 (2005). However, they still have weight in their advisory
role. See Orland, supra note 1, at 49-50 (explaining that it is not clear whether Booker extends
to the Organizational Guidelines, but even if it does, the guidelines have still been "a major
factor in the development of the law and practice of corporate compliance" and "will continue
to have an impact on corporate governance"); see also Ford & Hess, supra note 2, at 691
(explaining that in 1999 the "DOJ officially stated that it would take into account the adequacy
of a corporation's compliance program when deciding whether to prosecute a corporation, as
opposed to just prosecuting any individuals involved in the criminal activity," citing Diana E.
Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A Decade of Promoting
Compliance and Ethics, 87 lOWA L. REV. 697, 702-03 (2002)). In a Memorandum, Eric Holder,
Deputy Attorney General, stated that, when considering whether to charge a corporation, a
prosecutor should consider whether the corporation had an adequate and effective compliance
program. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice
to All Component Heads and U.s. Attorney (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder Memol,
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/charging-corps.PDF.
Later, in 2003, this memo was revised by Larry D. Thompson, and then by Paul J. McNulty in
2006. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice to
Heads of Dep't Components, U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003); Memorandum from Paul J.
McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice to Heads of Dep't Components, U.S.
Attorneys (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/day/speeches/2006/mcnulty-
memo.pdf (stating that "that prosecutors may not consider whether a corporation has
sanctioned or retained culpable employees in evaluating whether to assign cooperation credit to
the corporation."). See also Ford & Hess, supra note 2, at n.91 (detailing this history); see also
Orland, supra note 1, at 52-56.
71. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (holding
that business judgment rule protection only applies to directors who "exercise a good faith
judgment that the corporation's information and reporting system is in concept and design
adequate to assure the board that appropriate information will come to its attention in a timely
manner as a matter of ordinary operations").
72. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
73. Ford & Hess., supra note 2, at 690 (making same point and citing Hillary A. Sale,
Monitoring Caremark's Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 730)-33 (2007)).
74. Orland, supra note 1, at 51-52 (explaining that "[tjhese new Sarbancs-Oxlcy criminal
prohibitions and penalties appear to apply only to individuals, not corporate entities. Sarbanes-
Oxlcy fails to address rules for determining entity liability and does not establish new or
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represented a change in approach. Instead of focusing on penalizing
the individual actors and fining the corporation, the Department of
Justice ("DOJ") and SEC began directing corporate governance by
requiring certain changes to corporate structure, policies, programs,
and personnel relating to compliance.75
As will be discussed further in Part II, the recent revisions to the
sentencing guidelines include recommendations around the
compliance and ethics programs, and reporting structure.76
Additionally, in deferred prosecution and nonprosecution
agreements, various governmental departments have required
structural changes to the compliance function.7 7 These developments
have justified the implementation of a robust compliance function at78 I diin tlarge, publicly traded, corporations. In addition to
departmentalization and designating a high-ranking compliance
officer, many corporations have adopted a written code of ethics,
training pro grams, monitoring and audit systems, and reporting
procedures. Unsurprisingly, with the increased emphasis on
increased entity criminal sanctions" and arguing that "Itihe most important post-Sarbanes-
Oxley development has been the proliferation of corporate deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements, coupled with indictments of senior management, including Chief
Executive Officers, Chief Financial Officers, and General Counsels, of the corporations that
were the beneficiaries of the corporate agreements").
75. Ford & Hess, supra note 25, at 3 (noting that these agreements also often require
corporations to hire an independent monitor to manage and oversee the revised compliance
programs).
76. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (Proposed Amendments 2010), availab/c at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legal/Amendments/Reder-Friendly/20100121 -RFPAmendments.pdf.
77. See infra Part III; see also Krawiec, supra note 2, at 500-01 (explaining that the
Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Health and Human Services "borrow
heavily from the OSG's internal compliance-based liability regime in recent policies and
guidelines"). For an overview of the use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements, see generally Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV.
853, 856 (2007); Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred?
Judicial Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863
(2005); Jennifer O'Hare, The Use of the Corporate Monitor in SECEnforcement Actions, I
BROOK J. CORP. FIN COM. L. 89 (2006); Orland, supra note 1.
78. Christine Parker, Lawyer Deregulation via Business Deregulation: Compliance
Professionalism and Legal Professionalism, 6 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 175, 175-80 (1999)
(reporting that a 1996 Price Waterhouse survey of 240 large U.S. companies found that as of
1996 "86% had a formal compliance; 9% were developing a policy and only 5% had no policy,"
citing Angela Ward, Compliance Survey: Companies Say Better Safe Than Sorry, 62 CORP.
LEGAL TIMES, 1-3 (1997)); Paine, supra note 5, at 106.
79. Paine, supra note 2, at 112; Krawiec, supra note 2, at 496. These features are also what
the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines define as minimum requirements for an "effective"
compliance program that would justify a reduced sentence. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL §8A1.2(k)(1) (2001); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §8A1.2(k)(2) (2001).
They are also consistent with the recommendations by professional associations and consultants.
Krawiec, supra note 2, at 496; Marie McKendall et al., Ethical Compliance Programs and
Corporate Illegality: Testing the Assumptions of the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, 37 J.
Bus. ETHICS 367,372 (2002). Ford & Hess, supra note 2, at 692-94.
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compliance and its structure and organization at corporations, a new
profession of compliance professionals has developed.8 0 The number
of lawyers (and non-lawyers) that consider themselves part of this
new compliance profession has grown in addition to the number of
professional associations and conferences dedicated to compliance."
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE CORPORATE COMPLIANCE FUNCTION
Compliance means different things to different people and it
varies by industry. For the purposes of this Article, however, it is
useful to establish a common understanding of what is meant by
"compliance" by reviewing the secondary literature and interview
data from the Compliance Study that helps to define the compliance
function and the professional skills of compliance officers.82
1. Compliance Function
Putting aside the debate about whether the compliance function
is or should be considered a legal function, 8 3it is difficult to tell where
legal ends and compliance begins.84 Secondary research and the
Compliance Study interviews support the conclusion that both legal
and compliance personnel rely on legal expertise to do their job85 and
they have a shared goal: to increase compliance with the law.
Compliance personnel have to understand formal rules and laws and
assess risk. Compliance officer and general counsel interviewees
often said things like compliance involves "law, regulations, and
general standards of ethical behavior" or compliance is to me a very
80. Parker, supra note 1, at 339.
81. Parker, supra note 1, at 339 (making similar point about lawyer and nonlawyer
compliance professionals and associations); Ford & Hess, supra note 2, at 692-94. Ford & Hess,
supra note 25, at 2.
82. However, the compliance function is admittedly more complex than presented here.
83. As discussed infra, there is an assumption that compliance is not a truly legal function
and indeed nonlawyers do serve as compliance officers. See in/ra pp. 121-122 and
accompanying text. However, analyzing the pros and cons of compliance professionals having
formal training as lawyers is outside the scope of this Article and is a subject of a future article.
Conceptualizing the Role, supra note 24.
84. Langevoort, supra note 19, at 500 ("There is no clear conceptual distinction between
legal advice and compliance oversight.").
85. See Jose A. Tabuena & Jennifer L Smith, The Chief Compliance Officer Versus the
General Counsel: Friends or Foes? Part II, 8, J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE, 13,13-15 (2006);
see infra notes 298-302 and accompanying text.
86. Joseph E. Murphy, et al., General Counsel as CCEO? Not an obvious Answer,
COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS MAG., June 2009, at 3, 6.
87. Interviewee Stage 2 GC6 at 2. The Interviewees are anonymous and thus they are coded
throughout. "Stage 1" interviews were done in 2006-2007 and all interviews done in 2010-2012
are designated "Stage 2." The title of the interviewee is designated as follows: GC is general
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legal function.""" Compliance cases are, akin to
handling litigation-employee rights and privacy and making
sure that the investigation is appropriate and what kind of
record are we creating-and what we are telling regulators.
It is all very intertwined with lots of rules and regulations ...
that part of what I do is oftentimes in the legal department.89
The compliance function is also entwined with ethics (and
values)-which is also an area that those in the legal department
sometimes oversee. 90 Further, whether it is due to the revisions to the
Federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines in 2004 and again in
2010,91 or research that shows that more effective compliance
counsel, FGC is former general counsel, CO is compliance officer, CCO is chief compliance
officer, CEO is chief executive officer, CXO is chief ethics officer, CA is a compliance activist,
and CGO is a governmental official overseeing compliance. The number in the code designates
the interview identification number assigned to that particular anonymous interviewee. In a few
instances in Stage 2, follow-up interviews were conducted. In those instances, the interview is
coded with a number and the letter "a" for the first interview and "b" for the follow-up
interview. The page number refers to the transcript or notes if the interview was not recorded.
See infra Appendix for more detail.
88. CCO2 at 10 ("[U]ltimately what you are talking about is compliance with the law and
/or compliance with regulations. Then that means somebody has to know what the laws and
regulation are and they have to understand what the issues are and decide whether or not
compliance is actually occurring and that's very typically, especially in our industry, a very
complicated thing and a very difficult analysis.").
89. Interviewee Stage 2 CCO 15 at 10-11. If it is true that training as a lawyer helps
compliance officers do their job and compliance officers themselves believe they are
interpreting and advising on the law, the question might be whether nonlawyer compliance
officers are violating unauthorized practice of law statutes. For a detailed analysis of this issue
see Michele DeStefano, Compliance and Litigation Funding: Testing the Borders of Lawyers'
Monopoly and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). Svc
supra notes 127 and 289. It is also interesting to note that this conflicts with the presumption
that compliance is not a "legal" function and a law degree is not required to be a compliance
officer. See supra note 83. See also infra notes 121-122 and accompanying text.
90. Giovanni P. Prezioso, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Speech by SEC
Staff: Remarks before the Spring Meeting of the Association of General Counsel (Apr. 28,
2005), availablc at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042805gpp.htm (explaining that general
counsels should be viewed as the gatekeepers of ethics); see Tod Reichert et al., The Roles of
Gcncral Counseland Chief Compliance Offices, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Jan. 18,2011),
http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/the-roles-of-general-counsel-and-chief-compliance
-officers/ (explaining that it is common for general counsels to oversee compliance and ethics
programs "based on the premise that compliance is essentially a legal matter and, after all, the
legal department is often the source of the recommendation to create such a position based on
its awareness of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, applicable laws and guidance from
regulators who encourage companies to adopt rigorous compliance programs"). In Stage 2 of
the Compliance Study, twenty-seven percent of general counsels and sixty-six percent of
compliance officers reported overseeing the ethics function.
91. The amendments refer to the "compliance and ethics program" of a corporation and
define an effective program as one that is structured to "prevent and detect criminal conduct"
and to "promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment
to compliance with the law." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 18 U.S.C. § 8B2.1(a)
(2004).
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programs include elements of both compliance-based and integrity-
based approaches, 92 the compliance function at large, publicly traded
corporations is generally focused on a combination of: 1) compliance
detection, prevention, and response policies; and, 2) ethics
initiatives. 93 The following will attempt to briefly unpack these two
focuses.
92. Ford & Hess, supra note 2, at 692 (making point that empirical studies show that
integrity-based programs are more effective than compliance-based programs and that "the
importance of managing an organization's culture to ensure the effectiveness of a compliance
program gained significant traction when the Sentencing Commission formalized it as part of
the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines in 2004"); Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for
Organizational Integrity, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 106, 110-11 (making the
distinction and explaining that some utilize an "integrity-based" approach that focuses on values
and empowerment while others take a "compliance based" approach that is based on
punishment for transgressions); David Hess, A Business Ethics Perspective on Sarbanes-OxIcy
and the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1781, 1791-94 (2007)
(discussing empirical studies demonstrating that integrity-based programs are more effective);
see supra note 8; see also infra note 427 and accompanying text. There is also research
supporting the fact that a self-regulatory approach is more effective than a command-and-
control approach. Hasnas, supra note 5, at 516-17 (contending that "empirical research
demonstrates that the self-regulatory, procedural justice approach is significantly more effective
at reducing the level of illegal and unethical behavior among an organization's employees than
the command-and-control approach" but that "a business can actually increase its risk of federal
indictment by adopting the most effective methods of reducing employee criminal activity"); see
also Marius Aalders & Ton Wilthagen, Moving Beyond Command and Control: Reflexivity in
the Regulation of Occupational Safety and Health and the Environment, 19 LAW & POL'Y 415
(1997) (reviewing problems with the "command-and-control" approach and recommending
changes to the self-regulation approach); Jay A. Sigler & Joseph E. Murphy, A NovelApproach
to Business-Government Relationships, in CORPORATE LAWBREAKING AND INTERACTIVE
COMPLIANCE: RESOLVING THE REGULATION-DEREGULATION DICHOTOMY 1, 4-15 (Jay A.
Sigler & Joseph E. Murphy eds., 1991) (proposing a system in which corporations take a self-
regulatory approach so as to reduce the need for government scrutiny). Some commentators
claim that the government's focus on ethics and on other aspects of compliance like corporate
monitorships "demonstrate a broader regulatory trend that recognizes the limits of regulating
corporations through external prescriptions and inspections, and therefore directs its energies
towards encouraging corporations to engage in meaningful self-regulation through the adoption
of effective internal compliance programs." Ford & Hess, supra note 25, at 2; secsupra note 5.
93. Parker, supra note 1, at 340. Sc Ford & Hess, supra note 2, at 689-95 (showing that
corporate compliance programs now focus on compliance, ethics, and corporate culture); Caron
Carlson, How the Modern CCO Came to Be, COMPLAINCE WEEK, (Feb. 20, 2008),
http://www.complianceweek.com/pages/login.aspx?rcturl=/how-the-modem-cco-came-to-be/article
/185468/&pagetypeid=28&articleid=185468&accesslcvel=2&expireddays=0&accessAndPrice=0;
Parker, supra note 78, at 183 ("IClompliance professionals understand their work as being
about the articulation, accommodation and harmonization of legal norms to organizational
culture, corporate governance systems and business goals."); Paine, supra note 5, at 106
(explaining that the goal of compliance department is to "prevent, detect, and punish legal
violations. But organizational ethics means more than avoiding illegal practice; and requires a
"comprehensive approach"). Arguably, Corporate Social Responsibility ("CSR") efforts are
related to the compliance function given the compliance function's emphasis on ethics and its
objective to help corporations go beyond what is required by the letter and spirit of the law.
Andrew Stone, Where Next for Corporate Social Responsibility', PERFORMANCE PREVIEW, 5
(Sept. 2011) (citing Colin Crouch as explaining that CSR is all about "recognizing and acting on
negative externalities" and going beyond the requirements of regulations because they could
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Although there is disagreement about who should oversee
compliance, where compliance should be housed, and what role the
general counsel should play vis-a-vis the chief compliance officer,94
secondary literature and Compliance Study interviews appear to
agree that those in charge of compliance should: 1) build policies and
procedures; 2) monitor adherence to those policies and procedures; 3)
train and educate employees on specific regulatory obligations; and,4) test employees on adherence and remediate when necessary. 95 A
typical description of the position by a compliance professional
follows:
We are basically advising the business on the requirements
for an effective compliance program. So we provide advice
on what the management, support and resources should be
affect the business") http://performance.ey.com/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2011/11/EY-
performancePreview2_pg03-05-CSR.pdf; sc also Stephen Brammer, et al., Corporate Social
Responsibility and Institutional Theory: New Perspectives on Private Goverance, Socio-
Economic Review, 10 SoCio-ECON. REV. 1, 3-28 (applying institutional theory to
understanding CSR as a mode of governance). For a series of articles discussing what defines a
"responsible" corporation and how corporate responsibility initiatives fit within the other goals
of a corporation, see generally COLIN CROUCH & CAMILLA MACLEAN, THE RESPONSIBLE
CORPORATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY, (2012). Interestingly, although there appears to be an
increased emphasis on compliance in the past few years, since the financial crisis, it appears
there has been a decreased emphasis on CSR. Stone, supra note 93, at 4 (explaining that
"[tlhose companies that confidently expect to be around for a long time are more likely to act
responsibly"); see also Maria Gjolberg, The Origin of Corporate Social Responsibility: Global
Forces or National Legacies, 7 SOCIO-ECON. REV., 605, 605 (hypothesizing that "a company's
CSR efforts are a function of the dictates of the global market place" and that "Itihose that are
trapped in sectors where the crisis has hit hardest do not take a long-term view and will simply
seek to reduce costs as much as possible"). This may change, however, as the government
and/or company stakeholders begin to demand corporations to report on CSR initiatives. Sarah
E. White, The Rising Global Interest in Sustainability and Corporate Social Responsibility
Reporting, SUSTAINABILITY. (Oct. 5, 2011), http://sustainability.thomsonreuters.com/
2012/10/05/the-rising-global-interest-in-sustainability-and-corporate-social-responsibility-reporting.
Indeed, a recent report by KPMG, found that the percentage of companies reporting their CSR
activities within and outside the U.S. is increasing. Corporate Responsibility Reporting Has
Become De Facto Law for Business, KPMG, http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndnsighLs/
ArticlesPublications/corporate-responsibility/ Pages/de-facto-business-law.aspx (last visited Aug.
29, 2013). It claimed that corporations are under pressure to do so, in part because "[CSR]
drives innovation and promotes learning, which help companies grow their business and
increase their organization's value." Id.; see also, CR Reporting enhances Financial Value,
KPMG (Nov. 7, 2011), http://kpmg.com/global/en/issuesandinsights/articlepublication/corporate-
responsibility/pages/financial-value.aspx ("[M]any companies are now recognizing it as a business
imperative. Today, companies are increasingly demonstrating that CR reporting provides
financial value and drives innovation, reflecting the old adage of "what gets measured gets
managed.").
94. See supra Part II; see also Rostain, supra note 19, at 480-84.
95. See Parker, supra note 1, at 346 (explaining that "Illaw must be translated into training
that makes sense to line managers and staff and where possible into operational procedures and
principles that feed into what already happens"); see generally Caron, supra note 93; see also
Richards, New Compliance Rule, supra note 17; 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1 (2012); Heineman, supra
note 19, at 49.
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for compliance. We talk about what written standards and
controls should be in place. We review the written standards
and controls. We train around them, we communicate
around those standards. We don't necessarily do the audit
our selves, but we try to make sure that there's consistent
auditing and evaluating of those standards that we have out
there. And then, of course, we're responsible for the
enforcement against it. So when we get the complaints that
somebody is not following our code of conduct, we're the one
that goes out and investigates them. We also are the ones
that make sure that there is enforcement and consistent
enforcement against it.96
Thus, a compliance officer needs to be a strong process manager
to ensure consistency, coherence, and integration across the many
departments.9 7
Additionally, compliance officers attempt to "raise awareness
among employees that [the corporation has] policy and procedures
that cover a lot of what they do" and that the employees are
responsible "to be aware of them and claiming they are not aware
when violating them is no defense-not a defense we accept. Our job
is to raise awareness that there is an ethical obligation to be aware of
what is allowed, which in the end is in the best interest of clients and
that includes reporting if they see something that should not be done
or could harm the company or clients."9"
To that end, as the former chief compliance and ethics officer
from Tyco stated, "[o]nce upon a time, the CCO narrowly focused on
enforcement of regulatory requirements, codes of conduct, and
corporate policies and procedures .... The biggest change in the job
has been the integration of ethics into the compliance role."99
Therefore, the compliance function oversees not just what is legally
required but also that which the corporation has set as the ethical
obligations and social responsibilities of the corporation.'" As the
chief compliance officer of a large public bank explained:
96. Interviewee Stage 2 CCO6b at 3.
97. Heineman, supra note 19, at 49.
98. Interviewee Stage 2 CXO15 at 8.
99. Caron Carlson, The Evolution of the Modern CCO, Pari Center for New Learning
(Feb. 20, 2008), http://www.paricenter.com/library/papers/boehme0l.php (quoting Dave
Danjczek, who was previously the CCO at Titan ("You can't have either 'ethics' or 'compliance'
in your title; you need to have both."); see also Carlson, supra note 93 ("While the chief
compliance officer role remains in flux, just about everyone in the business agrees on one point:
It will probably never again be a simple matter of overseeing adherence to the rules."); Parker,
supra note 1, at 340.
100. Parker, supra note 1, at 340; Parker, supra note 78, at 186. Chief compliance officers
also advise on business and reputation risks. See in/ra note 338 and accompanying text. See
supra note 37.
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We have one code of conduct that covers everyone. We
strive for that. A lot of our culture is driven by the laws and
regulations that govern our business . . . my job is to get
people to A) at minimum do that-be aware of the laws and
regulations and policies we have in place that ensure you are
doing what is legally right and fulfilling and complying with
all these rules and regulations and laws-at minimum [to get]
everyone to comply with existing laws regulations and
policies. B) The stretch and nice to have-the goal is to have
them trained well enough and sensitized that something is
permissible but not the right thing to do . . . the concept of
doing the right thing-the right thing sometimes is more than
the legal thing ... you may be able to do it under the law but
its not right for that client or business or for that employee.101
Compliance personnel are charged with communicating and
providing training on the legal and ethical regulations to employees
around the world.'"O They are also charged with risk assessment.10 3
As another chief compliance officer elucidated, this international
training is important not just to ensure compliance but "so that we
can explain to the government, 'We did all we could: we went there,we were there in person, they got online training, we did risk
assessments. This still happened, but this is how we try to show we
have an effective Compliance Program.'""0 Thus, in addition to audit
and internal controls, training, ethics, and HR communications,
compliance professionals need to understand politics.'0 o
The substantive areas covered by a compliance department vary
a great deal by industry.'1 Although some companies segment
101. Interviewce Stage 2 CXO15 at 5.
102. Sce Parker, supra note 1, at 346; interviewee Stage 2 CCO6b at 10 ("We're so far-flung
across the world and we're doing business in so many different places that it's very hard to know
what you don't know and how things are going. And so we've got a major initiative this year to
try not just to reach people online but also to reach many more people in person.").
103. See, e.g., Ryan McConnell, Teaching Compliancc: How Law Schools Can Fight
Unemploymcnt, CORP. COUN. (May 29, 2013), http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/Pub Article
CC.jsp?id=1202601883560&slreturn=20130602160053#.UaX9fV3kejM.mailto (listing leadership,
communication, risk assessment, training, standards and controls, monitoring and response as
the "building blocks for a compliance program"). PWC, DEEPER INSIGHT FOR GREATER
STRATEGIC VALUE 5 (2013) [hereinafter PWC SURVEY] (finding that "CCOs are involved in
risk areas," but that "increasingly ownership of those risks resides with the business").
104. Interviewee Stage 2 CCO5 at 11-12.
105. See generally Tabuena & Smith, supra note 85, at 13-15; sec also SCCE Study March
2013, supra note 10, at 4 (quoting compliance professional survey respondent: "Legal's role is to
protect and defend. Compliance's role is to uncover weaknesses, develop controls and mitigate
risks. Uncovering weaknesses often poses a conflict within legal's role to protect").
106. For example, some sectors (like health care and financial services) are more heavily
regulated and, therefore, have extra concerns. In the health care sector, a compliance officer
must be concerned with HIPAA privacy law, Medicare, and the Food and Drug Administration
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certain aspects of compliance (like health and safety) often,
regardless of industry, compliance programs are fairly broad and
cover many compliance areas at once." As the chief compliance
officer of a large pharmaceutical company explained:
[y]ou can have regulatory compliance; you can have what's
known as GxP, good manufacturing process, good lab
practice, good clinical practice or process, compliance. It's
just insanely it's a very, very broad area. I kind of-we call
ourselves the Corporate Compliance Division here, because I
like to put on the notion of, it's kind of the corporate
compliance approach. It's the things that company has to do
to make sure that it's in compliance with, not just kind of the
laws and the regulations, but to a certain extent as well kind
of society's expectation of us. 08
Common substantive areas at issue for large publicly traded
corporations are fraud and corruption (e.g., gifts, antibribery,
anticorruption, antifraud, FCPA compliance, and data protection),
employment/labor law, antitrust/trade regulation, environment/health
and safety, and securities regulations.'"
rules on top of the other regulatory and liability rules that apply to all publicly traded
corporations. Carson, supra note 93; sec interviews with health care professionals (on file with
author). One Chief Compliance Officer in the health care field stated, "we focus on the federal
healthcare program requirements; Medicare, Medicaid, TRICARE; those types of programs
that are funded with taxpayer dollars. And we focus on eight distinct subject matter areas
within that. And those are quality; making sure that our patients get good quality. Making sure
that their services are medically necessary. Making sure that the providers that take care of
them are qualified to do so. Making sure that their patient rights are protected, that the facility
has the appropriate licensure and certification. Making sure that we document charge and bill
for services correctly. Making sure that if we receive an overpayment in error, it's not our fault,
but it's still not our money, that we give it back. Those are the focus areas that we work on and
that's how we define a compliance issue." Interviewee Stage 2 CCO8 at 5.
107. Ford & Hess, supra note 2, at 694 ("Although compliance programs started out focused
on specific issues, best practices now suggest that a single program should encompass the near
entirety of a firm's efforts at compliance with laws and regulations.").
108. Interviewee Stage 2 CCO2 at 3-4.
109. Svc Parker, supra note 78, at 180-81 (citing survey research in support and explaining
that in the Price Waterhouse Survey, the top eight areas of compliance programs included
lobbying and government relations, international business practices, and intellectual property);
sec also Rostain, supra note 19, at 467 ("The emphasis on compliance pervades every sphere of
corporate regulation, including environmental protection, occupational health, health care
regulation, anti-terrorism legislation, and employment discrimination."). Interviews from the
Compliance Study also support that these areas are among the top for some compliance officers.
Evidently, the largest threat involving securities violations come from securities class actions as
opposed to enforcement brought by the SEC or other regulatory agencies. TOM BAKER &
SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: How LIABILITY INSURANCE
UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 3 (2011).
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2. Compliance Organization
In terms of structure and organization at large publicly traded
corporations, historically there has been a trend for compliance
directors to report directly to the general counsel-or even to be the
general counsel."o In a 2013 survey of 630 compliance professionals,
110. See Ford & Hess, supra note 2, at 693 (making this point and that sometimes the CCO
also reports to the CEO); Rostain, supra note 19, at 481 (finding that most of the ten CCOs in
her study reported to the general counsel); sec supra note 10; cf Langevoort, supra note 19, at
500 (describing the newer trend in large organizations to have CECO's with separate staff who
report to the CEO). It is hard to generalize about the structure of compliance functions at
corporations in general. Sec supra note 56 and accompanying text. This Article is focused on
large publicly traded corporations. However, some of the surveys cited herein include data
from both public and private companies and companies of different sizes. That said, in large
publicly traded corporations, the trend appears to have been that the compliance officer reports
to the general counsel. See also Roy Snell, Greg Luce Talks About The Relationship Between
Legal Counsel And Compliance Seasoned Veteran Discusses How Compliance Has Evolved
And What It Takes To Be Effective, 9 J. OF HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 31 (2007)
("Notwithstanding the preference of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) to separate the
compliance and general counsel functions, many organizations include a report to the general
counsel by the compliance officer."). Boheme, infra note 173. Also, according to the
Compliance Study, some compliance officers report to the director of enterprise risk
management, which generally focuses on identifying and assessing risks and opportunities
related to the corporation's business objectives. Sce, c.g, Interviewec Stage 2 CCO7 at 3.
("[W]c've got our compliances Isic] under risk. It's separate from our legal counsel .... So
what we've got is within risk, like I said, it's close to 300 people. We've got a pretty big active
compliance unit of almost 70 people and the reason why our compliance unit is so big is we
touch so many different compliance risk disciplines for [the company].") In some ways, this
makes sense. Compliance is a form of risk management that focuses, in part, on assessing the
risks of non-compliance, monitoring those risks, and creating prevention tactics. See Rachel
Wolcott, Time to Merge Risk Management and Compliancc?, REUTERS (Apr. 5, 2012),
http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2012/04/05/time-to-merge-risk-management-
and-compliancel (stating that compliance and risk management are very intertwined because
essentially non-compliance is a risk, and considers whether companies should actually merge
departments); sce also David Martin & Mark R. Manley, Linking Compliance, Risk
Management, 34 PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS 18 (2006), available at http://search.proquest.
com/docview/222973834?accountid=14585 ("The effort to bring risk management and
compliance together is far from finished. But our experience to date has taught us that
convergence creates a more thoughtful, quality-oriented approach. When risk management and
compliance are embedded in all business functions, processes are streamlined and business
practices are clarified. This reduces compliance and regulatory risk and improves results for the
clients; ultimately, it improves results for the firm."). Interestingly, in the last ten to fifteen
years, law firms have begun to designate a firm lawyer as general counsel of the firm that
oversees ethics and compliance. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Compliance Specialists, supra note
25 (analyzing the role in-house compliance specialists play in thirty-two law firms); see also
Jaime Levy, More Firms See Benefit of Using In-House General Counscl, CHI LAW, at 28 (July
2004) (reporting that law firms are increasingly utilizing in-house counsel); Jonathan D. Glater,
In a Complex World, Even Lawyers Need Lawycis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2004, at C1; Leigh
Jones, More Firms Hire General Counsel: GCs Help Reduce the Risk of Liability, NAT'L L.J.
(June 6, 2005); see also Elizabeth Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy in Law Firm Rcgulation
Debates, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 119, 129-32 (2005) (explaining that there is an emergence of
compliance specialists and that they increasingly are the general counsel).
98 Vol. 10:1
CULTURE OF COMPLIANCE
conducted by Corpedia, thirty-nice percent claimed they reported to
the CEO while thirty-six percent claimed they reported to the general
counsel.111 In a 2010 survey by the Association of Corporate Counsel
("ACC"), more than half of respondents claimed the corporation had
a chief compliance officer 112 and almost half of the 936 respondents
claimed that compliance was ultimately overseen by the general
counsel or that the general counsel was the chief compliance
officer." 3 Similarly, in a survey conducted in 2005 by Corpedia and
111. ACC & CORPEDIA, 2013 ACC/CORPEDIA BENCHMARKING SURVEY ON COMPLIANCE
PROGRAMS AND RISK ASSESSMENTS (2013); Sue Reisinger, ACC Study Sees Compliance
Moving Out of the GC's Office, CORPORATE COUNSEL (Oct. 15, 2013), available at
http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1 202623517245&rss=rss cc mostvi
ewed&slreturn=20130928004535.
112. According to other scholars and industry surveys, "[1]arger companies are more likely to
have a chief compliance officer." See Ford & Hess, supra note 2, at 693 (citing Melissa Klein
Aguilar, CW Survey Shows Lack of CCO Standards, COMPLIANCE WEEK, (April 29, 2008),
http://www.complianceweek.com/pages/login.aspx?returl=/cw-survey-shows-lack-of-cco-standards/
article/185601/&pagetypeid=28&aiticleid=185601&accesslevel=2&expireddays-0&accessAndPric
e=0 and explaining that the "survey was an online survey of the readership of Compliance Week
conducted during March 2008 with 284 usable respondents. The respondents were from
corporations of a wide range of sizes and industries."); PWC SURVEY, supra note 103 at 5.
("[Liarger companies are more likely to have a CCO (88 for companies with more than $25
billion in annual revenues versus seventy three percent for companies in the $1-$5 billion
range).").
113. See ACC & CORPEDIA, supra note 10, at 9; See also ETHISPHERE, THE BUSINESS
CASE FOR CREATING A STANDALONE CHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICER POSITION (2010),
http://ml.ethisphere.com/resources/whitepaper-separation-of-gc-and-cco.pdf (assessing whether
general counsel should also act as the compliance officer); see also Matt Kelly, et al., BROADER
PERSPECTIVES; HIGHER PERFORMANCE. STATE OF COMPLIANCE: 2012 STUDY (2012),
available at http://www.pwc.com/enUS/us/risk-management/assets/2012-compliance-study.pdf
(finding that on a daily basis, thirty-five percent of compliance officers report to the general
counsel and thirty-two percent report to the CEO. On a formal basis, thirty-two percent of
compliance officers report to the audit committee, thirty-three percent to the general counsel,
and twenty percent to the CEO). A 2007 survey by the Ethics and Compliance Officers
Association found that thirty-two percent report to the CEO, fourty-one percent to the general
counsel, and seven percent to the board. Id at 18. A third study, conducted by the Conference
Board in 2005 with 225 respondents, found similar results, with thirty-one percent of executives
in charge of compliance reporting to the CEO, and 37 percent to the general counsel. RONALD
E. BERENBEIM, CONFERENCE BOARD RESEARCH REPORT UNIVERSAL CONDUCT: AN ETHICS
AND COMPLIANCE BENCHMARKING SURVEY 10-11 (2006). A 2010 survey with 481 responses
conducted by the Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics and the Health Care Compliance
Association reported that at 48 percent of respondent corporations, the chief compliance officer
reported directly to the board (although this does not mean that the CCO did not also report to
the GC). HCCA & SCCE, The Relationship Between the Board of Directors and the
Compliance and Ethics Ofliccr(Apr. 2010), available at, http://www.compliancestrategists.net
/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/scce.survey.reporting.ine20O0.pdf. Additionally, it reported
that there were more GC screening and editing of CCO reports before they are put to the board
in publicly traded corporations than in privately held corporations or non-profits. Id.
(reporting that thirty-five percent of publicly traded respondents answered that the reports by
the CCO are "always or substantively edited by the general counsel or other executive" where
as this was true for only fifteen percent of privately held company respondents and twelve of the
non-profits). And a recent study by Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics and the Health
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the ACC of 412 corporate counsels, sixty-one percent of corporations
had a chief compliance officer and forty-one percent of those
corporate compliance officers also had the role of general counsel.114
The number of corporations in which the general counsel is also
the chief compliance officer and in which the chief compliance officer
reports to the general counsel appears to be decreasing."' For
example, in a 2013 survey eliciting responses from over 800 private
and public companies and non-profits in a database of the Health
Care Compliance Association and Society of Corporate Compliance
and Ethics, fifteen reported that the general counsel was also the
chief compliance officer.'16  PwC's third annual survey of 800
corporate compliance officers,117 reported that there has been a
"steady reduction in formal reporting of compliance into the legal
function over the past three years" (from thirty-seven percent of
respondents in 2011 to thirty-three percent in 2012 to twenty-eight
percent in 2013)."' Further, in 2013, twenty-eight percent of chief
compliance officer survey respondents reported to the General
counsel and twenty-eight percent of the chief compliance officers
reported directly the CEO (as opposed to only twenty percent in
2012)."1 This is consistent with reports from the Compliance Study.
Eighty percent of thirty-six interviewees in Stage 1 but sixty-three
Care Compliance Association reported that fifteen percent of 800 respondents reported that the
same individual oversees legal and compliance. SCCEStudy March2013, supra note 10, at 6.
114. Association of Corporate Counsel & Corpedia, Inc., COMPLIANCE PROGRAM AND
RISK ASSESSMENT BENCHMARKING SURVEY 2005, 8 (2005), available at http://media0l
.commpartners.comlacc_wehcast docs/ComplianceSurvey.pdf; see also Corpedia and the
Conference Board 2006, COMPLIANCE PROGRAM AND RISK ASSESSMENT BENCHMARKING
SURVEY (2006) (surveying 225 inside corporate counsel and finding that 60 of all organizations
have a Chief Compliance Officer and 38 of the chief compliance officers also reported being the
general counsel); Judy Marras, Surveys Offer Guidance for Futurc Compliance Officers, SCCE,
at 14 (Aug. 2006), http://www.corporatecompliance.org/Portals/l/PDFIResources/Compliance
Ethics Professional/0806/CnEO806 13_Marrs.pdf (discussing this survey and others); see also,
Ethisphere, supra note 113, at 9 (claiming the chief compliance officer position is often housed
in the legal department).
115. See Boehme, infra note 174; SCCE Study March 2013, supra note 10, at 6 (reporting
results of approximately 800 responses from private, public, and non-profit companies from
January and February 2013. Finding that 88.5 percent of respondents rejected the idea that the
general counsel should also be the chief compliance officer, 80 percent opposed the idea of
having compliance report to the general counsel, and only 15 percent of respondents reported
having the general counsel also act as the compliance officer). Among 63 of the top 100
companies in the Fortune 100, 94 percent have a chief compliance officer and among those, 20
percent of the chief compliance officers also had the title of general counsel. See Appendix.
116. SCCE Study March 2013, supra note 10, at 6.
117. Survey participants were from the U.S. and the U.K. and spanned nineteen industries in
companies whose revenue ranged from $200 million to $100 billion. PWC SURVEY, supra note
111 at2.
118. PWC SURVEY, supra note 112, at 10.
119. Id. at 4, 9.
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percent of the interviewees in stage two said that the general counsel
had ultimate responsibility for the compliance function of their
organizations. The remaining reported to the CEO, Chief Operating
Officer, Chief Risk Officer, or no one person was in charge of
compliance. 120
3. Professional Skills of Compliance Officers
As others have pointed out, although the person that is in charge
of compliance (and their training) varies by organization,12' having a
law degree is not a prerequisite to becoming a compliance
professional at a corporation or becoming certified as a compliance
and ethics rofessional through a university or organization certificate
program.12 Although the compliance function may involve legal
expertise, it also requires skills in corporate management. 123 As
120. It was not always the case that there was one person with the title CCO. Although
some corporations did not have any one person in charge of compliance, some had various
personnel that had been assigned compliance tasks despite not having any one person
designated as CCO.
121. Ford & Hess, supra note 2, at 693 ("[Tihere is no uniformity when it comes to whom
the organization selects to be in charge of the compliance program."); see Langevoort, supra
note 19, at 499-500 ("Business organizations have a great deal of freedom to choose their
internal structures, and there is substantial variation as to the location of responsibilities
relating to law, ethics, compliance, and risk management."); see also supra notes 6 and 56.
122. See, e.g., The Fordham Corporate Compliance Institute, FORDHAM UNIVERSITY,
http://Iaw.fordham.edu/international-non-jd-programs/28994.htm (last visited June 27, 2013);
See also Julie DiMauro, Compliance Officers Face Multiple Options for Credentials, REUTERS
(May 17, 2012), http://blogs.rcuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2012/(05/17/compliance-
officers-face-multiple-options-for-credentials/ (detailing courses and descriptions). In addition
to Fordham, other law schools are offering classes (if not certification programs) in the
compliance arena. See, e.g., Ryan McConnell, Teaching Compliance: How Law Schools Can
Fight Unemployment, CORP. COUN. (May 29, 2013), http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/
PubArticleCC.jspid=1202601883560&slreturn=20130602160053#.UaX9fV3kejM.mailto
(discussing teaching corporate compliance at University of Houston Law Center).
123. Parker, supra note 1, at 339; id. at 346 ("Compliance is a management issue, not a legal
one."). See, e.g., Rostain, supra note 19, at 480 (hypothesizing that corporate counsel may
oversee compliance and "[tjo fulfill this function, lawyers will need to develop a hybrid
expertise that marries legal knowledge and managerial techniques."). It may be that lawyers
approach the role of compliance officer differently than nonlawyers. Parker, supra note 78, at
182-83 ("New compliance professionals claim an expertise that is superior to that of traditional
lawyers, particularly external lawyers, in implementing and facilitating compliance programs as
a matter of corporate management rather than legalism."). See Ford & Hess, supra note 2, at
693 (citing studies in support of this claim); Sec also Parker, supra note 78, at 183 (contending
that corporate lawyers treat regulatory law "as a symbolic regime of technical rules independent
of business to be managed and manipulated to suit client, or imposed as procedural constraints
upon corporate management" whereas compliance professionals have a "less autonomous,
more business responsive formulation of its own role" that is more pragmatic); id. at 183-88
(comparing how compliance professionals describe their work to how lawyers do so). However,
analyzing the pros and cons of compliance professionals having formal training as lawyers is
outside the scope of this Article and a subject of a future article. See supra note 24.
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mentioned above-and as Parker's research demonstrates-"a new
'compliance profession' is beginning to emerge as evidenced by the
growth of professional associations, conferences and training courses
catering specifically to their needs."l 24  Historically, regulation and
compliance oversight has been mana ed by in-house lawyers and to a
large degree that is still true today.12 The secondary literature (along
with reports from the Compliance Study) indicate that compliance
departments at large corporations-regardless of where the
departments are housed-are made up of a lot of people that
originally were trained in and practiced law.126 However, this new
field may not necessarily be owned by lawyers in the future and may
still be up for grabs. As others have commentated, "[t]he growth of
124. Parker, supra note 1, at 339; Parker, supra note 78, at 181-83 (reporting the number of
new professional associations and backgrounds of compliance professionals).
125. Rosen, supra note 8, at 487 (demonstrating that compliance oversight is central to the
in-house lawyer's job); Parker, supra note 1, at 339 ("Inhouse corporate lawyers are claiming
the area of preventative law as their own."); Donna Boehme, JPMorgan Chase Takes a Giant
Sicp on CCO Independence, CORP. COUN. (Jan 29, 2013), http://www.law.com/corporate
counsel/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202586012597&JPMorganChaseTakes a_Giant Step on CC
OIndependence. Donna Boehme, Big Banks Giving the CCO a Seat at the Table, CORP.
COUN. (Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=12025
90410783&BigBanksGivingjtheCCOaSeatat theTablc&slreturn=20130607091253
(explaining that pharmaceutical companies, which historically subordinated the CCO to the GC,
began leveling the playing field by including in their health care settlement agreements, that
CCOs would not be subordinate to the GC and that this is now also beginning to occur at large
banks); Richard S. Gruner, General Counsels in an Era of Compliance Programs and Corporate
Sef-Policing, 46 EMORY L.J. 1113, 1114-15 (1997); Parker, supra note 78, at 183 ("[T]he legal
profession will try to control regulatory space with a conception of legalism in which the
autonomy of law is highly significant"). There might be a role for outside attorneys to help
corporate clients manage compliance and, therefore, this burgeoning field may represent an
opportunity for law firms to add value. But see Parker, supra note 1, at 349 (emphasizing the
importance of being an insider in order to have persuasive power in compliance). However,
analyzing the role outside attorneys might play in helping corporate clients manage compliance
is outside the scope of this Article. See supra note 24.
On another note, one argument in support of departmentalization that I have not found
in the literature but was introduced to me by William H. Widen is that departmentalizing
compliance from the legal function mirrors the organizational structure found in law firms-
which typically have a litigation department and a corporate department. If the general
counsel's office in corporations tends to have more of a litigation focus, it could be that that
compliance expertise is structurally lacking in the legal departments of corporations. If the
corporate departments of large law firms are where more of the compliance expertise is housed,
this would support an argument for a corporation to set up a separate compliance department.
The compliance department within a corporation would be the analog to the corporate
department in a large law firm. Further, this could explain why regulators are gravitating to
creating separate compliance departments -perhaps even unconsciously. It feels familiar.
However, as Widen pointed out in our discussion, just because it is familiar does not mean that
it is the correct path to take. There are differences between the law firm and the corporation.
For example, whether the work involves litigation or a business deal, a law firm's work is,
essentially, transactional. The law firm is not attempting to foster a compliance culture.
126. Parker, supra note 1, at 339. See Ford & Hess, supra note 2; cf Parker, supra note 78, at
181. Wilkins, Rivals, supra note 49, at 2131-32 (citing Tanina Rostain for this proposition).
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compliance professionalism presents the potential for breaking down
part of the legal professional field and opening a new 'regulatory
field."'" 2 7
III. THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO CORPORATE
WRONGDOING: DEPARTMENTALIZING COMPLIANCE
FROM THE LEGAL DEPARTMENT
From Madoff to AGI to Goldman Sachs and more recently Wal-
Mart and JP Morgan, the past fifteen years have witnessed a slew of
corporate misconduct spanning industries that have devastated the
public's faith in corporate compliance with the law.128 Further, there
has been an influx of regulations across industries that increase
liability and penalties and provide incentives to corporations to
voluntarily adopt compliance and ethics programs focused on
monitoring and prevention.129
As discussed, in recent history, in large, publicly traded
corporations, the compliance function has been a part of the legal
department or at least overseen by the general counsel.13 0 Although
the SEC and other governmental agencies do not require that
corporations separate the compliance and legal functions, it seems as
though their unofficial stance is that they should. Recently, the OIG
of the SEC and DHHS have forced corporations that have
misbehaved to do just that, to develop a distinct compliance
department and designate a chief compliance officer that does not
report to the general counsel but instead to the CEO with direct
127. Parker, supra note 78, at 182-83; id. at 186 ("[Clompliance professionalism poses a
challenge to legal professionalism by making compliance advice and application the province of
a variety of people within the company with different skills and with responsibilities at all
levels."). For further discussion of areas where lawyers compete with nonlawyers and potential
violations of practice of law statutes, sec DeStefano, supra note 89.
128. MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO Do
WHAT'S RIGHT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 3 (2011). Se supra note 11; Barstow, supra note
8 (describing the corporate scandal of WalMart de Mexico, where the company allegedly spent
millions of dollars on bribes to obtain permits across Mexico in order to dominate the market);
Donna Boehme, JPMorgan Chasc Learns It's Not Too Big to Comply, CORP. COUN. (Sept. 20,
2013), http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202619981159 (describing
JP Morgan's recent announcement to spend $4 billion on compliance efforts including hiring
5,000 extra employees and replacing the chief compliance officer and separating the function
from the legal department).
129. See Parker, supra note 1, at 339 (making similar point and listing the various regulatory
regimes that provide incentives for corporations to voluntarily adopt compliance structures);
see, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). See supra notes 1, 17, and 37.
130. See supra Part II and note 110. Note, this Article does not analyze why compliance is
overseen by someone in the legal department at so many corporations.
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access to the board.'31 Other corporations (those that have not been
investigated) have followed suit, spending millions of dollars
developing compliance structures including codes of conduct, training
programs, monitoring and detection procedures and policies, 132 and
building separate compliance departments.133
This Part is divided in two sections. Section A begins by
exploring a few examples of companies that have been investigated
by the government and, as part of their consent decrees, deferred
prosecution agreements, or non-prosecution agreements, have agreed
to separate out the compliance function from the legal function
and/or designate an executive as a chief compliance officer with some
type of direct reporting to the board. Section B compares the
position taken by the government in these agreements to
recommendations and requirements found in other regulations, and
guidelines created by the Federal Sentencing Commission, the
government, and the ABA. The discussion is fairly descriptive and
seeks to show a common stance taken by governmental entities in
negotiating agreements around compliance oversight and that this
recent stance differs from that found in other guidelines and
regulations, which support general counsel oversight of compliance
departments and/or require that general counsels play a gatekeeping
role.
131. They have also issued guidelines recommending this. For example, the OIG of the
DHHS recommends that hospitals separate the compliance and legal departments and establish
a direct reporting relationship between compliance and the board of directors. Publication of
the OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 63 Fed. Reg. 35, 8987, 8989 (Feb. 23,
1998), available at http://www.oig.hhs.gov/authorities/docs/cpghosp.pdf. For background, sec
United States ex rel. Lam v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 287 Fed. Appx. 396 (5th Cir. 2008).
132. Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, supra note 128, at 3; id. at 102 (explaining that the
compliance "initiatives don't come cheap. A recent survey of 217 large firms indicated that for
every billion dollars in revenue earned, the average company spends one million dollars on
compliance initiatives."). Harry Hurt 1II, Drop That Ledger! This is the Compliance Officer,
N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2005, availablc at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/15/business/yourmoney/
15comply.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 ("A recent survey of 217 big companies by Financial
Executives International, a professional association, estimated the annual costs of complying
just with the internal controls section of Sarbanes-Oxley at almost $1 million per $1 billion in
revenue."); id. (reporting that executives at Sun Microsystems estimate compliance costs exceed
$6 million a year "if the figure included the time employees spent on compliance training,
auditors' and accountants' fees, and costs incurred by the corporate controller's office."). Also,
because corporate noncompliance can ruin a company's reputation and be very costly,
corporations may be over inclusive when it comes to training initiatives and deciding whom to
train. Id. See infra note 240.
133. See supra notes 17 and 37.
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A. GOVERNMENT AGREEMENTS REQUIRING CORPORATIONS TO
DEPARTMENTALIZE COMPLIANCE
Whether it is the result of more corporations misbehaving than in
the past, the passing of more regulations (e.g., the Dodd-Frank Act),
or simply an increase in public emphasis and scrutiny over corporate
malfeasance, it appears that more and more publicly traded
corporations are getting into trouble with the government for failing
to comply with regulations.134  Indeed, since 1986, settlements and
judgments for violations (or alleged violations) of just the False
Claims Act alone totaled over $25 billion. 135
1. Example 1: Schering-Plough
In 2004, the Schering-Plough Corporation, one of the largest
pharmaceutical manufacturers in the world, agreed to plead guilty to
fraud in relation to pricing information it provided (or failed to
provide) to Medicaid for its drug Claritin.136 Evidently, believing that
Claritin was too expensive, two health maintenance organizations
("HMOs") threatened to replace Claritin with Allegra on their list of
covered drugs.137 To discourage the HMOs from doing so, Schering-
Plough allegedly paid the HMOs millions of dollars in discounts via
data fees, interest free loans, and rebates."" Reputedly, Schering-
134. Cf Hannah D'Apice, Is the SEC's Recent Run of High-Profile Prosecutions a Flash in
the Pan?, CORP. COUN. (July 21, 2011) ("In the wake of the recent financial crisis and the
passing of the Dodd-Frank Act, corporate oversight is being done through an ever-sharper
microscope. Now that the Securities and Exchange Commission has gotten expanded authority
to oversee Wall Street, internal missteps seem to be getting more and more expensive."). Also,
corporate fraud has been predicted to be on the rise. See, e.g., THE NETWORK, INC., 2013
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND COMPLIANCE HOTLINE BENCHMARKING REPORT 6 (2013),
available at http://www.tnwinc.com/reports/2013-TNW-Corporate-Governance-and-Compliance
-Hotline-Benchmarking-Report.pdf?utm source=Form+Submission+Confirmation&utm_
medium=Landing+Page&utm-content=2013+Benchmarking+Rcport&utm-campaign=Report+
Accessed+-+2013+Bcnchmarking+Report (indicating that hotline incident reports for corporate
fraud rose in 2012 to higher than it was in 2005); Sue Reisinger, Survey Sees Rise in Corporate
Fraud Hotline Reports, CORP. COUN. (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.law.com/corporatecounsell
PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202615685805.
135. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD STATISTICS - OVERVIEW (2012), available al
http://www.taf.org/DoJ-FCA-statistics-2012.pdf.
136. TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD, TOTAL FY 2(04 FALSE CLAIM Acr FRAUD
SETTLEMENTS & JUDGMENTS (20(04), available athttp://www.taf.org/total2(X)4.htm. Claritin, an
allergy medicine, was Schering-Plough's best-selling drug and significantly costlier than Allegra,
a competitor's similar product. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Schering-Plough to Pay $345
Million to Resolve Criminal and Civil Liabilities for Illegal Marketing of Claritin (July 30, 2004),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/July/04_civ_523.htm [hereinafter Schering-Plough Press
Relcase.
137. See Schering-Plough Press Release, supra note 136.
138. Id.
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Plough failed to report these price discounts to the Medicaid
program, violating a provision in the Medicaid Rebate Statute that
required the company to offer to sell the drugs to Medicaid at a price
that was equal to the best price charged commercial customers. "3
Reportedly, Schering-Plough pled guilty to one count of offering and
paying a kickback in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute.'40
Further, it paid more than $290 million in settlementl 4' and assented
to a five-year corporate integrity agreement ("CIA") with the
DHHS's OIG.142 In addition to mandating that the company establish
a reporting hotline, develop employee training, and revamp the
written codes of conduct,' the CIA required the company to
designate a chief compliance officer who would report directly to the
Chairman, CEO, and President of the company. "4 It also mandated
that the chief compliance officer "shall not be or be subordinate to
the general counsel or chief financial officer." 145 Additionally, the
CIA required the company to hire an outside monitor to oversee
implementation of the CIA. 46
2. Example 2: Ouest Diagnostics
In October 2004, the SEC147 charged Quest Diagnostics with
fraudulently projecting over $3.8 billion in revenue earnings in a
139. See Schering-Plough Prcss Release, supra note 136.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012). See Schering-Plough Press Release, supra note 135;
Allegations of Waste, Fraud, and Abuse in Pharmaceutical Pricing: Financial Impacts on
Federal Health Programs and the Federal Taxpayer. Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 110-4 (2007) (statement of James W. Moorman,
President and CEO, Taxpayers Against Fraud).
141. TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD, supra note 136.
142. See Schering-Plough Corporate Integrity Agreement, Office of the Inspector General
of the Dep't of Health and Human Services (July 29, 2004), available at http://www.taf.org/
settlements.htm. Evidently, "Iiinvestigators found evidence that Schering-Plough marketed
drugs for off-label uses."
Schering-Plough Pleaded Guilty to Conspiracy Fined $435 Million for Promoting Off-Labcl
Use, ALLIANCE FOR HUMAN PROTECTION (Aug. 30, 2006), http://www.ahrp.org/cms/content/
view/331/150/.
143. See Schering-Plough Corporate Integrity Agreement, supra note 142, at 7-11 (codes);
11-15 (training); 21 (hotline).
144. Id. at 6.
145. Id. 5-6.
146. Id at 16.
147. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission "is the federal agency that administers
the federal laws governing the U.S. securities markets." U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, 2005
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 3 (2005), available at http://www.
sec.gov/about/secpar2005.shtml. In 2005, the SEC conducted 947 investigations and 629 civil
and administrative proceedings. Id. at 7. It prevailed in more than half of its enforcement
actions and negotiated more than $3 billion in disgorgement and other penalties. Id. During
that year, it brought several fraud cases involving mutual funds and investment advisers,
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"multifaceted fraudulent scheme to meet optimistic and
unsupportable revenue and earnings projections." 48 1In settling the
case, Quest agreed to pay a $250-million civil penalty 49 and to
revamp its code of conductso and training programs.1"' Further, the
CIA required that Quest create a Chief Compliance Officer position
and that the "Compliance Officer shall not be or be subordinate to
the General Counselor Chief Financial Officer," 5 2 but instead would
"report directly to Quest's CEO . . . [and] make periodic (at least
quarterly) reports regarding compliance matters directly to the
Quality, Safety, and Compliance Committee [("QSC")] of the Quest
Diagnostics Board of Directors . . . ."15 Additionally, the CIA
mandated that Quest hire an independent compliance expert to
review and oversee its compliance program.15 4
3. Example 3: Pfizer
In August 2009, Pfizer Inc., the largest pharmaceutical
manufacturer in the world, entered into the largest healthcare fraud
settlement in history for illegally promoting several of its drugs,
including Bextra, for uses that were not specifically approved by the
Federal Drug Administration ("FDA").' Pfizer paid $2.3 billion
accounting fraud, disclosure and auditing failures and cases against self-regulatory organizations
like the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and the Nationals Stock Exchange ("NSX"). Id.
at 8-10.
148. Quest Diagnostics Inc. Corporate Integrity Agreement, Office of the Inspector General
of the Dep't of Health and Human Services 4 (2009), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance
/corporate-integrity-agreements/cia-documents.asp#q.
149. U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, supra note 146, at 7.
150. Id. at 9.
151. Id. at 11-12.
152. Quest Diagnostics Inc., Corporate Integrity Agreement, supra note 148.
153. Id
154. Id. at 6-7.
155. Pfizer Inc. Corporate Integrity Agreement, Office of the Inspector General of the
Dep't. of Health and Human Services 35 (Aug. 31, 2009), available at http://oig.
hhs.gov/fraud/cialagreements/pfizerjinc_ 08312009.pdf. In the United States, doctors are allowed
to prescribe any FDA approved drugs at their discretion, but the manufacturers cannot market
their drugs to doctors for unapproved (so-called "off-label") reasons. The Enforcement of the
Criminal Laws Against Medicare and Medicaid Fraud: Hearing Belbre the H. Judiciary
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 111th Cong. 111-113 (2010)
(statement of Mark Collins, Director of the Nebraska Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, Nebraska
Att'y Gen.'s Office; Special Assistant U.S. Att'y, District of Nebraska for health care fraud
matters; and President, National Association of Medicaid Fraud Control Units). For example,
Pfizer allegedly "encouraged doctors [with dinners, subsidized travel, inflated payments for
speaking engagements] to prescribe Bextra for off-label uses such as acute pain," when the
FDA only formally approved it for treating types of arthritis and intense menstrual pain.
Jonathan D. Rockoff and Brent Kendall, Pfizcr to Plead Guilty to Improper Marketing WALL
ST. J., Sept. 3, 2009, available athttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB1251901607029797 23.html.
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and pled guilty to a felony criminal violation of the Federal Food,Drug, & Cosmetic Act and signed a five year CIA.156 In addition to
mandating a hotline,'57 heightened training,' 8 and specific provisions
in Pfizer's code of conduct, 5 9 the CIA required that the company
designate a "Chief Compliance Officer [who] shall not be, or be
subordinate to, the General Counsel or chief financial officer."o60 The
agreement also stipulated that Pfizer hire an independent review
organization to monitor compliance with the CIA's requirements.161
4. Example 4: SEC
Ironically, in 2009, the FBI began criminal investigations into the
SEC itself for possible insider trading by two SEC attorneys.162 The
OIG of the SEC alleged that two SEC attorneys sold their stock in
companies that they knew were going to be investigated, a "direct
violation of SEC rules."1 63  According to the March 2009 inspector
general report, at the time of the alleged insider trading, the
compliance function at the SEC was disjointed and housed in two
different departments.'" Disconcertingly, the OIG report concluded
that the SEC "lack[ed] any true compliance system to monitor SEC
employees' securities transactions,"' that SEC employees did not
156. Pfizer Inc. Corporate Integrity Agreement, supra note 155, at 35-36. Just this past year
Amgen Inc. was prosecuted for its drugs for "off-label" uses at doses doses not approved by the
Food and Drug Administration -pled guilty plea for $762 million. Angela Hunt, Big Pharma
Under the Compliance Microscope, CORP. COUN. (Oct. 24,2013).
157. Id. at 22.
158. Id. at 14-15.
159. Id. at 7.
160. Id. at 4.
161. Id. at 17.
162. Laura Strickler & Armen Ketcyian, SEC Attorneys Probed For Insider Trading, CBS
NEWS, May 15, 2009, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/05/14/cbsnews
investigates/main5014672.shtml ("It's hard to imagine a more serious violation of the public trust
than for the agency responsible for protecting investors to allow its employees to profit from
non-public information about its enforcement activities," quoting Grassley's letter to Schapiro).
163. Id.
164. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, CASE No. OIC-481,EMPLOYEES' SECURITIES
TRANSACTIONS RAISE SUSPICIONS OF INSIDER TRADING AND CREATE APPEARANCES OF
IMPROPRIETY; VIOLATIONS OF FINANCIAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS; AND LACK OF SEC
EMPLOYEE SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS COMPLIANCE SYSTEM 47-49 (2009), available at http://
pogoarchives.org/m/fo/sec-oig-report-20090303.pdf. Melissa Kelin Aguilar, SEC Strengthens
Rules on Staff Securities Trading, COMPLIANCE WEEK (May 26, 2009), http://
www.complianceweek.com/sec-strengthens-rules-on-staff-securities-trading/article/1 8718/
("jR]esponsibility within the SEC for ensuring staff compliance was split between two offices.").
165. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 163, at 8. The department heads that were
officially in charge of overseeing ethics and compliance "admitted that that there [was] 'no true
compliance' system at the SEC for determining whether SEC employees have committed Rule 5
violations." Id at 48.
108 Vol. 10:1
CULTURE OF COMPLIANCE
understand reporting requirements or who was in charge of
overseeing ethics and compliance,166  and that there was "lax
enforcement of the reporting requirements."6  The report
recommended that the SEC ensure that one department be vested
with primary responsibility over compliance. And in response, the
SEC consolidated the compliance department under the Office of
Ethics Counsel and hired its first ever, chief compliance officer.168
This department, however, remained a part of the Office of General
Counsel until late 2011.169 After the SEC's general counsel was
named as one of the defendants in a Madoff bankruptcy suit, the OIG
criticized the SEC for having the ethics counsel report to the general
counsel.7 o In response, the SEC "formally proclaimed the
166. Id. at 47 (stating that "no one Ithc OIGI interviewed was clear as to which office had
responsibility" to ensure compliance or review filings related to the alleged violation).
167. U.S. SEC. & ExcH. COMM'N, supra note 163, at 51. Id. at 48. (finding that there were no
checking or monitoring systems in place, "leimployces [weire expected to comply with the
financial disclosure and clearance systems . . based on the honor system").
168. In response, the SEC stated that the IG report does not accuse nor conclude that any
SEC employee conducted insider trading and that it had "been taking additional steps to
enhance Ithe] protections against the potential for improper conduct. Those include developing
a new computer system to facilitate reporting and review of securities trading by all SEC
personnel; hiring a chief compliance officer; and providing greater clarity of our rule governing
the reporting of trades." Strickler & Keteyian, supra note 162. Aguilar, supra note 163 ("In
addition, SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro has signed an order consolidating responsibility for
oversight of employee securities transactions and financial disclosure reporting within the Ethics
Office and authorized the hiring of a new chief compliance officer."); Matt Kelly, The Big
Picture, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Apr. 9, 2010), http://www.complianceweek.com/chief-compliance
-officers-sec-style/article/I 89690/ (reporting that Kathleen "Griffin is the SEC's first-ever chief
compliance officer, and her arrival is long overdue" and arguing that the problem is that Griffin
is not independent and does not report to the Chairman). Despite these efforts, the SEC
continues to get lambasted in the press about its ethical culture and ability to ensure
compliance, especially around its handling of the Bernard Madoff fraud Ponze scheme. SEC
Big Grilled on Ethics Issues, N.Y. POST, Sept. 23, 2011, available at http://www.nypost.com
/p/news/business/sec big-grilled-on-ethics issues stld4Sl sQxyEEuHuxwBseO.
169. It was reported that "loln October 14, 2011, pursuant to Section 1 of Reorganization
Plan No. 10 of 1950, the Chairman implemented that recommendation [of the OIGI and made
the Office of the Ethics Counsel a stand-alone Office of the Commission." Reporting Line for
the Commission's Exchange Act, Release No. 34-65742, (2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/34-65742.pdf. As of August 6, 2013, the Office of Ethics
Counsel is separated from the Office of General Counsel on the SEC's website. Office of Ethics
Counsel, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/aboutloffices/ethics.shtml (last visited
Aug. 6, 2013); Ollice of the General Counsc, U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, http://www.
sec.gov/aboutloffices/ogc.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2013). However, as of December 17, 2011,
the Office of Ethics Counsel was still listed as part of the Office of the General Counsel on the
SEC's website. The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/
about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Dec. 17, 2011). As of September 5, 2013, it is not clear from
the website to whom the Office of the Ethics Counsel reports.
170. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, CASE No. OIG-560 REPORT OF INVESTIGATION:
INVESTIGATION OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST ARISING FROM FORMER GENERAL COUNSEL'S
PARTICIPATION IN MADOFF-RELATED MATTERS 7 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/foia
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independence of its Office of Ethics Counsel as a stand-alone unit
within the agency." 171 Resultantly, the head of this office no longer
reports to the General Counsel but instead to the SEC Chairman.
B. GUIDELINES AND RULES SUPPORTING GENERAL COUNSELS AS
COMPLIANCE GATEKEEPERS
As exemplified above, when corporations get in trouble for
noncompliance, government entities (such as the OIG of the SEC and
of the DHHS) emphasize the formal structure, management, policies,
and programs of compliance at organizations. And more specifically,
a common recommendation is for the allegedly malfeasant
organization to separate the compliance function from the legal
department, designate a chief compliance officer who is not also the
general counsel (and that does not report to the general counsel), and
enable direct reporting to the CEO and/or direct reporting or at least
direct access to the board of directors.'72 Unsurprisingly, this view is
similar to that taken by many compliance related organizations of
private entities and audit, compliance, and governance executives
who arguably are self-interested. 7  It is also consistent with surveys
of compliance professionals.174  However, a preference for stand-
/docs/oig-560.pdf; Bruce Carton, SEC IG Releases Rcport on Becker Conflict Issue, Refers
Results to DOJ's Public Integrity Section, COMPLIANCE WEEK, (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.
complianceweek.com/sec-ig-releases-report-on-becker-conflict-issuc-refers-rcsults-to-dojs-public-
integrity-section/article/212434/.
171. Recsc Darragh, SECEthics Office Shakeup, COMPLIANCE WEEK, (Dec. 15, 2011), http:
//www.complianceweek.com/sec-ethics-office-shakcup/articlc/216792/.
172. The OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, developed by the Department
of Health and Human Services of the Federal Register also recommends an independent
compliance function. Publication of the OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 63
Fed. Reg. 8987, 8993 (Feb. 23, 1998), available at https:/Ioig.hhs.gov/authorities/docs/cpghosp
.pdf. OIG Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 70 Fed. Reg. 4858, 4874
(Jan. 31, 2005), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/complianceguidance/012705Hosp
SupplementalGuidance.pdf.
173. Kelly, supra note 167. For example, the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), a
guidance-setting body serving members in 165 countries, stresses the importance of an
independent compliance department. Tabuena, supra note 56, at 2 (stating that the Code of
ethics for health care compliance (HCCA) stresses the importance of an independent
compliance function).
174. See, e.g., SCCE Study March 2013, supra note 10 (finding that eighty percent of 800
compliance and ethics professionals were opposed to having the general counsel serve as chief
compliance officer). Id. (finding that eighty percent overall were opposed to having the
compliance function report to the legal department but only seventy-four percent of those
working for publicly traded companies were opposed). Kelly, supra note 167. Donna Boehme,
Making the CCO an Independent Voice in the C-Suite, CORP. COUN. (Mar. 19, 2013),
http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202592518804&Making-the_.CCO
anIndependent Voice in the CSuite. MICHAEL D. GREENBERG, PERSPECTIVES OF CHIEF
ETHICS AND COMPLIANCE OFFICERS ON THE DETECTION AND PREVENTION OF CORPORATE
MISDEEDS: WHAT THE POLICY COMMUNITY SHOULD KNOW 13 (2009), available at
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alone, independent compliance departments is not necessarily
consistent with the recent federal sentencing guidelines, sections of
Sarbanes-Oxley, nor the historical position taken by the ABA, all of
which allow, recommend, or require that the general counsel be a
compliance gatekeeper.
1. Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Before 2010, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines"' defined an
"effective" compliance program as one that designated overall
responsibility for the compliance and ethics program to specific high-
level personnel.'76 In 2010, the United States Sentencing Commission
revised its guidelines regarding, among other things, compliance
issues.1" The revised guidelines provide leniency to companies who
not only allocate appropriate authority to compliance personnel, but
also give them "direct access" to the board of directors."' Further,
the guidelines clarify that the presumption that an organization's
compliance program is not effective if "high-level personnel" were
responsible for, willfully ignorant, or condoned the misconduct,179 can
http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf-proceedings /CF258. MICHAEL D. GREENBERG, DIRECTORS AS
GUARDIANS OF COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS WITHIN THE CORPORATE CITADEL: WHAT THE
POLICY COMMUNITY SHOULD KNOW 11 (2010), availablc at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf-proceedings/CF277.html (reporting statements by chief
compliance officers at a recent conferences on compliance sponsored by the RAND institute).
175. The United States Sentencing Commission ("USSC") develops the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, which used to be mandatory but are no longer mandatory given a 2005
ruling by the Supreme Court. An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, at 2, available at http://www.ussc.gov/About-theCommission/Overview
of theUSSC/USSC Overview.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2013). United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005). These guidelines only apply in cases being heard in federal courts. Id.
FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, U.S. Sentencing Guideline Amendments in a
Nutshell (2012), available at http://www.famm.org/FederalSentencing/USSentencingGuidelines
/USSentencingGuidelinesUpdates.aspx.
176. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (Proposed Amendments 2010), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Lcgal/Amendments/Reader-Friendly/20100121-RFP-Amendments.pdf; U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2009).
177. Id. at 33.
178. J. Brady Dugan & Catherine E. Creely, Sentencing Guideline Amendments: What
Impact on Regulated Enterpriscs?, 25 LEGAL BACKGROUNDER 1, 2 (2010). This essentially
means that this person has express authority to report to the board directly about any
potentially criminal matter and does so annually. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
(Proposed Amendments 2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legal/Amendments/Reader-
Friendly/20100121-RFP-Amendments.pdf; see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
B2.1(b)(2)(C). Additionally, the following comments were added to the section that describes
what is an effective compliance program: "The organization may take the additional step of
retaining an independent monitor to ensure adequate assessment and implementation of the
modifications." Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 75 Fed. Reg. 3525, 3539 (Jan.
21, 2010).
179. Dugan and Creely, supra note 178, at 2.
Winter 2014 111
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
be rebutted if, among other things, "the individual or individuals with
operational responsibility for the compliance and ethics program
(have direct reporting obligations to the governing authority or an
appropriate subgroup thereof (e.g., an audit committee of the board
of directors)."' However, there is no requirement that the
compliance director not report to the general counsel. Indeed, the
compliance officer can report to the general counsel and can even be
the general counsel as long as the alternative reporting line is also
provided."' Thus, although the sentencing guidelines emphasize the
importance of having a chief compliance officer, unlike the CIAs
discussed above, this emphasis is not on independence of the
compliance function (from the legal function) but instead on ensuring
board of director oversight.
2. The ABA
There has been much debate among lawyers and academics in
the legal profession about whether lawyers should play the role of
gatekeeperl8 and whether outside or inside lawyers are better ableand situated to playing that role.183 However, the notion that lawyers
180. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (Proposed Amendments 2010), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legal/Amendments/Reader-Friendly/20100121-RFP-Amendments.pdf; U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2009) (including as requirements to rebut the
presumption: that "the compliance and ethics program detected the offense before discovery
outside the organization or before such discovery was reasonable likely; the organization
promptly reported the offense to appropriate governmental authorities; and no individual with
operational responsibility for the compliance and ethics program participated in, condoned, or
was willfully ignorant of the offense.").
181. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 8B2.1 (2009), (stating that it is not
necessary to employ a separate staff or organization to carry out the compliance function and
using existing personnel is acceptable for small organizations); Tabuena & Smith, supra note 85,
at 14 (contending that corporations often designate the GC to take on this role and that the new
guidelines "recognize that the small and mid-size organization often do not have the resources
to create an entirely new officer-level position to manage the program . . . . by offering an
endorsement for utilizing existing officers rather than creating a new CCO position.").
182. See Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs:
Constructing the Role of Inside Counsclin Large Corporations, 34 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 457, 470
(2000) ("The ability to "trump" a business decision has been identified by researchers as a
source of contention and confusion for both lawyers and their business clients from the earliest
studies of Donnell (1970) and Rosen (1984). Cops and counsel continue to confront such
tensions."). Sung Hui Kim, supra note 18, at 76 (coining the debates over the SEC's efforts to
require lawyers to gatekeep as "gatekeeping wars"); Pam Jenoff, Going Native: Incentive,
Identity, and the Inherent Ethical Problem of In-House Counsel, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 725, 731-
32 (2012) (describing the gatekeeping functions of in-house counsel).
183. There is an ongoing debate about whether internal or external lawyers are better
situated to play a gate-keeping role. See generally Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 429 (2007); Robert A. Kagan & Robert E. Rosen, On the Social
Significance of Large Law Firm Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 399, 435 (1985). After what Robert
E. Rosen aptly calls the "inside counsel movement" (much of which is often attributed to Ben
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should be "officers of the court" and play a gatekeeping role goes
back to the 1800s, 4 and is a common theme in the literature and the
history of the legal profession."'5 Historically, the legal profession
Heineman), the role of the lawyer became bifurcated. Rosen, Inside CounselMovement, supra
note 8, at 483-84. In-house lawyers argued that they were "better able to play the gatekeeping
roles than outside lawyers because they were part of the client and therefore were better able to
assess risk and counsel against risky behavior." Wilkins, Rivals, supra note 49, at 2083-84
("General counsel were therefore the lawyers who should be entrusted with the role of being
both a "partner" to the business in achieving its objectives and the "guardian" of the company's
long-term reputation and values."); Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Caught in the Middle, CORP. COUN.,
(2007), avaialble at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/corp-gov/articles/Heinemann-CC-
Caught-in-the-Middle-April 07.pdf (arguing that general counsel must be both "partners" and
"guardians"); see Deborah A. DeMott, The Discretc Roles ol General Counsel, 74 FORDHAM
L. REv. 955, 960-61 (2005) (explaining that even those that did not believe that outside lawyers
could play the role of gatekeeper, believed that in-house lawyers could). The counter argument,
of course, is that as in-house lawyers become a part of the client they are more likely to serve in
the role as advocate for their client as opposed to engage in counseling for the public interest.
Robert E. Rosen, We're All Consultants Now: How Change in Client Organizational Strategies
Influences Change in the Organization of Corporate Legal Services, 44 ARiz. L. REv. 637, 671-
72 (2002); see generally Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 181 (empirical research that demonstrates
this problem); see Coffee, supra note 18, at 195 (warning that even if "inside counsel lare
uniquely positioned to specialize in preventive law," there are many reasons to doubt that they
can or will). Two empirical studies conclude that in-house lawyers are not well suited to play
this gatekeeping role because they defer to management decision-making. Robert E. Rosen,
Lawyers and Corporate Decision-Making (1984) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California at Berkeley) (on file with author); Nelson & Nelson, supra note 181, at 470-73
(concluding that inside counsel are "subservient to managerial prerogatives ... land] typically
leave the final call on acceptable levels of legal risk to the businessperson involved"). Other
scholars have concluded the opposite. See, e.g., Rostain, supra note 19 (finding that the lawyers
in her study claimed "responsibility for determining the appropriate level of risk to be
undertaken by their companies lay with them"); see also the Compliance Study, supra note 26
and accompanying text. With respect to outside lawyers, scholars have often argued that the
reason why outside lawyers were not able to continue to play the "lawyer statesman" role is
because they do not have a close partnership with the client-like that of in-house counsel after
the movement. Wilkins, Rivals, supra note 49, at 2076; see, e.g., Coffee, supra note 18, at 194-95
(noting that the relationship between law firms and their corporate clients is now "less intimate,
ongoing or fully informed than is the relationship between the same corporation and its outside
auditor"). See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 15 (1993). Cf Kagan & Rosen, supra note 183, at 423-35 (1985) (asserting that the
law firm "lawyer-as-influential-and-independent-counselor role is likely to be extraordinary
rather than ordinary" and that outside corporate attorneys do not "aspirlel to serve as molders
of corporate and public policy.").
184. Wilkins, Rivals, supra note 49, at 2073 ("ITIhe idea that lawyers should be 'officers of
the court' with responsibilities to the public purposes of the law, however, is as old as the
profession itself."). See generally Eugene R. Gactke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42
VAND. L. REv. 39 (1989). Reinier Kraakman has been credited as being the first to use the term
"gatekeeper" to describe the lawyer's role and analyze whether lawyers can fulfill this role. See
Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatckeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enlorcement Strategy, 2
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986).
185. Cf Ben W. Heineman, The Ideal of the Lawyer-Statesman, 22 ACCA DOCKET 59, 60-
62 (2004) (quoting Gordon); see also Z. Jill Barclift, Preventative Law: A Strategylbr Internal
Corporate Lawyers to Advise Managers of their Ethical Obhgations, 33 J. LEGAL PROF. 31, 45
(2008) ("In the wake of criticism of corporate management misconduct and the role of lawyers
Winter 2014 113
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
views gatekeeping as consistent with lawyers' professional
obligations. David B. Wilkins, in his recent article on the nature of
the relationship between law firms and corporate clients, argues that
lawyers have historically (since Cravath first opened its doors at the
end of the nineteenth century) "aspired to be wise counselors, or
'lawyer-statesmen' . . . who played a key role in shaping their clients'
goals and in mediating between these private ends and the public
purposes of the legal framework."' 86
Along the same lines, in 2003, the ABA Task Force on
Corporate Responsibility (stemming from the fall of Enron) (and in
response to the passing of Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307)
recommended that the general counsel be the primary official in
charge of the compliance function (with direct oversight by the
board).' The ABA which had consistently resisted imposing gate-
keeping and whistle-blowing duties on lawyers'" amended the Model
as enablers of corporate misconduct, internal corporate lawyers increasingly describe their
responsibilities to include counsel on moral advice."); Parker, Ethics of Advising, supra note 1,
at 343-44. Id. at 344 (explaining that "prevention-oriented legal practice is not a top-down
model of a legal adviser mediating the law to companies (independent counselor), nor a client-
dominance model in which the legal adviser creates law to suit corporate purposes (adversarial
advocate). It is a model of dialogue, of accommodation and of day to day, hour to hour
involvement in the politics, business and management of the "client" organization [sic] that
employs the compliance professional.") Granted, positions taken by professional organizations,
scholars, and lawyers are relevant, but they are not necessarily persuasive. However, the
purpose of this section is to demonstrate that there are guidelines, rules, and regulations that
support lawyers role as gatekeepers and able to report misconduct despite their role as
advocate. For further discussion of the role of corporate attorney as gatekeeper, sec infra Part
IV.B.2.
186. Wilkins, Rivals, supra note 49, at 2073-75; id. at 2075 ("By the so-called "Golden Age"
of the large law firm in the middle decades of the twentieth century, this "Whiggish ideology"
had become the accepted understanding of the corporate lawyer's role."); see Russell G. Pearce,
The Legal Profession As a Bluc State: Reflections on Public Philosophy, Jurisprudence, and
Legal Ethics, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1339, 1347-58 (2006) (contending that until the middle of
the nineteenth century, it was taken for granted that lawyers owed the public special duties and
their higher duty was the public good); Norman W. Spaulding, The Discourse ofLawin Time of
War: Politics and Professionalism During the Civil War and Reconstruction, 46 W.M. & MARY
L. REV. 2001, 2029-39 (2005); see also ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS pmbl. (1908);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr pmbl. (2011). For a review of the history behind a
relational understanding of lawyer's role and ethics and when a shift occurred, see Russell G.
Pearce & Eli Wald, Rethinking Lawyer Regulation: How a Relational Approach Would
Improve Professional Rules and Roles, MICH. ST. L. REV. 513, 513-23 (2012).
187. James H. Cheek, III, et al., REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOC., TASK FORCE ON
CORP. RESP. 2003 32; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ADOPTED BY THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2003/journal/119a.pdf
(amending rule 1.6 and 1.13); William H. Volz and Vahe Tazian, The Role of Attorneys Under
Sarbancs-Oxley: The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee as Facilitator of Corporate
Integrity, 43 AM. BuS. L. J. 438 (2006); Tabuena, supra note 56, at n.8.
188. Further, the ABA in particular has before resisted efforts to view the attorney's role as
more than an advocate zealously defending the corporate client. See Coffee, supra note 18, at
192. For example, in 1981, the ABA argued against the adoption of SEC proposed regulations
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Rules regarding confidentiality and Model Rule 1.13 (the rule
governing lawyers who represent corporations and other
organizations) to enable in-house lawyers to play a gatekeeping role.
First, under Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6, lawyers can,
when reasonably necessary, disclose information to external parties to
prevent a client from "committing a crime that is reasonably certain
to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another" or to "prevent, mitigate or rectify" financial injury "that is
reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client's
commission of a crime or fraud." 89 Second, the amendments to
Model Rule 1.13, require lawyers in certain situations to report to a
higher authority within the organization, like the board of directors,
any "violation" by a corporate manager that reasonably might be
imputed to the organization."' 90 If the higher authority refuses or
fails to appropriately and timely address conduct that the lawyer
believes is "clearly a violation of law" and is "reasonably certain to
result in substantial injury to the organization," the lawyer is allowed
to disclose information to external authorities that the lawyer
"reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury" to the
that would require reporting of corporate noncompliance by corporate counsel. See Stephanie
R.E. Patterson, Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxicy Act: Eroding the Legal Profession's System
of Sclf-Govcrnance?, 7 N.C. BANKING INST. 155, 158-59 (2003) (citing THOMAS LEE HAZEN &
DAVID L. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 392-93 (6th ed. 2003)). Moreover, the ABA's
Ethics 2000 Commission originally refused to revise the section detailing remedies available to
attorneys that learn of corporate misconduct that is injurious to the corporation despite the
SEC's prior attempts. Richard W. Painter, The Evolving Legal and Ethical Role of the
Corporate Attorney After the Sarbanes-Oxicy Act of 2002: Panel 2: The Evolution of
Corporate Governance, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 613, 617-18 (2003). It also originally refused to
amend Model Rule 1.6 to allow attorneys to disclose illegal conduct that could prevent a future
crime. The Evolving Role of the Corporate Attorncy After the Sarbanes-OxIcy Act of 2002, 52
AM. U. L. REV. 613, 617-18 (2003); see also Jeffrey I. Snyder, Regulation of Lawyer Conduct
Under Sarbancs-Oxlcy: Minimizing Law-Firm Liability by Encouraging Adoption of Qualified
Legal Compliance Committees, 24 REV. LITIG. 223, 228 (2005) (stating that the SEC probably
would not have intervened if the ABA Ethic's 2000 Commission had required attorneys to
report illegal conduct to the corporation's board of directors).
189. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.6 (2012) (this rule does not cover the situation
wherein clients use lawyers' services to further criminal or fraudulent conduct without lawyers'
knowledge).
190. Id. at R. 1.13(b) (requiring lawyers to report to a higher authority-like the board-
when the lawyer "knows" that an employee is engaged in or intends to act in a way that violates
the law and that this violation may be attributed to the organization and is likely to result in
substantial injury to the organization, and the lawyer reasonably believes it is in the best interest
of the organization to report). Model Rule 1.13 used to allow lawyers to consider a broad range
of actions if the lawyer thought someone was doing something wrong that might harm the
corporation (through liability or regulatory action). See Id. (allowing the lawyer to "refer the
matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances to
the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable
law," if the lawyer believes it is in the best interest of the organization).
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organizational client.'91 Further, the rule protects lawyers that believe
that they have been forced to withdraw or have been discharged for
reporting to higher authority within the organization. 192 Although
this rule provides lawyers with a great deal of discretion, the point is
that the recent governmental settlement mandates that presume that
lawyers do not have the requisite independence to report wrongdoing
is incongruent with the historical view taken by the legal profession
and some of the recent revisions to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct for lawyers.
3. Sarbanes-Oxley
In 2002, in recognition that lawyers (directly or indirectly)
facilitated corporate misconduct by failing to protect the corporation,
Congress enacted section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.19
191. Id. at R. 1.13(c). This rule allows more reporting than Model Rule 1.6 because it allows
disclosure only when the lawyer's services were used in furtherance of the misconduct. Further,
R. 1.6 requires that there be a financial crime or fraud whereas R. 1.13 only requires a violation
of civil law or legal obligation to the corporate client. Lastly, R. 1.6 is discretionary whereas R.
1.13 is mandatory. In some states, R. 1.6 is interpreted to be mandatory, not discretionary.
According to the FLORIDA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-1.6 (2013), which is close to the
equivalent to MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2013), lawyers are "impliedly
authorized" to disclose. R. 4-1.6(b)(1) states that a lawyer must reveal information to prevent
the client from committing a crime. Other scholars have argued, however, that this rule has
very little teeth and that it actually requires the lawyer NOT to go up the ladder unless the fraud
is likely to result in substantial injury to the corporation. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN &
ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 104, 149-50 (3d ed. 2004) (explaining that
in Rule 1.13 "the lawyer is expressly directed to act 'in the best interest of the organization"').
192. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c) (2013). As Wilkins points out, these
provisions "protect the public from corporate misconduct, impose on the lawyer gatekeeping
responsibilities, and provide in-house lawyers at least some leverage against retaliation by those
who might be tempted to ignore the lawyer's advice or punish him or her for trying to give it."
Wilkins, Rivals, supra note 49, at 2127-28 (pointing out that these reforms do not "alter a
corporate client's fundamental right to exclude lawyers from the venues where important
decisions are made or to strategically manipulate the information the lawyer receives").
193. Sarbanes-Oxicy Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (2002)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. II 2002)). Mike Allen, BUSH SIGNS
CORPORA TE REFORMS INTO LA W, PRESIDENTSA YS ERA OF 'FALSE PROFITS' IS OVER, WASH.
POST, July 31, 2002, at A4 (reporting that the Act was approved by the U.S. House of
Representative by a vote of 423 to 3 and in the U.S. Senate by a vote of 99 to 0). See Sung Hui
Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 983, 986 (2005) (explaining that the SEC was "convinced" that "inside counsel are in a
superior position to interdict corporate fraud"). Section 307 mandates that the SEC issues rules
prescribing minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing
before the commission. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006). See Peter C. Kostant, From Lapdog to
Watchdog: Sarbanes-Oxey Section 307 and a New Role for Corporate Lawyers, 52 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 535, 544-45 (2007/2008) (explaining that reporting misconduct is now mandatory and
that the standard for reporting is the credible evidence standard which is less difficult to achieve
than the prior knowledge standard. Misconduct can be in the past or unrelated to legal
representation, and the SEC actually enforces section 307, whereas Model Rule 1.13 was hardly
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Under the act, the chief legal officer of the company is one of the two
primary executives given responsibility for handling the reporting of
"evidence of material violation."19 4  Section 307 mandates that the
standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and
practicing before the commission include a rule requiring attorneys to
report evidence of material violations of securities laws or breaches of
fiduciary duty or similar violations by the issuer up the ladder within
the company and then outside the company to the audit committee or
board of directors."' The SEC passed Rule 205.3(b) in response,
which entails a reporting up scheme that starts with internal reporting
up to higher ranking officials and the board of directors and then
proceeds externally. 6 The lawyer, who learns of a possible material
ever enforced).
194. 17 C.F.R. § 205.5(i) (2006) (defining "material violation"). Other responsibilitics for
both inside and outside attorneys were specified; SEC Implementation of Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 17 C.F.R. § 205.4 (2003) (supervisory attorneys
responsibilitics); 17 C.F.R. § 205.5 (2003) (subordinate attorney responsibilities).
195. Sarbancs-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (2002) (the
rule enacted by the SEC is 17 C.F.R. § 205, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296); sec Kostant, supra note 193, at
545 (stating that the SEC adopted § 205, which "requires lawyers to report up evidence of
material illegality or breach of fiduciary duties to the board or a qualified legal compliance
committee unless the attorney believes that the CLO or CEO has provided an appropriate
response."). There is no obligation to report evidence of material violation if an attorney was
retained to investigate such evidence of a material violation and is reporting it to the CLO, and
the CLO is reporting to the board (unless the attorney and CLO reasonably believe there is no
material violation). Maria Castilla, Client Confidentiality and the External Regulation of the
Legal Profession: Reporting Requirements in the United States and United Kingdom, 10
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 321, 332-36 (2012); sec also David A. Delman & Paul A.
Bruno, Up the Ladder and Out the Door: Saying "No"to the CEO, 46 INT'L LAW. 1007, 1017-
22 (2012).
196. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e) (2004). Although they may not place a duty on attorneys to report
up or out or counsel clients to different behavior, other SEC rules exist that place obligations on
attorneys to refrain from helping their clients in noncompliance. For example, lawyers aid their
corporate clients in drafting and preparing many types of public disclosure documents, including
filings for the SEC, and documents on securities offerings.
10(b) of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and
Exchange Commission apply to attorneys. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2009). 200. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2010), 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (2009) (prohibiting publicized deceit, misrepresentations, or omissions
that materially affect the purchase or sale of securities). There is no private right of action
against secondary actors under 10(b), however, the provisions prevent attorneys from directly or
substantially participating in misrepresentations or manipulative and deceptive conduct in
connection with a sale or purchase of a security. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, Inc v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008); Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511
U.S. 164, 194 (1994); Elizabeth A. Nowicki, 10(b) or Not 10(b')?.' Yanking the Security Blanket
for Attorneys in Securities Litigation, 2004 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 637, 639 ("jCentral Bankj was
a windfall for attorneys and other non-issuer defendants such as accountants, analysts, and
underwriters who had historically been brought into Section 10(b) lawsuits as aiders and
abettors. [And its] implications were huge: the attorney conspirators who were critical to
effectuating fraudulent transactions now appeared to be almost unreachable by defrauded
investors."). Despite the decision in Stoncridge, some courts have applied 10-b5 liability to
lawyers (and other secondary actors) as primary violators of securities laws under alternative
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violation, must report the evidence to the chief legal Officer ("CLO")
(and may also report it to the CEO).197 The CLO is then required to
conduct an appropriate inquiry into the reported violation and to
advise the reporting attorney of his/her determination and the
response that will be or has been taken.'98 If these officials do not
respond appropriately, Part 205 requires reporting to the audit
committee or the board of directors.'99  This rule places more
gatekeeping responsibility on the lawyer than does the bar. Model
Rule 1.13(b) requires lawyers to go up the ladder only when the
lawyer "knows" of a violation or legal duty "reasonably likely" to
result in substantial corporate injury. The new SEC rule, however, is
triggered by "credible evidence, based upon which it would be
unreasonable for a prudent and competent attorney not to conclude
theories like the "substantial participation" standard and the "creator" standard. Sec, e.g., In rc
Enron Corp., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 583-90 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (describing three different standards
"to determine when the conduct of a secondary actor makes it a primary violator" and applying
the "creator standard" proposed by the SEC proposed standard); Elizabeth Cosenza,
Rethinking Attorney Liability under Rulc 10B-5 in Light of the Supreme Court's Decisions in
Tel/abs and Stoneridge, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 47-48 (2008) (arguing for a liability
standard under Rule 10b-5(b) that "promotes the securities laws' goals of accurate and
continuous disclosure and enforces" a gatekeeping role for secondary actors); id. at 18-26
(reviewing the different standards). Further, the SEC can bring suits against lawyers for aiding
and abetting securities fraud. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, Inc., 552 U.S. 163; Sung Hui Kim,
Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 429 n.90 (2007) (The "PSLRA clarified
that the SEC (but not private parties) may bring enforcement actions and administrative
proceedings against aiders and abettors of securities fraud, so long as the SEC could prove that
such persons 'knowingly' did so.").
197. 17 C.F.R. §205.3 (b)(1)(2006). Rule 205 allows the lawyer or the CLO to report the
evidence to the Qualified Legal Compliance Committee ("OLCC") if the company has created
one; and then the lawyer is relieved of all future duties to report up the ladder. 17 C.F.R. §205.3
(c)(1)(2006) If the lawyer had reported the violations to the CLO, the CLO can report the
evidence to the QLCC and then is relieved of all future investigative responsibilities unless
appointed to handle the investigation. 17 C.F.R. §205.3 (c)(1)(2006). For a description of
QLCCs and recommendations to corporations about adopting OLCCs see Volz & Tazian, supra
note 187; see also Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, The Qualified Legal Compliance
Committee: Using the Attorney Conduct Rules to Restructure the Board of Directors, 53 DUKE
L.J. 517,524-27 (2003).
198. 17 C.F.R. §205.3 (b)(2)(2006).
199. Contrary to the initial proposal, there is no requirement that the attorney report the
transgression to the SEC if the company fails to comply. G. Thomas Stromberg, Jr. & Anna R.
Popov, Lawyer Conduct Rules Under Sarbanes-Oxley & State Bars: Conflicts to Navigatc? 4
(Wash. Legal Found., Critical Legal Issues, Working Paper No. 132, July 2005) jhereinafter
Stromberg, et al., Lawyer Conduct Rules]; Lawrence A. West, Can Attorneys Be Award-
Seeking SEC Whistleblowers?, THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (June 17, 2013, 9:22 AM), http://blogs.law.
harvard.edulcorpgov/2013/06/17/can-attorneys-be-award-seeking-sec-whistleblowers/. However,
SEC rule 205 responds to this directive and the SEC is still considering a noisy withdrawal
provision similar to that originally proposed. Implementation of Standards of Professional
Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Res. 6292-01 (Feb. 6, 2003); Stromberg, Lawyer Conduct Rules,
at 2-5.
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that it is reasonably likely that a material violation has occurred, is
ongoing, or is about to occur."200
According to commentators, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has
attempted to "deputize a public corporation's CLO as a gatekeeper of
our national securities markets." 201 Research by other scholars, like
Tanina Rostain and David B. Wilkins, support that these Sarbanes-
Oxley changes have enabled general counsel-especially in the name
of "compliance-to stand up against corporate misconduct, instill a
culture of compliance, and play a gatekeeping role." 202
Further, in 2004 the SEC adopted a new rule under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 and Investment Advisers act of
1940,203 dubbed the "Compliance Rule"2 04  that requires each
investment company and investment adviser registered with the SEC
to adopt and implement written policies and procedures to prevent
violation of the federal securities laws, and to designate a chief
compliance officer to be responsible and to report directly to the fund
board and meet with independent directors at least once a year.205
200. 17 C.F.R. §205.2(c); see Castilla, Client Confidentiality, supra note 195, at 332-44.
201. Kim, supra note 193, at 986 (contending, however, that inside counsel have failed to
adequately fill this gatekeeping role and criticizing SEC regulations and the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct for "set[tingj [general counselsj up for failure"); see also Cosenza, supra
note 196, at 47-48 (arguing for a standard of liability under Rule 10b-5(b) that "promotes the
securities laws' goals of accurate and continuous disclosure and enforces" lawyers' gatekeeping
role). Indeed, the SEC has proposed an even more onerous standard on attorneys in the past.
In re William R. Carter & Charles J. Johnson, Jr., Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, 47 SEC
Docket 471, 511 (Feb. 28, 1981) ("When a lawyer with significant responsibilities in the
effectuation of a company's compliance with the disclosure requirements of the federal
securities laws becomes aware that his client is engaged in a substantial and continuing failure to
satisfy those disclosure requirements, his continued participation violates professional standards
unless he takes prompt steps to end the client's noncompliance.").
202. Rostain, supra note 19, at 473 and 488-89 (providing caveats about the small sample
size); Wilkins, Rivals, supra note 49, at 2130 ("Surveys of the attitudes of general counsel after
the passage of the Act appear to support this conclusion, as does the fact that many companies
increased their spending on outside counsel during this period."); cf William H. Simon, The
Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the Bar's Temptations of Evasion and
Apology, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243, 253-58 (1998), reprinted, in PROBLEMS IN
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR A CHANGING PROFESSION 262, 269-72 (Andrew L.
Kaufman & David B. Wilkins eds., 5th ed. 2009) (arguing that there are three possible levels of
duty for reporting from the maximum which requires affirmative disclosures, intermediate
which prohibits directly or indirectly misleading conduct, to minimum, which prohibits only
explicit misrepresentation and direct assistance of it).
203. Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Res.
74, 714 (Dec. 24, 2003).
204. Id.; Richards, New Compliance Rule, supra note 17.
205. SEC Final Rule: Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment
Advisers, 17 C.F.R 270 & 275 (2004); SEC Investment Advisor Code of Ethics, 17 C.F.R 270,
275, & 279 (2011) (mandating that registered advisers also adopt codes of ethics). See also H.
Res. 3763, 107th Cong. (20(02) (enacted). SEC Final Rule: Compliance Programs of Investment
Companies and Investment Advisers, 17 C.F.R 270 & 275 (2004). According to reports by
others, before congress passed this law, most of the 9000 publicly held U.S. corporations did not
Winter 2014 119
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
The SEC has stated that the chief compliance officer should have a
"position of sufficient seniority and authority within the organization
to compel others to adhere to the compliance policies and
procedures." 206  Although this rule appears consistent with the
governmental mandates described in the prior part of this Article, the
rule does not require advisers to hire an additional executive to serve
as the compliance officer, but rather to designate an individual as the
adviser's chief compliance officer.2 0 Moreover, the rule does not
prohibit the chief compliance officer from also reporting to the
general counsel of the corporation.208
In sum, recent rules, guidelines, and recommendations by both
governmental and non-governmental entities arguably justify
buttressing corporate compliance initiatives and designating one
person as a chief compliance officer that has direct access to the
board. However, they do not directly support-and are sometimes in
tension with-the recent mandates by the government to
departmentalize compliance and entirely remove the general counsel
from compliance oversight responsibilities.
IV. ANALYSIS: SHOULD CORPORATIONS PREEMPTIVELY
DEVELOP COMPLIANCE DEPARTMENTS THAT ARE
SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT FROM THE LEGAL
DEPARTMENT?
As discussed above, there is an increased emphasis on corporate
compliance initiatives and a trend to separate out the compliance
function from legal department oversight and create new compliance
have chief compliance officers. Scc Hurt III, supra note 132 ("Sarbanes-Oxlcy has made chief
compliance officers almost as important to corporate success-or at least survival-as chief
executives and chief financial officers."). The Sarbanes-Oxlcy Act also requires a qualified legal
compliance QLCC in certain situations. Cf Fisch & Gentile, supra note 197, at 583-84
(suggesting that the SEC highlighted the benefits of QLCCs without describing the numerous,
associated costs and concluding that for QLCCs to be successful, there should be incentives for
active director monitoring).
206. SEC Final Rule: Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment
Advisers, 17 C.F.R 270 and 275 (2004).
207. Richards, New Compliancc Rule, supra note 17, at 5. ("1 would not automatically
assume that it should be placed within Legal or report through the General Counsel (remember
that the Chief Compliance Officer also reports directly to the fund's board of directors).
Intertwining the corporate legal duties and the duties of the compliance officer may create
conflicts not only in the implementation of the compliance program but also in the examination
of the program. If you decide that the Chief Compliance Officer will report to Legal, counsel
will have to clearly articulate instances of client privilege and show great effort to segregate any
dual responsibilities.").
208. For a detailed description of the requirements of Rule 38a-1 under the Investments
Company Act of 1940 and Rule 206(4)-7 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, see Rule
38a-1 Legal Alert, supra note 36.
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departments that are largely comprised of non-lawyers and non-
practicing lawyers, led by a chief compliance officer who reports
directly to the CEO and/or the board. 209 The question is: Is this best
practice? Or is the recent stance by the government a formal solution
that, at the end of the day, does not create the type of change that is
needed to ensure substantive and sustained change to corporate
culture? As one general counsel interviewee pointed out:
a number of the early mover companies that created
compliance departments did so as part of resolving major
mishaps or high profile problem-so it was not necessarily a
best practice. But after a number of major companies have
done it over the years, it starts to look like a best practice.
Once in that position, it becomes hard for a major
corporation to explain why they don't need a compliance
department.2 10
The legislature, judiciary, and private regulatory bodies have all
emphasized the importance of developing effective compliance and
risk management structures. 2 1 1 And there is an increased interest in
understanding how companies develop internal controls and
compliance systems to respond to the threat of external regulatory
enforcement. However, there is much debate over who should
have jurisdiction over compliance departments within organizations 213
and there are a range of stakeholders such as the government, public,
corporation, and legal profession.214 This Part, therefore, begins by
summarizing the common arguments for and against
209. Hannah D' Apice, Is the SEC's Recent Run of H h-Profile Prosecutions a Flash in the
Pan?, CORPORATE COUNSEL, July 21, 2011. ("Most corporations are responsible, and the level
of internal compliance and compliance programs for responsible corporations is radically
different from what you saw 15 years ago.... There will continue to be resources devoted to
compliance programs-more monitoring, more scilf-investigation. . . . They want to make sure
that they avoid getting swept up in these potentially large cases that could be financially
devastating to any corporation. Everyone gets it; I think it is a rare company that doesn't.")
(quoting Richard Scheff chairman of Montgomery, McCracken, Walker, & Rhoads, and former
consultant to the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Law Enforcement); Bochme, supra
note 174 (claiming that a large percentage of CCOs are lawyers but there are also some
successful nonlawyer CCOs); see also Langevoort, supra note 19, at 6 (describing new trend to
have a CECO that is separate and independent from the CLO and that some argue that the
CECO should not be a lawyer).
210. Interviewee Stage 2 FGC2. See also supra note 52.
211. Rosen et al., Lawyers are Followers and the Poetry ofResiience (2012) (draft on file
with Author) at 18.
212. See generally Parker, OPEN CORPORATION supra note 25; See generally CHRISTINE
PARKER & LAUREN NIELSEN, EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO
REGULATION (2011); Parker & Gilad, supra note 17; Parker & Nielsen, Corporate Compliance
Systems: Could they make a differcnce?, 41 ADMINISTRATION & Soc'Y 3-37 (2009).
213. Langevoort, supra note 19, at 6.
214. See generally supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text discussing the other
stakeholders involved in this debate and potential perspectives the analysis could consider.
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departmentalization and dividing them into three types. Utilizing this
categorization, the strength of the arguments for departmentalization
are analyzed from the public's perspective,215 considering the
presumptions that departmentalization will increase access to
information about noncompliance, actual compliance, and a
corporation's commitment to compliance and ethics. This analysis
explores the effects of removing the legal department from the role of
compliance gatekeeper, and identifies potential negative
consequences that have yet to be considered seriously in the literature
and that may tip the balance against departmentalization.
A. COMMON ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST
DEPARTMENTALIZATION: A PROPOSED TYPOLOGY
Proponents of departmentalization argue that there is an
inherent conflict of interest between the general counsel's main
objective to protect the corporation and encouraging reports of
noncompliance.216 Separating compliance from legal, the proponents
contend, will increase reports of noncompliance to both the board of
directors and the government because the chief compliance officer
will be independent and autonomous.217 Second,,the government and
public will have more access to information when a corporation is
investigated because information will flow directly from the chief
compliance officer and the attorney-client privilege is less likely to
apply to communications with a chief compliance officer that is not
acting at the direction of the general counsel.218 Third, more ethical
and legal transgressions will be prevented because the compliance
officer's role is to counsel on ethical and social responsibility whereas
the general counsel's role is to provide advice related to the technical
requirements of the law.219 Further, there is something about the role
215. Id.
216. Sce, c.g., SCCE Study March 2013, supra note 10, at 4-5; see Tabucna & Smith, supra
note 85, at 14-15.
217. Boehme, supra note 174 (emphasizing the importance of autonomy from management
and using Wal-Mart's recent misconduct as an example where the general counsel is alleged to
have recommended that the CEO hire outside counsel that had approved the brides);
Langevoort, supra note 19, at 5 (explaining the argument for independence and autonomy).
218. SeegencrallyTabuena & Smith, supra note 85, at 13-15. See, e.g., SCCE Study March
2013, supra note 10, at 4-5 ("Compliance should be independent of Legal to ensure that
information flow is not interrupted or spun.") (quoting a compliance officer). See infra notes
296-298 and accompanying text.
219. As discussed, common statement by chief compliance officers is that the general counsel
merely tells whether you can do something as opposed to whether you "should" do something.
However, this is not the view taken by many general counsels, scholars, and the ABA. See
generally infra notes 335-341 and accompanying text.
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of a lawyer that interferes with the ability to create a corporate
culture of ethics and compliance.220
Opponents argue that turf wars will develop between newfound
chief compliance officers and general counsels that will impede the
reporting of noncompliance and will create inefficiencies due to
overlap in function. Second, these opponents argue, general
counsel actually do have sufficient autonomy and independence to
serve in the gatekeeping role and have already demonstrated that
they can manage conflicts of interest that exist between compliance
reporting obligations and protecting the corporation.22 2 Lastly, they
contend that general counsels should continue to play a gatekeeping
role and that they are better able to do so given their position in the
223company.All of these arguments can be categorized into three types: 1)
autonomy and independence; 2) transparency; and, 3) role. It is to
this typology that the next section turns.
B. AUTONOMY AND INDEPENDENCE
One rationale for departmentalization is that it will establish a
high-level executive with the requisite autonomy and independence
to uncover, report, and prevent noncompliance. 4 The belief is that
when legal and compliance are housed together, there is an inherent
conflict of interest between the chief compliance officer's duty to
220. Langcvoort, supra note 19, at 5, 6 ("There is a strong strand in the organizational
behavior literature (admittedly, a field dominated by nonlawyer academics) that something in
the training, socialization, and professional identity of the lawyer interferes with the ability to
generate an ethical corporate culture."); see Linda Klebe Treviflo et al., Managing Ethics and
Legal Compliance: What Works and What Hurts, 41 CAL. MGT. REV. 131, 146 (1999)
("(Lawyers'j education and background best prepare them to develop a legal compliance
approach, not a values approach."); see generally infra note 323 and accompanying text. This
part provides an overview of the common arguments for departmentalization. For a less
common argument, see supra note 125.
221. Bochme, supra note 174 (contending arguments of turf wars are the least concern);
Langevoort, supra note 19, at 5 (discussing the "strong scent of professional competition"
between lawyers and compliance officers).
222. See, e.g., Heineman, supra note 183; Langevoort, supra note 19, at 6 (explaining that the
"literature often claims that the lawycring-compliance role situates the CLO and staff as a
guardian of corporate integrity, the "conscience of the corporation" or some variant thereof, so
that the legal role takes on ethical responsibilities as well"); Heineman, supra note 46, at 7, 14-
15.
223. See, e.g., Ben W. Heineman, Jr., The General Counsel as Lawyer-Statesrnan, supra note
46, at 14. http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/plp/pdf/GeneralCounselasLawyer-States
man.pdf; see also Rostain, supra note 19, at 485 (reporting that general counsels feel that their
position as secretary to the board of directors provides a level of power and influence).
224. Also, this focus on the chain of command is in keeping with the focus of corporate law,
which according to Robert E. Rosen, "is concerned with Generals and leaves it to Generals to
command the troops." Rosen, supra note 20, at 1160.
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report and the general counsel's obligations to hold confidences
confidential and defend the corporation. 25  Given the rules and
standards regulating lawyers, a general counsel does not have the
same obligation-or independence-to report transgressions to the
board like a chief compliance officer does. Separation creates a
position for an executive (that is not serving in a legal capacity) that
can, and is required, to uncover and report compliance in a way that
will increase compliance and the opportunity for criminal
prosecution. Essentially, this is an argument centering on
independence-or lack thereof, if the chief compliance officer reports
to the general counsel. The argument is that by being independent,
the chief compliance officer will have the autonomy to report and
stop noncompliance. Although, as described in Part II, there are
instances where the general counsel can and is required to report
noncompliance, a chief compliance officer has a different objective
than the general counsel and therefore, may handle the reporting
differently than would the general counsel. If the chief compliance
officer uncovers misconduct by an employee, he/she may want to
publicize the misconduct and make an example out of the person (in
order to deter future misconduct) whereas the general counsel might
want a quiet severance pay agreement to get rid of the problem. As
one interviewee aptly described:
There would very likely be a time when the general counsel
would say, "It's not in our interest to report the wrongdoing to the
government," in which the compliance officer could say, "But we
need to report to the government to get the credit."22 6
Further, creating a separate department and changing reporting
structure may send a message to the company about the importance
of compliance.227 Creating a compliance department might help
develop group identification that cements values and norms around
225. Sce, c.g., Parker, supra note 1, at 341-43 ("Traditional understandings of ethics and the
role of corporate lawyers do not easily accommodate the notion of a preventative law
practitioner."); id. at 349 (explaining the alter argument that lawyers may use their power and
sway to control clients); Rostain, supra note 19, at 482. See also SCCE Study March 2013, supra
note 10, at 4 (reporting that compliance professionals believe there is a conflict of interest
between lawyers' role as defender of the corporation and compliance officers' duty to report).
226. Interviewee Stage 2 CCO5 at 18. See also SCCE Study March 2013, supra note 10, at 5
("Legal approach is about controlling information and disclosures, while Compliance approach
is more open and less political. Legal tends to move more slowly than Compliance. Legal is
about controlling the fallout, while Compliance is about fixing the problem. Compliance should
be independent of Legal to ensure that information flow is not interrupted or 'spun."') (quoting
compliance professional survey respondent).
227. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Ethical Infrastructure, supra note 227, at 701,704 (discussing
view that law firm "structure" is separate from and opposed to "culture" and arguing that the
creation of internal compliance structures is culturally significant serving as a "visible signal of
the firm's attention to high ethical standards" whether or not true or effective).
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ethical behavior2" and, therefore, may actually help support a culture
of compliance.2 29
From the public's perspective then, departmentalization may
potentially increase access to information about noncompliance and
help the creation of a corporate culture of compliance. However,
something that is not stressed in the debate is that, without power and
capability, the benefits of autonomy may not be realized. Further,
there may be other tradeoffs.
1. Power and Influence
A compliance officer plays both an independent and dependent
role, acting in the interest of the public and the corporation. 23 0  A
compliance officer needs a certain level of political and personal
power and influence to be able to utilize an understanding of the law,
corporations, and individual motivation to play both roles.2 3'
Separating the compliance department from the legal department-
although it may signal that the corporation is committed to
compliance 2 32 -does not necessarily empower the chief compliance
officer or compliance department.
First, departmentalization appears to be based on the idea that
getting people and corporations to comply is about "power over" as
opposed to power from within and empowerment. Indeed, literature
from compliance professionals talks about independence as if it is a
precursor for respect and clout. 233 But arguably, decision-making and
228. Parker, supra note 1, at 348. Chambliss, Nirvana, supra note 110, at 141; cf Valerie
Braithwaite, The Australian Government's Affirmative Action Legislation: Achieving Social
Change Through Human Resource Management, LAW & POLICY 15, 327, 327 (1993).
229. See generally supra note 58 and accompanying text supporting that formal trappings of
compliance may not be sufficient but can support corporate culture creation. See also Lauren
B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the "Haves" Hold Court: Speculations on the
Organizationallnternalization ofLaw, 33 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 941, 981 (1999) ("[Eiven 'merely
symbolic' compliance can exert lasting substantive effects as it redirects organizational
attention, alters the organization's public identity, and draws new sets of participants into the
organization's dominant coalition.").
230. Parker, Ethics ofAdvising, supra note 1, at 345-46.
231. Rosen, Inside Counsel Movement, supra note 8, at 503.
232. See generally supra note 229 and accompanying text; see also PwC 2013 Survey, supra
note 112, at 9 ("[H javing the CCO report to the CEO raises the profile of compliance.... This
higher profile structure is usually more impactful than having the CCO report to the legal
counsel, or further down in the organization and thus one or more steps removed from the C-
suite."). Alternatively, keeping compliance within the general counsel's purview could send a
strong signal as well. Rostain, supra note 19, at 482 (making a similar point).
233. Parker, supra note 1, at 347 (making a similar point); John Bradford Braithwaite & J.
Murphy, Clout and Internal Compliance Systems, CORP. CONDUCT Q., 52-53 (Spring 1993);
Gordon, R. & W. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS'
PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 230,253 (Nelson R. et
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power in corporations today is inter and intra; not top-down. To be
sure, power within a corporation is not limited to who has access to
the board (that is only one kind of power) or based on formal
reporting lines.234 As one chief compliance officer interviewee (that
was also an associate general counsel) explained,
even if the chief compliance officer reports to the [board] or
CEO, they are going to have the same problem, because
chances are the CEO is going to want to listen to the general
counsel ... because they are their trusted legal advisor. Very
rarely is the compliance officer reporting to a CEO, because
that's what the CEO wants.235
Factors like individual influence and power, compensation,
relationships between the executives, and corporate history may also
play a role. 236  Further, compliance officers lack the breadth of
function like that of a general counsel or even a chief financial officer.
In other words, simply because chief compliance officers have the 'C'
for 'chief' in their title does not necessarily unlock the door into the
"C-Suite" or help them attain credibility or broad stature with the
board, CEO, or other business leaders.237 This may be especially true
al. eds., 1992).
234. Further, according to corporate governance scholars, new and innovative companies
have redesigned to "flatten hierarchy" and "management and the board do not review, let alone
direct, the substance of most transactions." Rosen, supra note 20, at 1160; sec also Rostain,
supra note 19, at 473 ("The Igeneral counselI occupied positions of power within the managerial
hierarchy and were expected to play a significant role in monitoring compliance within the
organization. Formal reporting lines, however, did not define the parameters of their
authority.").
235. Telephone Interview with Interviewee Stage 2 CCO5, General Counsel. Heineman,
supra note 19, at 3 ("In a bad company, with a poor culture, a distant board and an indifferent
CEO (or worse), independent voices-whether from a chief compliance officer or the
GC/CFO-will be muffled and discouraged.").
236. In addition to "title," compensation might affect the level of power and influence a
compliance officer has. See Chambliss, Nirvana, supra note 110, at 141 ("Of course, specialists'
power to promote compliance with formal rules and policy typically will be greater when law
firm management invests in and supports the specialist, making clear that management values
compliance."). According to a recent survey by the SCCE of chief compliance officers (one
third of which worked at publicly traded companies), chief compliance officers do not on
average appear to make as much money as general counsels. Compare 2012 Cross Industry
Chief Compliance Officers Salary Survey, SOCIETY OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE
AND ETHICS, Jan. 2012, at 15, available at http://www.corporatecompliance.org/Resources/
View/Articleld/883/2012-Cross-Industry-Chief-Compliance-Officers-Salary-Survey.aspx
(reporting that average base salary for chief compliance officers working at publicly traded
companies earned $199,405) to A CC's Chief Legal Officers Survey 2013 Executive Summaiy,
ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, Jan. 2013, at 5, available at http://www
.acc.com/CLOsurvey (reporting that thirty-eight percent of survey respondents earn an average
base salary of $250,000). (Note: This difference could be related to the survey samples).
237. Cf The Chief Compliance Officer of the Future: Embracing a Risk Intelhgent View,
DELOITrE INSIGHTS (May 11, 2012), http://www.deloitte.com/view/enUS/us/Insights/Browse-
by-Content-Type/podcasts/a8f8676d52c47310VgnVCM3000001c56f0OaRCRD.htm (quoting
126 Vol. 10:1
CULTURE OF COMPLIANCE
in those companies that have for years subordinated the chief
compliance officer to the general counsel. 238 General counsels, now
considered part of senior management (often serving as secretary to
the board of directors), have a lot of power, influence, and credibility
that will not disappear simply by changing the compliance reporting
239structure.
Second, creating a separate and distinct department and a
department head creates a risk that the compliance personnel
(whether trained as lawyers or not) will be viewed as another cost
center. Granted, there is increased emphasis on compliance
departments and right now corporations appear to be willing to spend
the money-lots of money-to beef up their compliance function.240
However, compliance will constantly have to prove its worth (and
compete for limited resources). And just because it is not housed
under the general counsel, does not mean it will not be housed within
a different department (such as operations or enterprise risk
management ("ERM")) 2 4' or under a different corporate executive
like the CFO.2  These entities may create roadblocks for compliance
initiatives that eat at the bottom line or view compliance as just
Tom Rollauer, Director, Deloitte & Touche LLP, as stating that, "It]he role of the chief
compliance officer has been elevated land] is now, typically, an official member of the C-suite
... whereas in the past it was often sort of a subpart of the legal division. ). Sec also supra
notes 45 and 46 and accompanying text.
238. See Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 25, at 582 ("ITIhe most important source of
credibility for . . . [in-house] specialists is the visible support of firm leaders."); see also
Raymond, supra note 43, at 168 (urging that specialists receive "adequate compensation,
institutional respect, and appropriate authority"). However, it may be that merely symbolic
appointments might also lead to creation of a culture of compliance. See Chambliss, Nirvana,
supra note 110, at 140-41 ("Management's values are not ultimately determinative of the
specialist's influence. For instance, if the specialist is personally committed to promoting
compliance with formal rules, a merely symbolic appointment may lead to conflict, mobilizing
previously passive constituents inside and outside the firm.").
239. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. The power and influence of the CFO might
also come into play. See infra notes 242, 291-292.
240. See supra note 131. See also Richards, Instilling, supra note 17; Richards, New
Compliance Rule, supra note 17 (discussing the costs associated with the new rules requiring
buttressing the compliance department as required by the Compliance rule); U.S. Sec. 8 Exch.
Comm'n Press Release No. 204-164 Sec Adopts Rules Requiring Payment Disclosure By
Resource Extraction Issuers (Aug. 22, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2012/34-
67717.pdf (discussing the costs associated with the new compliance rule); cf Krawicc, supra note
2, at 533-34; see also Bochme, supra note 128 (reporting that JP Morgan will pay $4 billion to
beef up its compliance function).
241. "Enterprise risk management (ERM) is a management approach that holistically
manages risks across the organization." Donald Pagach & Richard Warr, The Characteristics of
Firms that Hire Chief Risk Officers, 2 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1010200.
242. Compliance is about adherence to the spirit and letter of the formal rules that are often
laws but they can also be accounting rules. Heineman, Don't Divorce the GC, supra note 19, at
49. See infra note 290.
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another risk to be "managed." 243  Also, it is not clear that the
employees of a corporation will believe the commitment is "real" if
the corporation creates a distinct compliance department because it is
forced to or does so to receive future leniency from the
government.24 Thus, the head of a cost center that is continually
trying to prove its worth may actually have less clout than the head of
the legal department (also a cost center) that has already to some
degree proven its worth and increased its stature over the years.245
Third, creating a separate and distinct department and
department-head creates a risk that the compliance personnel
(whether trained as lawyers or not) will be viewed as separate and, as
such, as "outsiders," (as in-house counsel once were) 246 and lose their
ability to be what Parker calls "persuasively relevant." 247 Many of the
chief compliance interviewees in the Compliance Study expressed
243. Pagach & Warr, supra note 241, at 2 (finding results that support hypothesis that "that
firms adopt ERM for direct economic benefit rather than to merely comply with regulatory
pressure"); id. (finding "that firms that are larger, have more volatile operating cash flows, and
greater institutional ownership are more likely to initiate an ERM program. In addition, when
the CEO has incentives to take risks (through compensation), the firm is also more likely to hire
a [chief risk officer] CRO."). A couple of the chief compliance interviewees reported to
operations and enterprise risk management. See supra note 110. Some compliance officers may
attempt to manage their departments as profit centers, to add value to the corporation. Rosen,
Risk Management, supra note 20, at 1167. This stance, however, could make monitoring risks
difficult if combined with an organizational structure where the compliance professionals work
on teams. As one chief compliance officer (who also oversees an ERM program) explained,
"[IIt's . . . trying to have that upside [of risk] and revenue generating kind of mantra and trying
to find new things out there to just come up with that stuff as well too. So yeah, it's both. I
mean we do that analysis. We look at our credit losses and our risk management cycle expenses
and add that up and then apply that against this other stuff and show that we do-we are kind of
a revenue generating positive aspects of the company." Telephone Interview with Interviewee
Stage 2 CCO7 at 5; Rosen, Risk Management, supra note 20, at 1168-69; id. at 1180 ("[Ais a
result of corporate redesign, compliance officers have become risk-managers. Compliance
officers' zeal is re-shaped. A crucial consequence is that noncompliance becomes an option.
Risks are not always eliminated; they often are transformed, hedged, and insured.").
244. Indeed, one of the interviewees (a former compliance monitor) gave at least two
examples where compliance departments were dismantled as soon as the time period for the
consent decree had passed. Telephone Interview with Interviewee Stage 2 CCO3 at 11-12; see
also Ford & Hess, supra note 25, at 515 (explaining that the only way to ensure that a
corporation continues to focus on its culture of compliance once the requirements of the
consent decree have been fulfilled is for the corporation to have "buy in").
245. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. See also Raymond, supra note 43, at 168
(pointing out that appointment of a compliance specialist that is undervalued or does not have
the requisite authority may signify management's lack of support for the appointment which
could result in pushing culture in the opposite direction of a culture of compliance). There is
also the risk that appointment of a chief compliance officer and departmentalization will be
counterproductive if employees view these moves as a way to protect upper management from
future blame for corruption. Linda Klebe Treviflo, et al., Managing Ethics and Legal
Compliance: What Works and What Hurts, CAL. MGMT. REV. 131, Winter 1999, 131,131-51.
246. Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 183, at 477; see supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 47.
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that they were viewed, at times, as "cops," 24 8 or "watchdogs." 2 49 One
chief compliance officer exclaimed dryly: "I think compliance is the
world's longest four letter word and it initiates a response in people
that is negative." 250 As such "compliance officers are often seen as
outsiders, not good team players."2  Employees are afraid to invite
the chief compliance officer to the table. As many compliance officer
interviewees bemoaned, "people are afraid to talk to you or invite
you to table because we are not obligated to keep confidences and
they understand that there is no privilege." 25 2  Separating the
248. Telephone Interview with Interviewee Stage 2 CCO4 ("Now, the reason compliance
organization is seen as corporate cops is, because if the local business doesn't follow protocol
and they are out of line in terms of their monitoring activity and so forth, then the compliance
organization has an obligation to report up the senior management. So in that regard, we would
be seen as corporate cops."); Telephone Interview with Interviewec Stage 2 GC5 at 10 ("So our
Ichief compliance officer/associate general counselj is sort of the go to on significant compliance
issues and I certainly think people view her little bit as the cop;"); Telephone Interview with
Interviewee Stage 2 C013 at 13 ("1 think it depends on who you talk to on what day because,
you know, quite frankly there are lot of sales representatives who view me as I would say,
Philadelphia cops in the 70's, you know, where I'm coming and if you are in my way you
probably are going to get beaten. You are going to get beat up and then you are going to get
arrested for resisting arrest.").
249. See Hurt, supra, note 132 ("Now in-house watchdogs . . . are required at all these
companies."); see also Chambliss, Nirvana, supra note 110, at 140 (explaining that some
corporate counsel and law firm counsel may play the role of "cop" in their firms, a "specialists
influence on individual compliance does not depend on direct enforcement of ethics rules or
firm policy").
250. Telephone Interview with Interviewee Stage 2 C03 at 7; Telephone Interview with
Interviewee Stage 2 FGC3b at 1 (explaining that it is "human nature to hate the word
'compliance').
251. Telephone Interview with Interviewee Stage 2 C03 at 7. A running theme in the
Compliance Study interviews was that CCO is a tough and lonely job. See infra note 261. Also,
it is consistent with surveys of compliance officers. See "Stress" Taking a Heavy Toll on
Compliance Ethics Professionals, SoC'Y OF CORP. AND ETHICS (Jan. 10, 2012, 11:31 AM),
http://www.corporatecompliance.org/Resources/View/Articleld/321/-Stress-Taking-a-Heavy-Toll-
on-Compliane-and-Ethics-Professionals.aspx (finding that sixty percent of CCOs consider
leaving their jobs).
252. Telephone Interview with Interviewee Stage 2 C03. Although it is true that
confidences will only be privileged if the purpose of the conversation with the lawyer was
primarily to receive legal advice and services, the fact that there is absolutely no hope of
privilege in a conversation with a chief compliance officer could prevent the initial
communication from occurring because the compliance officer may be seen as an enemy. Scc
Snyder, supra note 187, at 239 (pointing out the risks of lawyers being seen as "enemies" when
the potential for attorney-client privilege is eroded). This is problematic if it is true (as some
believe) that the existence of the privilege motivates employees to share information so that the
employee can be counseled to comply with the law. This is often a primary justification used by
courts in support of applying for the corporate attorney client privilege. NXIVM Corp. v.
O'Hara, 241 F.R.D. 109, 125 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) ("The free flow of information and the twin
tributary of advice are the hallmarks of the privilege. For all of this to occur, there must be a
zone of safety for each to participate without apprehension that such sensitive information and
advice would be shared with others without consent."); Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon, Corp., 434 F.
Supp. 136, 144 (D. Del. 1977) ("In a society as complicated in structure as ours and governed by
laws as complex and detailed as those imposed upon us, expert legal advice is essential. To the
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compliance function from the legal department could exacerbate this
attitude. As the spotlight continues to focus on corporate
malfeasance and emphasis continues to be placed on the role and
reporting obligations of the compliance function at large publicly
traded corporations, the chief compliance officer may become more
disenfranchised.2 53
2. Capability and Effectiveness
a. Collaboration and Creative Problem Solving
Although many general counsel and chief compliance officers
talk about the close relationship that they have and are dedicated to
maintaining between them, one common identified risk of
departmentalizing compliance and legal is what could be labeled as a
threat of "turf wars." That is, there exists a risk of overlap between
the compliance and legal function that may result in rivalry between
departments as they compete for power, influence, and limited
resources.255
As Wilkins points out:
[a]lthough creating a separate 'compliance counsel' might
prevent the legal profession from losing market share to
these new competitors (many of whom, [Tanina] Rostain
notes, are themselves lawyers), it might also entrench the
furnishing of such advice the fullest freedom and honesty of communication of pertinent facts is
a prerequisite. To induce clients to make such communications, the privilege to prevent their
later disclosure is said by courts and commentators to be a necessity."). That corporations are
willing to turn over privileged information in order to appease the government but at the same
time use the attorney-client privilege to convince employees to share information is a conflict
much debated as is whether the attorney-client privilege should be applied to corporations at
all. See, e.g., Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege. A Study ofthe
Participants, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 191, 222-28 (1989) (reviewing the debate); see also David
Luban, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 206-34 (1988) (explaining why the
privilege should not be applied to corporations); John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration
of the Corporate Attorncy-Client Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 443, 464-68 (1982) (outlining the
risks and benefits of applying the attorney-client privilege to corporations).
253. See Part V. A for a more detailed discussion of the importance of interdependence and
collaboration to the level of influence and power of the chief compliance officer.
254. See, e.g., Stress, Compliance, and Ethics, SOC'Y OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND
ETHICS & HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE ASS'N, Jan. 2012, available at http://www.hcca-
info.org/Resources/View/Articleld/194/Stress-Compliance-and-Ethics.aspx (finding that eighty
percent of respondents scored the relationship between compliance officers and legal as a 4 on a
I to 5 scale); see infra note 385 and accompanying text.
255. CL Kraweic, supra note 2, at 533-34; cf Rosen, supra note 20, at 1166 (describing the
fight for limited resources among teams in the new corporation that has less hierarchical
control); see also Heineman, supra note 24, at 2 (explaining that it may cause "turf-fighting").
Cf Parker, supra note 1, at 339 ("In-house corporate lawyers are claiming the area of
preventative law as their own."); see, e.g., Interviewee Stage 1 GC20.
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kind of turf wars that will only work to obscure the
fundamental purpose underlying these regulatory schemes-
that achieving effective compliance is the joint responsibility
of legal and business professionals. 256
Although it could be that turf wars and competition for work
increases the number of people that are passionate about compliance
and the intensity of their interest, these turf wars may decrease the
compliance officer's ability to access information in an efficient way.
For example, if there is competition between the departments,
information may not be freely shared and collaboration might be
impeded. Indeed, this might be true even if turf wars do not exist.
Once the departments are separated, it may simply be harder to share
information.2" Thus, there is a risk of less communication and a loss
of shared earnings that may be more automatic when the two
departments share a reporting structure or are aligned
organizationally.
Moreover, if corporate directors are independent and treated as
outsiders they may be less knowledgeable about what is happening on
the inside and decision-making may be impaired. 8 The
segmentation arguably removes those in compliance from daily
interaction and makes them even less cognizant of the invisible social
networks of communication that make a corporation work. 259  As
many of the interviewees explained, knowing what is happening and
having people feel like they can come to you and communicate
informally is essential to identifying potential compliance issues
before they get out of hand.260 And independence (and access to the
board) can have the opposite effect. The chief compliance officer
may be seen as a spy or a cop instead of a concerned counselor. Thus,
the chief compliance officer may be ostracized. Many of the chief
compliance interviewees talked about how lonely it was to be a chief
256. Wilkins, Rivals, supra note 49, at 2131-32 (explaining that it is "necessary to move
beyond a regulatory focus that assumes that gatekeeping duties are the sole responsibility of a
single actor").
257. See infka Part V discussion around social networks.
258. Further, when groups or individuals are isolated, there is an increased chance that
norms that are not in line with the organization's desired values will develop. BAZERMAN &
TENBRUNSEL, supra note 128, at 165.
259. See infka discussion in Part V about the importance of internal social networks to
understanding corporate culture. While one might argue that this is true of legal departments as
well, legal departments have been around for ages and general counsels are now a part of the
executive management team at large publicly traded corporations.
260. See Interviewee Stage 2 CCO8 at 23 ("[Olur goal is, when there is a problem in the
[company! and someone in the senior administrative team is aware of it, my ideal scenario is,
they get up, they walk down the hall, they sit down in the Compliance Officer's office, and they
say, we have a problem and I want you, I want your opinion on it, and I want your help on
solving it. That's what we drive everything towards, that that is comfortable, that that is an
environment in which they can feel good about doing that.").
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compliance officer, how little they can share, how rarely they can trust
what someone is saying to them and why.261 It is, as Toni Morrison
describes, a "loneliness that roams.. .. A dry and spreading thing that
makes the sound of one's own feet going seem to come from a far-off
place." 262  This raises the issue of identity and connectedness.
Christine Parker claims that compliance professionals are more
effective when they identify with a community of compliance
professionals and regulators. 63 It is not necessary to this group
identification, however, for the compliance department to be separate
from the legal department - in a "far-off place." Indeed, it may be
just the opposite, given that one could describe the legal department
as a community of "gatekeepers." 264 Being a part of this gatekeeping
community might have many benefits-especially if combined with
the power to report to the board.265
Separate compliance departments, like walled off silos, are
antithetical to research that stresses the importance of open
environments that enable cross-fertilization between disciplines and
that bridge different departments and units together.266 First, such
open environments have been shown to lead to more innovation.267
Indeed, one study of intra-firm and inter-unit networks suggests that
261. Scc Interviewee Stage 2 CX015 at 9 (analogizing the role of Compliance Officer to
Internal Affairs because it is often so lonely); see Interviewee Stage 2 CGO2 at 20-21 ("Some
people think you are just a pain in the ass that's preventing them from . . . doing. .. what they
want.").
262. TONI MORRISON, BELOVED 274 (1987).
263. Parker, supra note 1, at 348; see Braithwaite, supra note 228, at 327-54; J. Rees
Reforming the Workplace: A Study of Self-Regulation in Occupational Safety (Univ. of Pa.
Press, Philadelphia) at 43-44 (1988).
264. See supra Part IV.D.2 discussion of lawyers as gatekeepers.
265. See also Heineman, supra note 24, at 3 (making similar a point). In other words, the
compliance officer can report to the general counsel and also have dual reporting lines to the
board of directors.
266. Martin Reuf, Strong Ties, Weak Ties and Islands: Structural and Cultural Predictors of
Organizational Innovation, INDUSTRIAL CORPORATE CHANGE 11, no. 3 (2002): 427, 430; id. at
445 (suggesting that entrepreneurs can create innovation by "diversifying their networks to
include a wide range of social contacts").
267. STEVEN JOHNSON, WHERE GOOD IDEAS COME FROM, THE NATURAL HISTORY OF
INNOVATION 162, 166, at 166-67 (describing a similar study by a professor at the University of
Chicago business school who researched innovation at Raytheon Corporation and found that
"innovative thinking was much more likely to emerge from individuals who bridged 'structural
holes' between tightly knit clusters."); R. M. Kanter, WHEN A THOUSAND FLOWERS BLOOM:
STRUCTURAL, COLLECTIVE, AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS FOR INNOVATION IN ORGANIZATIONS
(1988); B. M. Staw & L. L. Cummings (Eds.), Research in organizationalbehavior, Vol. 10: 169-
211; Bruce Kogut, & U. D. 0. Zander, Knowledge of the Firm, Combinative Capabilities and
the Replication of Technology, ORGANIZATION SCIENCE, Vol 3. No. 3, 389 (1992) ("It is the
sharing of a common stock of knowledge, both technical and organizational, that facilitates the
transfer of knowledge within groups."); id. at 391 ("New learning, such as innovations, are
products of a firm's combinative capabilities to generate new applications from existing
knowledge.").
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there is a positive correlation between the extent of information and
26resource exchange between firm units with innovation.268 Second,
such intra-firm and inter-unit collaboration has been shown to
increase efficiency and enhance problem solving. Consider the more
recent emphasis by corporations to take a Kaizen-like approach to
work. For example, Apple employs what is called "concurrent or
parallel production" -all the different departments involved in a
development cycle (from design to engineering, to marketing) meet
continuously to exchange ideas, identify problems, and share
solutions. 2 69  In other words, they cocreate. This Kaizen-like
approach is accredited with increasing efficiency and market power.270
Although these studies show that multidisciplinary and
multifunctionary cooperation is possible even if the parties involved
are not organized within the same unit, because of the turf wars and
the job of a compliance officer to uncover and report misconduct,
departmentalization may create barriers to just that type of
cooperation and interdependency that is needed between
departments.
Innovation and creative problem solving is essential to being an
effective compliance manager.272 Without collaboration with others,
the ability to creatively solve compliance issues may decrease. And
there may be a benefit to collaborating with lawyers (or other
executives) who may counterbalance extreme compliance attitudes
and protocols that impede innovation in product development.27 3
268. Tsai & Ghoshal, supra note 383, at 473 ("Our analysis suggests that investing in the
creation of social capital inside a firm eventually creates value. Informal social relations and
tacit social arrangements encourage productive resource exchange and combination and thereby
promote product innovations.").
269. Johnson, supra note 267, at 162, 171.
270. Roya Behnia, Legal Kaizans and Gcting Lawyers to Solve Simple Problems Together,
The New Normal (Nov. 2, 2011), available at http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/
getting_1awyersjto solve simple-problems together/?utm source=maestro&utm medium=email
&utm campaign=weekly-email (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
271. See supra Part IV.B.I.
272. Parker, supra note 1, at 345 ("Good compliance work means being constantly inventive
in finding ways to persuade the rest of the business that ethically and legally responsible action
is consistent with business goals.").
273. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Throttled by Compliance, DEFINING IDEAS (Mar. 2,
2011), http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/69086 (arguing that excessive
regulations can cause corporations to displace creative and entrepreneurial executives with the
"dull masters of compliance" who are "not necessarily good at launching new companies,
developing new drugs, or forging employee relations"); Tangled Up in Green Tape, THE
ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 2012, http://www.economist.comlnode/21547804; see also Tyler Cowen,
Can I See Your License, Registration and CR U?, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2011, http://www
.nytimes.com/2011/05/29/business/economy/29view.html?_r=0 (arguing that much-needed
technological advances in transportation, namely the driverless car, are hitting major roadblocks
because of heavy government regulation); Robert HalfSurvey: Lack of New Ideas, Red Tape
Greatest Barriers to Innovation, PR NEWSWIRE (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.prnewswire.com/
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Further, cross-functional collaboration is an essential ingredient to a
robust compliance program. For example, compliance needs to work
closely with the finance and accounting departments among others.2 74
As the interviewees in the Compliance Study pointed out, compliance
programs in any large public company (regardless of industry)
requires collaboration to develop, advertise, and implement.
Compliance officers cannot do their job without securing the
cooperation and commitment of employees to legal and social
responsibility, and business goals are threatened if the business is not
kept in compliance. Parker's research on compliance supports this
view as well. Based on more than thirty in-depth interviews with
compliance professionals in the U.K., U.S., and Australia, she
conceptualizes the ideal approach to advising corporations on
regulatory compliance. These new 'ideal' compliance professionals
take "an ethical stance of interdependence" 275 in which they view
themselves as "citizens of the corporation, not independent advisors
of it." 276 In keeping with that, many of the interviewees explained
that although it keeps them up at night, they cannot ensure that
employees are complying with the law and they accept that every
single day someone may not be complying. The aim, however, is to
facilitate and empower others in the business to "do
compliance" by working with a variety of other managers and
professionals in the company, to translate law into
commonsense. Most significantly, compliance professionals
continually attempt to "cascade" responsibility for
compliance down through the line management, so that a
culture of compliance commitment permeates the
277organization.
In sum, while it is true that collaboration can occur despite
reporting lines, an unofficial mandate to separate compliance from
legal emphasizes independence and separation as opposed to
interdependence and collaboration which have been shown to lead to
news-releases/robert-half-survey-lack-of-new-ideas-red-tape-greatest-barriers-to-innovation-14607
4815.html (reporting that in a survey of 1,400 CFOs, 24 responded that too much bureaucracy
was the greatest barrier to innovation at their respective companies); http://rhfa mediaroom.
com/file.php/1225/innovation-infographic.gif]; but see infra discussion regarding the lightning
rod salesman approach of lawyers.
274. Sce, c.g., Mary Bachinger, The General Counsel and the CFO: Partners in Compliance,
http://www.nacubo.org/Business Officer Magazine/BusinessOfficerPlus/Bonus Material/The
GeneralCounselandtheCFOPartners inCompliance.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2013).
See supra notes 239-242. See infra notes 291-292.
275. Parker, supra note 1, at 340.
276. Id. at 345; Id. at 346 ("[C]ompliance officers cannot be autonomous and aloof from the
business; they must be seen as very much a part if the business.").
277. Parker, supra note 1, at 346.
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more efficient, effective results and better problem solving and
arguably, are essential to effective compliance.2
b. Skills and Expertise
There is no reason to believe that an independent chief
compliance officer will have a better set of compliance skills or
expertise than a chief compliance officer who reports to the general
counsel. 2 79 As discussed earlier in Part I, compliance officers are in
charge of building policies and procedures and training programs that
are designed to monitor, detect, and prevent noncompliance. To
effectuate these programs, compliance officers need to understand
HR issues, manage people, work in teams, work with audit, be
exemplary communicators, and employ financial and project
management skills. Common lore among lawyers and compliance
officers is that lawyers don't know how to "do" these things. 2  They
do not know how to "do" compliance. A typical statement by a
general counsel interviewee was "general counsels are struggling-
scratching their heads wondering how do we do this compliance-I
know laws but I don't know jack about process." 281
Further, some contend, like Robert E. Rosen and Parker that
there is a lawyer "cast of mind" that may not aid but may actually
impede compliance initiatives. In a recent research study comparing
lawyer-led compliance programs with non-lawyer led compliance
departments, Rosen et a! found that lawyers are "followers: they
follow their company's normative orientation. When companies are
committed to compliance, lawyers in charge of compliance structure
their company's compliance practices and behaviors accordingly" but
"when companies are not committed to compliance, lawyers do not
278. See generally Michele DeStcfano, NonLawyers Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks
in the Kitchen or Stone Soup?, 80 FORDHAM. L. REV. 2791 (2012); see also Parker, supra note 1
but see note 294.
279. 1 am supportive of having compliance established as a department but do not agree that
it is necessary to prevent general counsel oversight of the compliance department. See supra
note 43. Rostain, supra note 19, at 493.
280. See, e.g., Daniel Currell & M. Todd Henderson, Can Lawyers Stay in the Driver's
Scal?, University of Chicago Institute for Law and Economics Working Paper Series Index, at
1-2 (Jan. 16, 2013), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2201800 ("Lawyers don't generally have sophisticated . . . project management
and commercial skills.").
281. Interviewee Stage 2 CCO4 at 3; see also SCCE Study March 2013, supra note 10, at 4
("There are also key skills for a CCO that a GC may not necessarily have (project management,
presentation) and the advisory role of Counsel doesn't always mesh well with the CCO role.")
(quoting compliance professional survey respondent); see, e.g., Rostain, supra note 19, at 481
(reporting that "the GC of a food processing company," claimed that "accountants and business
people were better suited at setting up compliance systems than lawyers").
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. . . promote compliance" and "may even aid their clients to resist and
subvert regulation." 28 2  Thus, they find that lawyers can behave as
"gamesters" treating the law as "a game of loopholes" and litigation
as unavoidable.283 Similarly, others contend that lawyers take an
''excessively legalistic approach" to compliance that obscures the
"cultural influences that impact employee behaviors or nuances." 284
Although the type of professional selected to lead compliance
may reflect a firm's compliance culture and objectives (to reduce
uncertainty or to increase legitimacy), 285 research indicates that what
makes a difference is if the compliance professional is a "compliance
specialist," an expert in running compliance initiatives.28 The
governmental mandates to separate compliance from legal do little to
ensure that compliance specialists are leading compliance. As
discussed, secondary literature (supported by Compliance Study data)indicates that these new compliance departments are often led by and
comprised of lawyers (even if they are not considered practicing
lawyers). There is no reason to believe that a lawyer's "cast of mind"
(if it exists) will be erased simply because the lawyer has been moved
from the legal department to an independent compliance department.
To that end, corporate senior management can appoint any person as
the chief compliance officer. Indeed, they can select based on
attitude, ideology, level of influence, and behavior.287
Thus, it is not clear that the unofficial governmental mandate will
change the current status quo. However, the status quo might change
in a different way if departmentalization means that more lawyers
282. Rosen et al., supra note 211, at 4 (summarizing research results from Rosen et al., supra
note 25).
283. Rosen et al., Followers, supra note 211, at 3.
284. John P. Hansen, Corporate Counsel Perspective: The Crisis of Ethics and the Need for
a Compliance-Savvy Board, Remarks at the Rand Center for Corporate Ethics and Governance
Conference (May 12, 2000), in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: DIRECTORS AS GUARDIANS OF
COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS WITHIN THE CORPORATE CITADEL: WHAT THE POLICY
COMMUNITY SHOULD KNOW 41, 44, available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
conf proceedings/2010/RAND CF277.pdf.
285. Rosen et al., supra note, 211, at 16.
286. Id, ("[Miore fulsome compliance structures ... are present when the department is
headed by a compliance specialist."); id ("[Tihe professional background of the individual
responsible for compliance has little impact on a company's compliance management structures
and practices or assessment of stakeholders.").
287. A similar argument has been made against the Sarbanes Oxley requirement around
independent directors. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-
Oxley, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1817, 1847-49 (2007) ("The weak spot in the independence
movement has always been that a company's senior management dominates the selection of
independent directors, which means management can select for certain attitudes and
preferences."). Of course, this cuts both ways. That this is possible may mean that senior
management (in choosing the right type of compliance officer) can side step some of the
potential negative consequences discussed in this Part around power, influence, and
connectedness.
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working in compliance do not consider themselves bound to the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 288  Currently, some general
counsels that oversee compliance believe that (despite whether the
attorney-client privilege would apply) that:
[t]here is NO such thing as a non-practicing lawyer-purely
practical-if you are a lawyer you are a lawyer. It doesn't
matter if you are licensed to practice law or not. People look
at you as a lawyer and rely on you as it and believe you
dispense legal advice despite title . . . and therefore, in my
view, I'm a GC of a company if one my lawyers screws up,
I'm responsible. I can't say that's a lawyer in compliance and
289I get a "by" . . . I think that is functionally wrong ....
If the compliance officer or compliance professionals are not
structurally considered a part of the legal department, they might not
have the attitude displayed in the quote above. If so, legally trained
compliance professionals might not consider themselves bound by the
professional norms. In that scenario, these legally trained compliance
professionals may actually have just enough information, training,
power, and "cast of mind," to do more bad than good.290
Further, despite the development of a new, independent
department, there may be a decrease of substantive expertise
dedicated to compliance. As the former General Counsel for
General Electric, Ben W. Heineman Jr., blogged recently,
"compliance is not one substantive subject, it is many: competition
law, employment law, environmental law, labor and employment law,
international law, accounting rules, and disclosure law. "29 1 Since the
288. This would be the case if they clearly communicate to their clients that this is a law-
related service that does not procure the benefits of the lawyer-client relationship. Model Rule
of Professional Conduct 5.7.
289. For a discussion about the possibility of compliance professionals violating
unauthorized practice of law ("UPL") statutes see DeStefano, supra note 127.
290. These compliance professionals would add to the growing industry of "law consultants"
not necessarily part of a profession. See generally Tanina Rostain, The Emergence of 'Law
Consultants,' 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1397, 1399 (2006) (considering "the effects that law
consulting might have on the interests and values that professional regulation is intended to
protect"). See generally CHRISTINE PARKER, supra note 25. See also DeStefano, supra note
127 (discussing the risks associated with these law consultants as it relates to the fields of
compliance and litigation funding); Dana A. Remus, Out of Practice, the 21st Century Legal
Profession, - DUKE L. J. (forthcoming 2013) (contending that quasi-legal roles "create[I
opportunities for abuse by individual lawyers who seek to evade ethical obligations, and for
ethical arbitrage by sophisticated corporate clients who seek to access legal expertise without
the strictures of professional regulation.").
291. See Heineman, supra note 19, at 1-2; sec also Heineman, supra note 19, at I ("[I]t
makes no sense for the chief compliance officer to be "independent" and to hire the various
substantive experts who must work on compliance but also on business problems for the GC
and CFO. That doesn't amount to appropriate "checks and balances," but is a source of
bureaucratic waste, confusion, and possible turf-fighting."). It may also prove to elicit opinion
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substantive legal experts in all of these subjects already report to the
general counsel, "[i]t makes absolutely no sense to duplicate that
expertise by having a second set of experts who report to the chief
compliance officer."2 92
Further still, such duplication would be an extremely costly
endeavor. There is already concern over costs associated with
designating a chief compliance officer and creating a compliance
department 293-let alone attempting to replicate the range of
substantive expertise in the legal department. Thus, it is not likely
that corporations will actually duplicate expertise. If that is the case,and there are communication gaps between the departments,
substantive expertise housed in the legal department may not be
leveraged in the compliance department. Separation, therefore,
could lead to an increase (as opposed to decrease) in compliance
294transgressions.
C. CORPORATE TRANSPARENCY
There is a belief that enhanced corporate transparency will result
in enhanced corporate ethics and responsibility. 295 To that end, an
argument in favor of departmentalization is that separating
shopping. Compliance Study Interviewee, FGC3b at 2.
292. Heineman, supra note 19 at 2. Many corporate failures have resulted from fraud in
accounting or other financial rules. Thus, the compliance function likely also needs to have
financial expertise or a close working relationship with the CFO, auditors, and comptrollers.
Compliance Study Interviewee, FGC3b at 2.
293. Richards, supra note 17.
294. On the other hand, as William H. Widen pointed out in reviewing a draft of this Article,
a regulatory scheme that required a duplication of the compliance function in the legal and
compliance departments might result in more compliance because it would set up a competition
between the legal department and separate compliance office. Of course, this might also
exacerbate the issues stemming from turf wars discussed in Part IV.B.2.
295. See BARBARA KOWALCZYK-HOYER, TRANSPARENCY IN CORPORATE REPORTING:
ASSESSING THE WORLD'S LARGEST COMPANIES 4 (2012), http://files.transparency.org/content/
download/459/1891/file/2012_TransparencylnCorporateReportingEN.pdf (last visited June 11,
2013) (stating that, "[bjy adopting greater corporate transparency-publicly reporting on
activities and operations-companies provide the necessary information for investors,
journalists, activists and citizens to monitor their behavior); cf generally Antonino Vaccaro &
Joan Fontrodona, The Myth of Corporate Transparency, THE ECONOMIST ONLINE, Sep. 7,
2010, http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2010/09/myth-corporate-transparency (last
visited June 11, 2013) (contending that this is a "fashionable" belief but that access to more
information is not the solution); see H. Stephen Grace Jr. & John E. Haupert, Corporate
Governance: Lessons from Life and Litigation- With Implications for Corporate Counsel, 85
N.Y. ST. B.A. J. 32, 33 (2013) (stating that checks and balances and transparency in an
organization can create and foster an ethical environment); see also Langevoort, Social
Construction, supra note 287, at 1828-33 (contending that the Sarbanes Oxley legislation
around corporate governance can be interpreted to have the goal of increasing corporate
transparency and accountability to the public).
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compliance from the legal department weakens the application of the
attorney-client privilege, and therefore, increases transparency into
corporate conduct during corporate investigations and in response to
government inquiries. 296 The reasoning is that the chief compliance
officer and other officers in the department (even if they are legally
trained) will have a weaker argument for privilege protection because
they are not, organizationally, part of the legal department. The idea
is that when the professional is not part of the legal department, it is
harder to demonstrate that the professional is acting as a lawyer.
However, this reasoning does not track with the doctrine.
The attorney-client privilege only applies to communications
between lawyers and their clients for the purpose of providing legal
advice and services.297 In the case of compliance officers, regardless
of their training or the department in which they sit, the common
view is that compliance officers are not really acting as lawyers or
providing legal advice and, therefore, cannot garner attorney-client
privilege protection. 2 98 This is in keeping with views of SEC
296. Tabuena and Smith, supra note 85, at 14-15 (contending that a benefit of having the
general counsel play the role of chief compliance officer is that "legal privileges and discovery
protections readily apply and can be more easily managed").
297. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947) (explaining that there is no expectation of
confidentiality); Cavellro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 246 (1st. Cir. 2002); 8 WIGMORE, at §
2317 (McNaughton rev. 1961). The attorney-client privilege is considered waived when
confidential information is shared with a third party. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508; 8 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 2317. However, there are some exceptions to waiver. However, there are
some exceptions to waiver. See generally Michele DeStefano Beardslee, The Corporate
Attorncy-Client Privilege. Third Rate Doctrine for Third Party Consultants, 62 SMu. L. REV.
727 (2009).
298. Richards, New Compliance Rule, supra note 17 ("Routine compliance monitoring is not
subject to attorney-client privilege, and in particular . . ."). See, e.g., Interviewee Stage 2 CCO5
at 17 ("What I tell people is that the compliance work, we should consider it probably not to be
privileged. And so when I do my compliance work, I always make sure they would have work
product [protection] and I tell my clients, because a lot of times my clients are the same."); but
see CCO2 at 12 (claiming that even though the departments are separate and he does not report
to the general counsel, there is an argument that the work he does is covered by the privilege);
id. at 14
("We tell the lawyers in our group, in my compliance group, they're still lawyers they
maintain a legal division title like, Senior Corporate Counsel or Assistant General
Counsel or that type of thing even though they are no longer in the legal division and
we do that for a multitude of reasons. We want to try to make it, it's good an
argument, we can for privilege purposes, we do want to attract and retain the best
people, we want people to be able to maintain bar requirements in terms of practicing
law and the like and etcetera, etcetera.").
Note: this is the only interviewee that held this position. The work product doctrine can apply
to materials created by a nonlawyer representative of the client or agent. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 87 cmt. a (2000); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A); Occidental Chem. Corp. v. OHM Remediation Serv. Corp., 175 F.R.D.
431, 434 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); see also NXIVM Corp., 241 F.R.D. at 128. The work product
doctrine protects tangible (and intangible) materials developed in anticipation litigation, trial, or
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officials 299 as well as general counsels and compliance officers in the
Compliance Study as exemplified by the following three quotes:
The entire legal department which includes compliance, by
the way, here does report up to me as the chief legal officer
but we are organized across business lines as well . . . . We
have a lot of attorneys in our law division who are in the
compliance department.... Compliance is not part of the law
We have to say they're working as compliance
professionals, not lawyers but there's a godly number who
have law degree.
I am a lawyer; but I am not acting as a lawyer, I'm not acting
as an in-house lawyer on behalf of the company. There is
sometimes some confusion within the Law Department itself
as far as that distinction is concerned, and there is also
sometimes confusion from internal clients that think, "Oh, I
can just go . . ." straight to me to get legal advice; and I have
to tell them, "I'm glad to talk to you, but I'm not acting as a
lawyer; what we're talking about is not privileged; and if you
want legal advice, ou will probably have to go down the hall
to somebody else.'
And so this may be a little bit of splitting hairs; but I am
technically not part of the Law Department. I report in to the
General Counsel, Senior Vice-President. . . . General
Counsel, Senior Vice President of Governmental Affairs and
Corporate Secretary. He has different groups reporting to
him. He's got Compliance, he's got the Law Department,he's got the Corporate Secretary's Office, and he's got
Governmental Affairs; so he's got four different groups that
report in to him. So I'm technically not part of the Law
Department. I am a lawyer by trade; but I don't hold myself
out as a lawyer representing the company, and I try not to be
other type of an adversarial procedure. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3); FED. R. EVID. 502(g)(2)
(providing that intangible materials are also protected by work product doctrine); Hickman, 329
U.S. at 511-12. For an overview of the history and contours of the work product doctrine see
Michele DeStefano, Taking the Business out of Work Product, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1896,
1890-909 (2011); for a review of the differences between the attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine, see Beardslee, Third Rate, supra note 296, at 755-59. At least one
interviewee that was an ex-deputy GC believed that there may be a chance for privilege
protection under the argument that a compliance officer who is a lawyer can be acting as a
lawyer in the compliance role. Interviewee Stage 2 CCO1. It is unclear whether a court would
give credence to that argument.
299. Richards, New Compliance Rule, supra note 17.
300. Interviewee Stage 1 GC28 at 2.
301. Interviewee Stage 2 CCO6 at 2.
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providing legal advice, because I am acting in the position as
Chief Compliance Officer rather than as an in-house lawyer
for the company.30 2
Departmentalization by itself should not increase or decrease the
potential of privilege protection. This is because regardless of who
the chief compliance officer reports to or what department the chief
compliance officer is in, the chief compliance officer is (supposedly)
not "acting" as a lawyer (even if trained as one) and, therefore,
cannot garner attorney-client privilege protection to shield
information that is disclosed by corporate employees.
That said, departmentalizing compliance might make it more
obvious that the chief compliance officer is not acting as a lawyer.303
Contrary to common lore, clearly demarcating that the chief
compliance officer is not acting as a lawyer may not lead to a decrease
in the effective use of the attorney-client privilege to protect
communications regarding corporate misconduct. Indeed, it might
have the opposite effect. Here's why: Lawyer communications that
mix business and law are protected by the attorney-client privilege as
long as they are "predominantly legal"304 or "made primarily for the
purpose of generating legal advice."3 05  Courts protect these mixed
communications because it is almost impossible to distinguish
between business and law306 and even "the average lawyer-whether
[in-]house or outside counsel-often mixes his legal advice with
business, economic and political counsel."3 0 7
302. Id.
303. This would also be true if the chief compliance officer was a nonlawyer in a compliance
department overseen by the general counsel.
304. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954)
("When he acts as an advisor, the attorney must give predominantly legal advice to retain his
client's privilege of non-disclosure, not solely, or even largely, business advice.").
305. McCaugherty v. Siffermann, 132 F.R.D. 234, 240 (N.D. Cal. 1990); United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950) ("IT]he privilege of
nondisclosure is not lost merely because relevant nonlegal considerations are expressly stated in
a communication which also includes legal advice."); United States v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 66
F.R.D. 206,212 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Sec supra note 297.
306. See, e.g., Sedco Int'l v. Cory, 683 F.2d 1201, 1205 (8th Cir. 1982); Diversified Indus., Inc.
v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 610 (8th Cir. 1977); Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136,
147 (D. Del. 1977); 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2317, 2296 (McNaughton rev. 1961); sec
also, c.g., Ann M. Murphy, Spin Control and the High-Profile Client-Should The Attorney-
Clicnt Privilege Extend to Communications With Public Relations Consultants?, 55 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 545, 581 (2005).
307. NXIVM Corp., 241 F.R.D. at 126; Rattner v. Netburn, No. 88-Civ-2080, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6876, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1989) (alteration in original); United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
89 F. Supp. at 360; John M. Burman, Advising Clients About Non-Legal Factors, WYo. LAW.,
Feb. 27, 2004, at 40 ("ICilients are in search of help with problems which they perceive ... to
involve legal issues. But they generally want more. No legal problem arises in a vacuum . . . . A
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However, determining whether the primary purpose for the
communication was to ascertain legal advice or services is extremely
difficult when a lawyer has dual responsibilities-as general counsels
do.30 Given the blurriness between the compliance and law
functions, it is even more difficult in the scenario where the
compliance officer acts as both a lawyer reporting to the general
counsel and a compliance officer reporting to the CEO.309
Specifically, when an attorney who reports to the general counsel is
both a compliance officer and a lawyer, it is hard to prove that the
primary purpose of any communication with the client (that may have
contained both legal and compliance advice) was to garner legal
advice.310 Adding to the difficulty is that many courts, worrying that
corporations are including in-house lawyers in communications
simply to garner privilege protection,"' require a higher level of proof
that the communication was primarily for legal advice if the in-house
attorney has legal and non-legal duties.3 12  If the chief compliance
client usually wants, therefore, advice about how to resolve the problem, in general, and not just
the legal aspects of it. Resolving a problem thus invariably involves non-legal issues."); Gregory
Sisk & Pamela J. Abbate, The Dynamic Attorncy-Client Privilege, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 1,
36 (2010) (contending that when "non-legal components of a communication arc intertwined
with genuine and material requests for or legal advice provided by corporate counsel, whether
in-house or outside, the privilege should attach").
308. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1994);
NXIVM Corp., 241 F.R.D. at 139; Michele D. Beardslee, If Multidisciplinary Partnerships Are
Introduced into the United States, What Could or Should Be the Role of General Counsel?, 9
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 15 (2003) ("[TheJ job is multi-disciplinary and cross-functional
by nature."); id. at 20 ("Most General Counsel have a broad range of responsibilities and
perform a mixture of legal and non-legal work." ); Murphy, supra note 306, at 581 ("The
problem is especially pronounced . . . if the attorney is in-house counsel. . . ."); United States v.
Chevron Texaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065,1069 (N.D. Cal. 2002) ("Because ... attorneys ...
performed the dual role of legal and business advisor, assessing whether a particular
communication was made for the purpose of securing legal advice (as opposed to business
advice) becomes a difficult task."); Bufkin Alyse King, Commentary, Preserving the Attorney-
Client Privilege in the Corporate Environment, 53 ALA. L. REv. 621, 623 (2002).
309. See supra Part 1Il.B.
310. See generally Michele DcStefano Beardslee, supra note 297. Interestingly, the difficulty
with claiming privilege when an officer has dual responsibilities as a lawyer and Chief
Compliance Officer was identified by the SEC as a caution against the Chief Complaince
Officer reporting to Legal. Richards, New Compliance Rule, supra note 17 ("If you decide that
the Chief Compliance Officer will report to Legal, counsel will have to clearly articulate
instances of client privilege and show great effort to segregate any dual responsibilities.").
Interviews confirmed that compliance officers that are also lawyers often provide legal advice.
Interviewee GC Stagel #20 (the problem you often face is compliance officers giving legal
advice-and it's hard for them not to do it sometimes, given the nature and scope of their
jobs"); CCO2 at 12; cf Parker, supra note 1, at 339 ("In-house corporate lawyers are claiming
the area of preventative law as their own.").
311. First Chicago Int'l v. United Exch. Co., 125 F.R.D. 55, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Hercules,
Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 143 (D. Del. 1977).
312. In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Borase v. MIA COM, Inc., 171
F.R.D. 10, 13-14 (D. Mass. 1997); McCaugherty v. Siffermann, 132 F.R.D. 234, 241 (N.D. Cal.
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officer is not and does not report to the general counsel and leads a
department separated from the legal department, whenever the
general counsel (or other attorney from the legal department) is in a
meeting with the chief compliance officer or a compliance officer,
there is a strong argument that the lawyer's communication was
sought for the primary purpose to provide legal advice and services.
True, confusion as to whether the compliance officer is providing
legal advice may still exist after departmentalization (if the
compliance officer is a trained lawyer). However, the division in roles
and between departments supports the contention that the lawyer in
the legal department is not acting as both legal and business advisor
but instead included in the conversation to provide the "legal" point
of view thereby enhancing the potential that the privilege will be
applied.' As one chief compliance officer interviewee explained,
"[a] lot of times I will retain Counsel to advise me or to help make
sure that the work can be privileged."3 14 Interestingly, although the
government has often put into its consent decrees that a company
"shall not assert a privilege to the OIG with respect to legal advice or
1990); Elizabeth Chambliss, The Scope of In-Firm Privilege, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1721,
1727 (2004); see Murphy, supra note 306, at 581 ("ISiome courts . . . have imposed a heavy
burden on corporations seeking to protect communications with persons holding dual
legal/nonlegal rules.") (internal citations and quotations omitted); Carl Pacini et al.,
Accountants, Attorney-Client Privilege, and the Kovel Rule: Waiver Through Inadvertent
Disclosure Via Electronic Communication, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 893, 901 (2003); King, supra
note 308, at 623. Some courts consider whether the communication expressly requests legal
advice. Allied Irish Banks v. Bank of Am., 240 F.R.D. 96, 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Others
courts consider if the communication would have transpired if the client did not need legal
advice. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rep. of Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1423-24 (3d Cir.
1991); HPD Labs., Inc., v. Clorox Co., 202 F.R.D. 410, 415 (D.N.J. 2(01); U.S. Postal Serv. v.
Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp, 852 F. Supp. 156, 163-64 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); First Chi. Int'l, 125 F.R.D.
at 57-58; Sexton, supra note 252, at 459.
313. Some might claim this moot because as interviewces often disclosed, "whether it's
privileged or not, you are still going to want to turn the work over to the government to show
that you've done something in good faith." Interviewee Stage 2 CCO5 at 17; sco also
Interviewce Stage 2 FGC3a at recent conference on corporate governance at which the Author
presented ("When it's a high profile matter, GCs presume there is no privilege."). However, as
a Chief Compliance Officer (who was formerly the Associate General Counsel) at a large
pharmaceutical company explained, "[ciompanies sometimes waive the privilege; very
frequently you can make disclosures and do things in a matter that doesn't even calls you to,
have to deal with the privilege. You just don't have to give all the privilege material, you can
give over material that's not privilege that gives the government exactly what they need."
CCO2 at 12.
314. Interviewee Stage 2 CCO6b at 17 ("And when we start off with an investigation, we do
work closely with a lawyer, almost always have a lawyer involved with us in the investigative
stages so that we can retain the attorney-client privilege as much as we can"); Stage 2 FGC3a at
2 (explaining that "unless you have the legal department involved in the beg with the corporate
privilege you don't have it and once you don't have it, you can't get it back and you gotta have it
set up so that it is set up as narrow as possibly can be and so that you don't give it up at the get-
go").
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counsel," many of these agreements state that "the Officer may seek
legal advice from internal or external attorneys outside the
Compliance Department without waiving any applicable privilege."315
Before departmentalization, a corporation might include an
external lawyer in meetings in an effort to have a stronger argument
for nondisclosure. After departmentalization, the corporation can
achieve a similar benefit by including an in-house attorney in
meetings-without the extra costs of hiring an external lawyer.3" In
this new structure, therefore, the in-house lawyer is serving in many
respects like an outside counsel (perhaps depleting the need for
outside counsel advice). True, if there are turf wars, as described
above, departmentalization may segregate internal attorneys from
compliance and prove an opportunity for more work for outside
lawyers.317 However, from a transparency standpoint,318 the public
doesn't benefit whether an internal or external lawyer plays this
role.319 Instead of increasing access to information around
noncompliance so that criminal prosecution can be pursued,departmentalization may impede it.
D. ROLE OF CORPORATE LAWYERS
Proponents of departmentalization support their view by relying
on role arguments. They define the lawyer's main role as providing
legal advice related to the parameters of the law and advocating and
defending against legal liability.320 They differentiate this role from
315. Quest Corporate Integrity Agreement, supra note 148, at 5.
316. Of course, an external attorney does not face the same number of hurtles in proving
that he/she was present for the primary purpose of providing legal advice.
317. Indeed, others have suggested that companies should be required to hire an
independent outside attorney to review annual and quarterly disclosure documents and certify
that the disclosures were not materially misleading. Scc, e.g., Coffee, supra note 18, at 231;
Wilkins, Rivals, supra note 49, at 2130 (making similar point). Coffee further proposes that
without this review, inside lawyers could be sued for aiding and abetting their corporate client's
fraud. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 18, at 231. Law firms have begun offering compliance
support and services either directly or through ancillary businesses. For example, Baker and
McKenzie created LawinContext PTE LTd, a separate business to offer online information,
consulting, and training services for clients (and potential clients) based on industry needs. See
Philip Marcovici & Victoria Dalmas, Rationale and Organization of Practice Groups,
MANAGEMENT VON ANWALTSKANZLEIE EROFIGREICHE FUHRUNG VON
ANWALTSUNTERNEGHMEN at 167-68 (2012). One of the industries it focuses on is tax and
compliance services. Id. For a discussion of how law firms have evolved from practice group
organization to industry groups, see gencrallyid at 163-70.
318. Transparency issues aside, there may be other reasons why the public might benefit
from having lawyers at the table. See supra Part V about lawyers as lightning rod salesman and
infra discussion around interdependence.
319. Of course, having external and/or internal lawyers involved in compliance matters may
help create a culture of compliance or actual compliance. See infra discussion at Part IV. D.
320. But see Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion,
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the role of compliance professionals, which they contend is to
uncover noncompliance and promote socially responsible and ethical
behavior above what the law requires.321  Further, they contend that
lawyers are not able to create an ethical corporate culture based on a
values approach because they are trained as lawyers and serve in the
role of lawyers, and, therefore, take a too "legalistic approach,"3 22 are
too "zealous, aggressive, driven, [and] loyal." 23 Thus, they argue for
departmentalization.
Although designating a specific department as keeper of the
corporate moral compass is likely in the public's interest, there could
be negative consequences to segregating this group from the legal
department. First, counter intuitively, there may be less emphasis on
risks. Second, separating the compliance function from the legal
department may put lawyers in the role of legal technicians that will
impede compliance with the spirit of the laws, ethical behavior, and a
normative commitment to compliance and ethics. It is to these two
potential consequences that the following sections turn.
1. Role of Lawyers as "Lightning-Rod Salesmen"
First, having compliance report to legal may increase the
corporation's attention on risks, and, therefore, compliance.
Although Rosen concluded that having a "lawyer cast of mind" might
impede compliance, their findings also (perhaps contradictorily)
support that a lawyer cast of mind might actually raise awareness of
the risks associated with noncompliance and support corporations'
adherence to practices that are above that required by the law. As
Installment Two: How Far Should Corporate Attorneys Go?, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1119
(2010) (claiming that the advocate role may not be defensible or appropriate in the corporate
context).
321. GC Interviewee Stage 2 GC8 at 2 ("At the end of day-well the role of the general
counsel is really to defend vigorously the interest of company whether right or wrong. Whether
the company did something wrong or not, [the general counsel role is tol try to say the
corporation did something right and to protect company. The chief compliance officer is there
as a secondary check to provide the company with a moral compass."); see also SCCE Study
March 2013, supra note 10, at 4 ("Legal's role is to protect and defend. Compliance's role is to
uncover weaknesses, develop controls and mitigate risks. Uncovering weaknesses often poses a
conflict within legal's role to protect.") (quoting compliance professional).
322. Hansen, supra note 284, at 44.
323. Langevoort, supra note 19, at 501 (making the same point). For a discussion about how
the different types of lawyer personalities affect lawyers' ability to be leaders, see DEBORAH L.
RHODE & AMANDA K. PACKEL, LEADERSHIP: LAW, POLICY, AND MANAGEMENT 41-56
(2011); see also Susan Daicoff, Asking Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should Lawyers
Change? A Critique of Solutions to Problems with Professionalism by Reference to Empirically
Derived Attorney Personality Attributes, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 547 (1998); Susan Daicoff,
Lawyer, Know Thyself A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on
Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337 (1997).
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Rosen explain, "having a lawyer [within the legal department] in
charge of compliance is associated with the company's perception of
heightened legal risk."3 24 Lawyers, they claim, are like Herman
Melville's "lightning-rod salesmen and saleswomen" putting fear into
people's heads about the risks that "lightning" will strike.' When a
lawyer (as opposed to another type of professional) is in charge of
compliance "the company is more frightened of conflict with
regulators and third parties." 326
Although Rosen found that lawyers are not actually (as a
practical matter) able to turn their heightened assessment of risk into
effective programs and procedures that prevent risk,327 their findings
do not necessarily support the conclusion that the compliance
department should not report to someone in the legal department or
that the general counsel should not have compliance oversight. In
other words, that lawyers themselves should not be the actual
professionals to develop and put into place compliance programs at
corporations does not mean that they should not be the ultimate
superintendents of compliance. 328 Rosen find that "greater normative
commitment to compliance is correlated to the perception of being
watched." 329  If this is accurate, then having the general counsel
ultimately oversee compliance might actually increase a corporation's
normative commitment to law and law abidingness. This is because a
324. Rosen ct al., Lawyer Cast of Mind, supra note 25, at 101-02. This is consistent with
research on the effects of having lawyers on the board of directors. See, e.g., Charles
Whitehead, Lubomir P. Litov & Simone M. Sepe, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2218855, draft of
Feb. 15, 2013, Lawyers and Fools: Lawyer-Directors in Public Corporations at 40-43 (finding
that when a lawyer is on the board there is a reduction of risk-taking by the firm that is
correlated to compensation and incentive structures of the CEO).
325. Rosen et al., supra note 211, at 3; cfKrawiec, supra note 2, at 530-31 (discussing legal
compliance professionals tendency to overstate legal risk and reviewing studies in support of
that notion). For a story about a lightning rod salesman, see Herman Melville, The Lightening
Rod Man, http://www.melville.org/lrman.htm (last visited June 13, 2013); http://www.
classicshorts.com /stories/tlrm.html (last visited June 13, 2013).
326. Rosen et al., supra note 211, at 7.
327. They found that lawyers as compliance professionals emphasized manuals and training
programs that they assessed as "merely window dressing especially for companies not
committed to compliance." Rosen et al., supra note 211, at 7; id. at 181 (explaining that "where
the person in charge of compliance is a lawyer, the company compliance efforts will be marked
by manuals and training programs" and that "compliance structures are generally merely
formal-and likely largely symbolic").
328. True, one could departmentalize and put a lawyer in charge of the new separate
compliance department. However, it is not clear whether a lawyer-who is not a practicing
lawyer-will place the same enhanced attention on to legal risk when not formally acting as a
lawyer and working among other practicing lawyers -although they may. See, e.g., supra note
298. Rosen et al's research compared professional backgrounds of compliance managers,
including those who were lawyers versus nonlawyers. Rosen et al., Lawyer Cast ofMind, supra
note 25.
329. Rosen et al., Lawyer Cast of Mind, supra note 25, at 166; id. at 181.
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general counsel's potentially heightened obsession with risk may help
create the perception (even if not true) that the corporation cannot
be shielded from the regulator's purview. And if Rosen et al.'s
finding that lawyers follow the corporation's normative commitment
to compliance is true, an enhanced commitment on the part of the
corporation may mean that lawyers are less likely to look for
loopholes and more likely to counsel for compliance with the spirit of
the law.33 0
2. Role of Lawyers as Legal Technicians vs. Gatekeepers
However, the opposite may result. Separating the compliance
and legal functions could entrench the fallacy that the general
counsel's role is to define what the corporation "can" do from a
technically legal point of view versus what it "should do" based on the
spirit of the law and other considerations.
First, perceptions might change as a result of
departmentalization. As discussed earlier, many general counsel
interviewees claim to take their gatekeeping function very seriously
and do not view their job as merely a legal exercise.33' They view law
and ethics as their core function and their role as the advisor on how a
company can be a good citizen. Other studies support this
contention. 3 2 Further, it may be true, as some of the general counsel
interviewees pointed out, that general counsels are not going to
simply stop playing the ethics and counselor role because they do not
have formal responsibility over ethics.33 3 However, perceptions of the
general counsel's role might change if compliance and ethics are
330. See supra notes 282-283 and accompanying text.
331. See supra discussion at notes 182-186 and 221-223 and accompanying text. Scc also
Rostain, supra note 19, at 473-74 ("Respondents in this study spoke with one voice about their
gate-keeping functions, which they characterized in very strong terms. All were confident of
their capacity to stop deals that they believed posed significant legal risks to the company.").
332. Rostain, supra note 19, at 473; Peter J. Gardner, A Role for the Business Attorney in
the 21st Century. Adding Value to the Client's Enterprive in the Knowledge Economy, 7
MARO. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 17, 37 (explaining that business lawyers often utilize non-legal
arguments to affect corporate client's behavior even if the client's intended actions are within
the bounds of the law); sc Chad R. Brown, In-House Counsel Responsibilties in the Post-
Enron Environment, 21 ACCA DOCKET 92 (2(X)3); (describing recent ACCA survey of 1216
in-house lawyers that found that 57 believed that "in-house counsel should play a role as
important as that of the CEO, COO, or CFO in preventing financial and accounting fraud, as
well as other illegal and unethical behavior"); Parker, supra note 1, at 342.
333. Many of the general counsel interviewees argued that maintaining the corporation's
values and counseling the corporation to compliance is at the core of what they do-and will
remain that way regardless of whether the compliance and legal are segmented. See
Compliance Study Interviews. Wilkins, Rivals, supra note 49, at 2117 ("Lawyers can, and
should, play a central role in maintaining a company's core values. Indeed, many general
counsels assert that this is at the core of what they do.").
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separated from the law department. As a general counsel interviewee
aptly pointed out, "the risk is that you will see lawyers that are more
akin or more used to basically putting the answer in terms of whether
or not you can do it instead of whether or not you should." 334
For example, chief compliance officer interviewees (even those
who were formerly practicing attorneys within the legal department)
often distinguished the compliance function from the legal function
by explaining that compliance is about "preventing misconduct,"
neutral fact finding, acting in the interest of the company's
stakeholders, and uncovering misconduct while the legal function is
all about the law.33 ' These former in-house lawyers claimed that the
legal department involves the law and lawyers tell you what the law
says and are concerned with legal liability and vigorously defending
the corporation at all costs. 336 They made a demarcation between can
and should. "The lawyers tell you whether you can do something,
and compliance tells you whether you should."33' The compliance
officer's job is:
. . . about doing the right thing the right way for the right
reasons. In any business . .. the right way is often debatable,
because, in any business, if we do X we'll make a trillion
dollars but there may be a lot of legal risk. And if we do Y,
we make a billion dollars but have no legal risk.... My job is
to help people understand the potential impact of those risks
.... My job is to make sure those conversations occur. It is
not just about money but a successful business is doing the
right thing.338
The general counsel's job, these compliance officers claim, is
much more clear-cut: "The general counsel's job is . . . to advise [the
company and senior managers] of the legal risks but not initiate the
334. Interviewee Stage 2 CCO6 at 7-8 ("And so I guess my reaction is, yeah, I could view
that as a risk of splitting it out. That said, I don't know if that's something that actually happens
in practice or not. I would hope that no matter how you cut it that the Law Department and the
General Counsel still work very closely with the Compliance function, because of all the groups
that we work with, they definitely have to be one of the top two or three groups that we work
with on a regular basis.").
335. See Banks et al., supra note 86.
336. See supra note 321; see also SCCE Study March 2013, supra note 10, at 4 ("Counsel is
representing the organization from a legal perspective- doing what is in the best legal interest
of the organization. A compliance Officer is actually representing the integrity of the
organization-what may be legal may not be ethical!") (quoting compliance professional survey
respondent).
337. Pfizer Inc. Corporate Integrity Agreement, supra note 155 (quoting Lewis Morris of the
OIG).
338. GC Interviewee Stage 2 CCO3 at 6-7. The interviewee in this quote appears to be
claiming that the compliance officer advises on reputation risk as well as on what is "right"
ethically which is classic legal counseling and risk counseling that general counsels typically
provide.
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conversation over what is the right thing to do-the general counsel's
job is more black and white i.e., these are the legal risks."3 39 The legal
department is about whether you can do something.
The Law Department, on the other hand, I think may be less
perspective in their actions in Compliance . . . . So they
basically are the ones, hey, a business person comes to them,
'Can we do this, can't we do this?' and they look at the laws
and they try to make sure . . . they are the ones that are
interpreting the laws and regulations for the business itself.34 0
Compliance is about ethics and whether you "should" do something:
Legal tells you what you can do to comply with the law-
what you literally need to do to comply with the law.
Compliance tells you what you should do to comply with the
spirit of the law-may be more than legally required.
Ethics-takes it a step further tell you to ask yourself it may
be legal and it may be within spirit of law but is it really in
best interest of my client and my firm. 34 1
All of these quotes are from legally trained professionals (who
were formerly practicing attorneys) and are now leading compliance.
While these role differentiating statements may be self-serving, they
create the perception that the legal team is a group of super talented,
super educated set of strategic individuals-completely off the hook
for compliance, ethics, reputation, and business risk counseling-and
completely on the hook for helping the corporation find loopholes in
the law-in keeping with Rosen's findings about what lawyers do.342
Second, a change in perception might result in a change in
expectation. While it is true (as mentioned above) that many general
counsels claim that it is their job to be the gatekeepers for the
corporations in which they work3 43 and that inside lawyers may not
view their role narrowly regardless of departmentalization, other
corporate executives and managers might. And that view may, in
339. Id. at 7.
340. GC Interviewec Stage 2 CCO3 at 3.
341. Id. at 6. Sec also Roy Snell, Just How Independent Should the CECO Bc (From
Legal)?, Mar./Apr. 2011, 13 No. 2 J. OF HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 25, 28 (2011)
(interviewing and quoting Donna C. Bochme) ("The compliance profession falls in an entirely
different dimension -it is the job of the CECO to develop, implement, and oversee a system of
risk management that detects and prevents wrongdoing and supports a culture of integrity.
Compliance is mostly proactive, not reactive. The legal profession never embraced this new
proactive role, which as it developed required very different key competencies, skills, and
mindset than usually found in a general counsel.").
342. Rosen et al., Lawyer Cast ofMind, supra note 25.
343. Sce, c.g., Rostain, supra note 19, at 478 (explaining that "the GC's deployed a variety of
techniques, including invoking reputational and ethical considerations to persuade their peers,
proposing different, less risky ways to structure transactions, or leaving the issue to management
to decide after providing a full discussion of the risks involved").
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turn, impact expectations and remove some of the support for lawyers
to stand up to pressure from corporate clients that want advice about
what they "can" do instead of what they "should" do. Essentially, the
risk is that the perception of the legal department's role affects
expectations and expectations affect the ability of lawyers within the
department to play that role. David Wilkins argues that we are (and
should be) moving to a world of interdependent "long-term strategic
partnerships"3 44 between lawyers and clients.345  Importantly, this
interdependent relationship provides lawyers with the framework to
say "no"-to resist pressures to pursue risky options.3 46  If the
departments are separate, and compliance and ethics are not part of
the general counsel's purview, the level and type of influence the
general counsel has in the company-an influence which general
counsels have worked very hard to secure over the past thirty
years347 -may change and it may enable corporate clients to pressure
lawyers to give technical answers as opposed to answers that counsel
against risky or borderline unethical behavior. Indeed, lawyers,separated from compliance (and ethics), may not be expected to
stand up to pressure from clients as long as the actions are within the
letter of the law. Rather, they might be expected to be legal
technicians and to waive their own ethical responsibilities.3 48  This
attitude, then, traps lawyers in an attorney-client relationship that is
one of agency wherein the lawyer, as agent, owes a duty to his client
(the corporation) to promote the client's interests above all else.3 49
Although this may be consistent with some forms of current practice
and with the agency model that has characterized the lawyer-client
344. Wilkins, Rivals, supra note 49, at 2069-70.
345. Id. at 2071 (arguing that the relationship between outside counsel and clients is
becoming closer to the relationship between inside counsel and clients. In other words, clients
have moved both relationships to a "logic of embeddness" (as opposed to one of agency)).
346. Id.
347. Parker, supra note 1, at 341 (discussing the rise of in-house counsel in number and
influence between 1970 and 1980.)
348. Indeed, in companies (like hospitals) that have legal, compliance, and risk management,
one wonders if lawyers will continue to be called on to provide legal advice that includes
business advice around risk- like PR risks. See Michele DeStefano Beardslee, supra note 320.
349. See Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham, Witten by Himse/f 19 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1213, 1215 (2006) ("[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one
person in all the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them, to himself, is his
first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the
destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an
advocate, he must go on reckless of the consequences, though it should be his unhappy fate to
involve his country in confusion.") (quoting 2 The Trial of Queen Caroline 3 (1821)) as Lord
Brougham would say "by all means and expedients and at all hazards and costs to other
person," even "to himself.").
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relationship for decades,"'o it is inconsistent with much of the
profession's history, which has-since 1820-portrayed the lawyer's
role as a dual one: client advocate and public servant."'
Third, a change in perception and/or expectation may impact
how the general counsel and in-house lawyers approach their work
and view their role.352 Currently, many general counsels claim they
counsel clients on the reputational risks of decisions because of the
impact negative PR can have on the business.5 While they may
continue to counsel about this business/legal concern, under the new
organizational structure, it is not clear that all general counsels will
choose to counsel their corporate clients on the social, ethical, and
moral risks of legal decisions-especially if pressured to do
otherwise. 35 4 There is room for role-differentiated behavior. Indeed,
350. Wilkins, Rivals, supra note 49, at 2075 ("By characterizing the relationship between
corporate lawyers and their clients as fundamentally one of agency, the standard account
systematically marginalizes, and indeed delegitimizcs, a lawyer's allegiance to this broader
public role."); Wilkins, Diversity Wars, supra note 49, at 855-56 ("IT]he agency model of the
lawyer's role assumes that all ethical obligations flow from the lawyer-agent to the client-
principal.").
351. Wilkins, Rivals, supra note 49, at 2073-75 (tracing this dual obligation from 1820 to now
and arguing that the agency model and market conditions today make it difficult for lawyers to
play a gatekeeping role); id. at 2075. Se also supra Part III.B.
352. Id. at 2131-32. This is a problem of shirking. In the context of law firm compliance
specialists, Margaret Raymond has argued that reliance on specialists creates the risk that
lawyers will feel that they do not have to own ethics principals because someone else is covering
it. See Raymond, supra note 358, at 154-60. See supra note 334.
353. See Beardslee, infra note 363 (discussing lawyers role in counseling corporate clients on
reputational risk associated with high profile legal controversies).
354. Although many general counsels claim they play a gatekeeping role (see supra notes
331, 332 and accompanying text), corporate scandals in the past ten to fifteen years raise some
questions whether all general counsels do so and lend support for the risk that a general counsel
might serve as a legal technician. See, e.g., 148 Cong. Reg. S6555 (Daily ed. July 10, 2002)
statement of Senator Enzi) (stating that lawyers helped draft documents that were involved in
the fraudulent transactions); Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers:? The Corporate
Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1185-90 (2003); Susan P. Koniak, Corporate
Fraud, See Lawyers, 26 HARV. J. L. & PUBL. POL'Y. 195, 196 (2003); Deborah A. DeMott, The
Discretc Roles ofGcncral Counsel, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 955, 958, 975 (2005) (detailing recent
examples in which general counsels were named as defendants or plead guilty to criminal
charges or securities fraud and explaining that the SEC "has recently brought an unprecedented
number of enforcement actions against corporate counsel"). Just last year, the general counsel
of Wal-Mart de Mexico was implicated in authorizing bribes. David Barstow, Vast Mexico
Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After Top-Level Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/2 2fbusiness/at-wal-mart-in-mcxico-a-bribe-inquiry-silenced.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=1 [hereinafter Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Casej; cf Langevoort, supra
note 19, at 515-17 (exploring lawyers' role in the financial crisis and contending that "with their
relative lack of financial expertise and lack of access to diffuse risk-related data-were
particularly well positioned to appreciate the gradual changes taking place until it was too late.
Nor was the law ever clear enough to allow them to push back effectively against the preferred
interpretation of the business people even if they had become alarmed."); Donald C.
Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers' Responsibility lor
Cliets' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REv. 75, 77-78 (1993) (coining the phrase "venality hypothesis"
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some scholars argue that lawyers should not act as moral or ethical
filters355 and that lawyers can and should do anything within the law
to secure a business advantage including bluffing. 5 1 Under this new
organizational structure with new expectations, the general counsel
and the legal team may begin to more closely identify with the
business team. As Wilkins explains, when this happens, they may
approach managing legal risks with noncompliance as a
viable option.' More fundamentally, even if one concedes
that both clients and firms have a mutual interest in
preventing misconduct and reducing risk, there is a danger
that the 'risk management' perspective that this shared
interest engenders will paradoxically diminish 'a lawyer's
individual responsibility for making moral choices about his
role in law and society,' inducing 'a kind of moral apathy'
that will ultimately 'hobble professional independence.'
Creating specialized and independent compliance departments
may undermine attorney accountability.35 8 Attorneys reporting to a
regarding the assumption that the reason why the legal scandal occurred was because the
lawyers were greedy and corrupt, "know of their clients' misdeeds, or at best deliberately close
their eyes to the evidence, simply to preserve their wealth, status and power"); see, e.g., Kim,
supra note 193; cf Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42
CONN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009) ("relying on an identity-theory explanation of lawyer behavior," and
identifying two situations in which "attorneys may be particularly susceptible to such a partisan
bias"). Also, as others have pointed out, "experience has shown that people who consider
themselves (and are considered by others) highly moral can be led into misconduct by any of the
five P's: pressure, pleasure, power, pride, or priorities-not to mention payment. Forces like
these are rampant in the C-suite, where ambitious executives confront enormous economic
stakes, strong pressures and incentives, and high expectations for performance, under
circumstances where they have great discretion to act and the power to avoid external controls."
Scott Killingsworth, Boards, CEOs, and C-Suite Compliance, Corporate Counsel, Oct. 16, 2013
at 2.
355. See, e.g., Stephen Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem,
and Some Possibilities, 11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 617 (1986) (contending that lawyers
should not act as moral filters. What matters is if the "conduct which the lawyer facilitates is
above the floor or the intolerable and is not unlawful"); Andrew L. Kaufman, A Commentary
on Pepper, 11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 651 (1986) (arguing that rules should allow lawyers to
decline to help clients with lawful conduct but "there is a great deal more scope for role-
differentiated behavior" and "lawyers have to be very careful about overriding clients' wishes in
the name of morality").
356. See, e.g., Albert Z. Carr, Is Business Bluffing Ethical?, 46 HARV. BUSINESS REV. 143
(1968) ("But from time to time every businessman, like every poker player, is offered a choice
between certain loss or bluffing within the legal rules of the game. If he is not resigned to
losing, if he wants to rise in his company and industry, then in such a crisis he will bluff-and
bluff hard.").
357. Wilkins, Rivals, supra note 49, at 2120 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
358. A similar argument has been made with respect to supervisory liability for law firms and
with appointing compliance specialists in large law firms that are independent from the other
lawyers in the firm. See, e.g., Julie Rose O'Sullivan, Professional Discipline for Law Firms? A
Response to Professor Schneyer's Proposal, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 4 (2002) (claiming that
law firm discipline "may actually undermine individual ethical incentives rather than furthering
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general counsel that no longer also oversees compliance might "get
comfortable" with providing technical legal advice that will protect
the client from liability based on the letter of the law (as opposed to
the spirit).3 5 9 Adding to this is the fact that the Model Rules can be
viewed as permitting (if not endorsing) lawyers that behave as
Holmesian bad men and do exactly that.36 This risk is further
supported by Rosen's research that indicates lawyers can behave as
followers when it comes to compliance initiatives. If the company is
not committed to compliance, lawyers may see their role as
"gamesters," and help the company find loopholes in the law.3 61
Lastly, if you have a broad view of the role of lawyers, if you
believe as other scholars 362 and many general counsels do,3 63 that the
attorney accountability"); sc also ROBERT A. CREAMER, COMMENTS CONCERNING DRAFT
MODEL RULES 5.1 AND 5.3 (A.B.A. COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr 2000), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/creamer10.htmi [hereinafter
Creamer, Comments] (stating that "Jainy shift from the individual responsibility of lawyers to
the collective responsibility of the firm" will undermine the deterrent value of disciplinary
sanctions); sec Raymond, supra note 43 at 154 ("Telling pressured and overwhelmed lawyers
that this area is, in effect, way too complex for them to master may cause them to lack
ownership of ethics principles."); but see Chambliss, Nirvana, supra note 110, at 138-39 (arguing
the opposite).
359. This is often a complaint made against outside attorneys. See Simon, The Kaye Scholar
Aftir, supra note 197, at 246-51, 264-68. See also Langevoort, supra note 19, at 495-96
(discussing how lawyers try to "get comfortable" with client goals and contending that "the
process of "getting comfortable" may too readily become a process of collective rationalization"
that undermines lawyer objectivity); id. at 505 ("My hypothesis about in-house counsel is that an
above-average tolerance for legal risk and a "flexible" cognitive style in evaluating such risk are
survival traits in settings where corporate strategy and its surrounding culture are strongly
attuned to competitive success."); id. at 513-14; see generally BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL,
supra note 127 (discussing biased professional judgment in business settings).
360. SecOliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 459
(1897) ("If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who
cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a
good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the
vaguer sanctions of conscience."); Pearce and Wald, supra note 186, at 528 (pointing out that
"the Rules' embrace [sic] the understanding that lawyers and clients are autonomous actors has
undermined regulatory efforts" and that "this perspective blocks the development of a culture
that supports compliance.").
361. See supra notes 281-283.
362. Wilkins, Rivals, supra note 49, at 2112 ("In addition to being zealous advocates for the
interests of their clients, lawyers are also supposed to play a broader gatekeeping role in which
they both counsel their clients to conform their conduct to legal standards and refuse to
cooperate-and in extreme cases, even blow the whistle-when the client seeks to engage in
conduct that undermines these standards."); Wilkins, supra at 680 ("Elite lawyers never
conceived of themselves . .. as 'deferential servants' who merely carry out the client's bidding.
Instead, these early lawyers aspired to be wise counselors, or 'lawyer-statesmen' . . . who played
a key role in shaping their clients goals and in mediating between these private ends and public
purposes of the legal framework."). This view is also consistent with the view held by some
scholars that "lawyers not only can but also should counsel clients on non-legal issues,
particularly moral concerns." Larry O'Gantt, II, More Than Lawyers: The Legal and Ethical
Implications of Counsc/ing Clients on Nonlegal Considcrations, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 365,
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general counsel should have gatekeeping responsibilities and should
play the role of counselor in charge of corporate culture and ethics
and the corporate conscience of the company,M then this move
toward separation presents an ideological problem as well.3 65 To be
sure, there has been debate over whether Anthony Kronman's
"lawyer-statesman" ideal3 66 should be put to rest. However, there has
been a growing emphasis on lawyers' obligations, the role of the
lawyer in society, and the need for a view that re-embraces the
lawyer's dual obligations.3 67  Further, there has been increased
365 (2005). Sec also Gregory Sisk & Pamela J. Abbate, The Dynamic Attorney-Client Privilege
23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 201, 237 (2010) ("[A] lawyer who fails to engage in a moral discussion
with the client, at least on matters of significance with obvious moral implications, simply is not
doing his or her job."). Evidently, Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxlcy Act of 2002 targets inside
counsel for just this reason. Kim, supra note 193, at 986 (contending that although SEC believed
that "inside counsel are in a superior position to interdict corporate fraud," inside counsel have
failed to prove this true, and the SEC and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct have "set
[general counsels] up for failure"); see also COFFEE, supra note 18 at 195 (claiming that there
are many reasons to doubt that that inside counsel can or will "specialize in preventive law,"
despite their unique potential to do so); ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM 247, 258 (1988) (contending that because
corporate attorneys identify with their clients, they may not be able to behave as gatekeepers);
Nelson & Nielsen, supra note, 183, at 477 (concluding based on qualitative research that in-
house lawyers "were willing to 'discount ... their gatekeeping function in corporate affairs' in
order to be seen as part of the company, rather than as obstacles to getting things done."); see
supra note 249 (discussing research that suggests the opposite).
363. Heineman, supra note 185, at 60-62. There is other support for this contention. For
example, in a 2003 survey by the American Corporate Counsel Association of 1216 corporate
counsel, seventy-eight percent of the respondents felt in-house attorneys should report
misconduct when they learn of it. Chad R. Brown, In-House Counsel Responsibilities in the
Post-Enron Environment, 21 ACCA DOCKET 92, 97 (2003); see Michele DeStefano Beardslee,
Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion Installment 1, Broadening the Role of Colporate
Attorneys, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1168 (2009) (claiming that research indicates that
"many corporate attorneys want to play a gatekeeping role or, at least, want to counsel clients to
behave socially responsibly"); Heineman, supra note 185, at 60-62 (claiming that GCs want to
show "a deep concern about both the private good and the public interest-and a deep concern
about building durable institutions which achieve their aims in a fair and honest way even under
stress") (quoting Kronman); Rostain, supra note 19, at 465-90 (claiming that there is empirical
support for the contention that general counsels, in part because of the new regulatory
environment, are beginning to play a larger gatekeeping role than before).
364. Heineman, supra note 19, at 2 ("[I]t should be the role of the GC not only to address
the question of 'what is technically legal,' but also to raise and help analyze the question of
'what is right."'); id. ("It is ludicrous to suggest, as some do, that the GC only worries about
what is "legal" and the chief compliance officer worries about what is "right." The "what-is-
right" set of issues is at the center of the role of the modern, broad-gauged general counsel as
wise counselor and leader.").
365. Indeed, many of the interviewees saw these distinctions in reverse -claiming that it is
the general counsel (as opposed to the chief compliance officer) that is in charge of the ethical
culture of the company and that CCOs can sometimes just be "traffic cops." Interviewee Stage
2 CCO5 at 24 ("t don't think it's hard for me. I mean, I think I try to explain to people that
Compliance is still black-and-white and what are the rules.").
366. See KRONMAN, supra note 182, at 12; see also Ben W. Heineman, Jr., supra note 46.
367. Wilkins, Rivals, supra note 49, at 2076.
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emphasis in common law, legal practice, and other regulations to hold
lawyers more accountable to more constituents for their behavior and
for the social consequences of their corporate clients' conduct.3 68
Departmentalization may work against these movements.
V. HYPOTHESIS, OTHER CONSIDERATIONS, AND A
PRELIMINARY PROPOSAL
Based on the analysis in Part IV, this Part provides a hypothesis
and a proposal for future focus and change.
A. HYPOTHESIS
Departmentalizing compliance from legal so as to remove
general counsel oversight of compliance may not necessarily be in the
public's best interest. To the contrary, the analysis leads to the
hypothesis that departmentalization poses consequences that might
subvert its objectives.
The current unofficial governmental preference for stand-alone
compliance officers and departments prizes independence and
traditional notions of control over interdependency, embeddedness,369
and collaboration. Although autonomy and independence are
important for reporting compliance transgressions, without power
and influence, the chief compliance officer's ability to monitor and
deter noncompliance may diminish. Departmentalization may
ostracize the compliance officer from those that have the sway with
the C-suite and it may create barriers that impede communication
and collaboration with people across the organization. Specifically,
for some corporations, a divided reporting structure could create turf
wars, potential inefficiencies, and communication gaps within the
corporation. Also, departmentalization does little to ensure that the
right type of professional is leading compliance and that it is staffed
with the right level of expertise. Further, departmentalization may
strengthen the argument that the attorney-client privilege should
apply to communications with lawyers around compliance issues and,
therefore, lead to less transparency into corporate behavior and
368. Milton C. Regan Jr., Professional Responsibility and the Corporate Lawyer, 13 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 197, 204-06 (20(0). For an argument that legal scholars tell their clients what
they want to hear and help law firms develop justifications for conduct that is close to legal
malpractice, sce William H. Simon, The Market for Bad Legal Advice: Academic Prolcssional
Responsibility Consulting as an Example, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1555, 1556-58 (2008); Wilkins,
Rivals, supra note 49, at n.187 (explaining that, [Simon's] contentions that academic ethics
advisers are providing bad advice asside, his claim that corporate clients desire lawyers' opinions
that support corporate decisions, arguably, has merit).
369. Wilkins coined this term. Wilkins, Rivals, supra note 49.
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decrease the ability of the government to prosecute criminal
noncompliance. Lastly, departmentalization may work against the
creation of a culture of compliance and normative commitment to
compliance in two ways. First, having ethics and compliance outside
the legal department's purview risks a role division that places the
general counsel and/or the legal department in the role of legal
technician or worse the role of gamester. In that world, lawyers could
be expected to help the corporation comply with the letter of the law
at the sake of the spirit of it. Second, although governmental officials
have claimed that they will assess whether a company has a culture of
compliance when determining liability for noncompliance,"" they
place value on structural manifestations of compliance like adoption
of codes of conduct, revisions to mission statements, and enactment
of training programs. 371 However, there is little empirical evidence
that these trappings are effective at deterring prohibited conduct
without more3 and experts claim they may actually be the "weakest
370. William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, Address at Directors College at Stanford
University Law School (June 20, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch062004whd.htm
("What's really needed is a change in mindset-a company-wide culture that fosters ethical
behavior and decision-making. Creating that culture means doing more than installing
competent legal and accounting staff, and doing more than giving them responses and up-to-
date technology. It means instilling an ethic-a company-wide commitment to do the right
thing, this time and every time-so much so that it becomes the core of what I call the essential
'DNA' of the company."); see RULE 38A-1 LEGAL ALERT, supra note 36, at 8 ("SEC officials
have stated that a culture of compliance begins with senior management and that the SEC staff
will inquire about the role of the board, senior management and other key executives in setting
compliance strategy and holding supervisors responsible for compliance. Does senior
management adhere to a fundamental philosophy of a fiduciary in serving the needs of investors
first? Is the enterprise's compliance policy in writing, communicated to employees and
emphasized by the CEO?"); sec also Richards, Instilling, supra note 17, at 4 ("Simply put, this
means instilling in every employee an obligation to do what's right-even if there is no clear
legal restriction or regulatory guidance."); Richards, New Compliance Rule, supra note 17.
371. Sec supra discussion in Part III. Sec Legal Alert, supra note 36 (quoting Rule 38A); sec
gencrally Krawiec, supra note 2, at 494-511; Richards, Instilling, supra note 17 at 6 (noting that
the most frequent finding of SEC's inspection staff was inadequate written policies and
procedures).
372. Scc supra notes, 43, 53, and 58 and accompanying text; Krawiec, supra note 2, at 511-22
(arguing more broadly that the negotiated governance model used to regulate compliance
represents opportunities for strategic behavior on the part of organizational defendants and
legal compliance professionals.); cf Gary R. Weaver et al., Corporate Ethics Practices in the
Mid-1990's:- An Empirical Study of the Fortune 1000, 18(3) J. Bus. ETHICS 283, 283 (1999)
(finding that "the vast majority of firms have committed to the lower cost, possibly more
symbolic side of ethics activity: the promulgation of ethics policies and codes."); BAZERMAN &
TENBRUNSEL, supra note 127, at 122; cf Parker & Gilad, supra note 17, at 23-29 (concluding
that it is difficult to empirically evaluate formal compliance systems given the complexity of
corporate behavior and that culture is "largely invisible in quantitative survey research"); id. at
13 (supporting the idea that regulatory initiatives cannot create a corporate culture simply by
requiring certain compliance structures because the way those structures are implemented and
understood in practice is variable); but see gcncrally Parker & Nielsen, supra note 212 (finding
that the implementation of six different formal compliance structures is associated with better
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link in an organization's ethical infrastructure."3 73
Departmentalization may be just another one of those trappings.374
Thus, there is a risk that corporations will departmentalize and adopt
these common structural exemplifications of a robust compliance
program as "best practice," believing that real change will result.
The problem with this is that studies have shown that the
informal norms imposed by other employees are superior to the
formal controls that managers implement. Part of the reason for
this is that formal controls are completely unconnected to the way
employees interact 376 and are decoupled from norms and ethics. 3
The government's current preference for stand-alone compliance
departments does not consider and account for: 1) networks (the
importance of internal networks to effective compliance); 2) how
ethics intersects with compliance and law; and 3) how people are
motivated. 378 The next section discusses these topics.
compliance practice but commitment and oversight by management and organizational
resources are just as important).
373. BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 128, at 118; id. at 122 (explaining that "the
informal norms are difficult to overtly identify. Rather, they are embedded in the stories
employees tell, the euphemisms they use, the socialization methods they encounter, and the
informal enforcement of norms."). As Robert E. Rosen points out, if you "[tireat the
corporation as a bureaucracy" then "one gets meaningless bureaucratic responses that will not
alter the behavior of redesigned corporations." Rosen, Risk Management, supra note 20, at
1168-69.
374. See supra analysis Part IV. Note: this is not to suggest that compliance officers should
not also report to the board of directors. Indeed, having a dotted line and access to the board
and a direct report to the general counsel may be a great alternative to departmentalization for
corporations. See supra note 43.
375. BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 128, at 118; id. at 122; id. at 18.
376. CL Parker & Gilad, supra note 17, at 9 (pointing out that "a compliance system does not
stand alone sending unambiguous messages and instructions. Second are the perceptions,
motivations and strategies of individuals within the organization, which may involve avoidance,
resistance, ritualism and creative compliance in addition to commitment and capitulation."); id.
at 11-13.
377. CL BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 128, at 19.
378. Evidently, "little empirical attention has been devoted to examining how people
actually do behave and how their ethical behavior can be improved -knowledge that is needed
to understand and improve not just how philosophers behave, but also how the ethical and
economic crises of the past decade emerged." BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 128, at
28. Other scholars in the field of compliance have argued that it important to understand the
inner workings and networks of a corporation as well as the motivations values and perceptions
of compliance professionals and the teams and individuals that make up the organization. See
generally Parker & Gilad, supra note 17; see Parker, supra note 25 at 203-05 (arguing that
formal structures will not change behavior unless they are based on an understanding of
motivations and connected to employees values). Ben W. Heineman, Jr., argues that the CEO
is the only person within the corporation that has the power and ability to create a culture of
compliance and that only the CEO can combine high performance with high integrity
(describing the principals and practices that CEOs should adopt to do so). Heineman, High
Performance, supra note 4; Heineman, Only the Right CEO, supra note 4, at 2.
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B. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS: CONNECTIVITY, ETHICS, AND
MOTIVATION
1. Connectivity
The importance and utility of formal, prescribed roles in
corporations has diminished. According to sociologists, this is
because of globalization, "a rise in knowledge-intensive work"379 that
"has become more project-specific, flexible, and short-term, "and
"managerial initiative[s] such as delayering, reengineering, and team-
based designs."" Thus, the way that employees interact and the
groups they interact with do not match static organization or
traditional communication flow diagrams.38' Instead, "social
networks" (defined by Rob Cross and Andrew Parker as "those
crossing functions in a core process or integrating mergers or
alliances") are the more relevant indicator of organization and
communication flow within institutions.3 82 And they have a dynamic
influence on an organizations' performance and its ability to execute
strategy, react to issues, and to change." The internal dynamics of a
corporation can create stopgaps and "moral mazes."3  Thus, an
emphasis on the formal organizational structure of a corporation to
gauge the effectiveness of its compliance function may be
misplaced."' Instead, there is a need for a more inward look at the
webs of connection that cannot be seen on an organization chart.
There is a need to identify the social networks that exist within a
379. Scc ROB CROSS & ANDREW PARKER, THE HIDDEN POWER OF SOCIAL NETWORKS:
UNDERSTANDING How WORK REALLY GETS DONE IN ORGANIZATIONS, HARV. Bus.
SCHOOL PRESS at vii (2004).
380. Id. at 133; Rosen, supra note 20, at 1166-67 (describing Enron as an example of new
corporate structure "in which self managing teams initiate and design projects").
381. CROSS& PARKER, supra note 378, at 133; Rosen, supra note 20, at 1163-64.
382. CROSS & PARKER, supra note 378, at vii.
383. CL id. at 133 ("Managers have paid little attention to the more dynamic characteristics
of networks and the ways that dynamic qualities of networks affect organizational flexibility and
change."); id. at vii. ("These seemingly invisible webs also have become central to performance
and execution of strategy. Research shows that appropriate connectivity in well-managed
networks within organizations can have a substantial impact on performance, learning and
innovation."); W. Tsai and S. Ghoshal, Social Capital and Value Creation: The role oflntrafirm
Networks, 41 ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 464,474 (1998).
384. See CROSS & PARKER, supra note 378, at 133; Robert Jackall, Moral Mazes:
Bureaucracy and Managerial Work, HARV. Bus. REV. 118-30 (Sept.-Oct. 1983); Hasnas, supra
note 5, at 520 (making a similar point); Kogut & Zander, supra note 267, at 387 ("The
knowledge displayed in an organizational chart, as in any blueprint, is limited to providing
information on personnel and formal authority. The know-how is the understanding of how to
organize a firm along these formal (and informal) lines.").
385. CL CROSS & PARKER, supra note 378, at vii, viii, 10 (maintaining that organizational
charts do not "adequately represent how work gets divvied or done").
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corporation, and importantly that do not exist, despite the line or
dotted line on the chart. So much depends on the relationships
between the individual executives and the teams. In keeping with
that, many interviewees believed that their compliance department
was effective because there was a special relationship between the
general counsel and compliance officer.3 86
It is not, however, simply an issue of the relationship between the
chief executives or even the right attitude of chief executives. A
common theory (and one that many interviewees purported) is that
the right tone at the top is essential to establishing a culture of
compliance.387 While that may be true, in keeping with the notion
that social networks are integral to compliance culture at an
organization, as one deputy general counsel who was also the chief
compliance and ethics officer explained, it may be the tone set at the
middle-at the intersection of social networks-matters just as much:
I don't worry about the tone at the top; I worry about the
tone in the middle, and that's what I focus on. So I tell
people, "We can have great tone at the top; but the people in
the warehouse, they look at their Supervisor, they look at
their Manager. So if their Manager is having sex with the
secretary, they don't believe anything about the Ethics
Program." You know what I mean? ... But the secretary can
come in late, and they can't come in late. They don't care
what we tell 'em about ethics. That's what ethics means to
them, because if they are going to get fired because they are
late, but the secretary gets to stroll in late because she's
sleepin with the Supervisor, that's what ethics mean to
them.
Essentially, a culture of compliance has to be integrated from the
top down. The adoption of compliance systems and structures
386. Perhaps this special relationship exists because it is not uncommon that the chief
compliance officer was formally a deputy general counsel. When a close relationship exists, the
threat of turf wars may decrease. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
387. Gilad, supra note 17, at 15 (making similar point and pointing to empirical studies that
suggest that "management commitment is important to the success of corporate compliance
systems.); cf HEINEMAN, HIGH PERFORMANCE WITH HIGH INTEGRITY, supra note 4, at 5
(contending that only the CEO can create a culture of integrity but to do so CEOs must "move
beyond 'tone at the top' platitudes" and instead utilize "powerful leadership that voices the
vision and the values" and "effective management that builds the integrity principles and
practices into business operations"); see also MICHAEL VOLKOV, COMPLIANCE IN THE C-SUITE
6 (2013), available at http://www.compliancestrategists.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/ Volkov-
WP-Final-Draft-with-Pre-Pub-Banner-May-2013.pdf; Killingsworth, supra note 354, at 2-3
(contending that "the board must do more than hire a CEO of apparent high integrity and get
out of the way" and recommending that the board take a more involved role in compliance).
388. Interviewee Stage 2 CCO5 at 26-27.
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(especially at the top) does not ensure that compliance and ethics will
be internalized.389
2. Ethics
Despite the efforts by corporations to enhance internal
compliance and adherence to ethics, it is not clear that the programs
developed by corporations have done so or are designed to effectively
do so. o According to leading sociologists and legal scholars, one of
the reasons for this failure is because the compliance initiatives do not
account for the reality that employees do not necessarily recognize an
ethical dilemma-as an ethical dilemma-when it is presented to
them," and many ethical violations are unintentional 92 and have
nothing to do with integrity but rather result from "blind spots."393
Research shows that these "blind spots" can stem from
functional boundaries3 94 within an organization that create segmented
decisions across departments. 395  "As a result, the typical ethical
dilemma tends to be viewed as an engineering, marketing, or financial
problem even when the ethical relevance is obvious to other
groups." 396 An often-cited example of this is the decision by NASA
and Morton Thiokol engineers to launch the Challenger despite
evidence that the Challenger had close to a one hundred percent
chance of failure. 397 Because the decision was classified as a
"management decision, the group recommended launching the
Challenger. Another oft repeated example is the story of the Ford
Pinto. According to researchers, the decision to bring the Pinto to
market despite evidence that it may kill people was viewed as a
"business decision," "based on a cost-benefit analysis that weighed
the minimal cost of repairing the flaw (about $11 per vehicle at the
time) against the cost of paying off potential lawsuits following
accidents."3 99  Ergo, how people classify a decision affects the
decision. 400 And a contributing factor to that classification is the
389. Gilad, supra note 17, at 22-23; Parker, supra note 25, at 208-12.
390. BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 127, at 28 (citing study that found "little
support for the notion that traditional ethics training creates more ethical citizens").
391. Id. at 4,30.
392. Id. at 19.
393. Id. at 21.
394. Id. at 16; id. at 30.
395. Id. at 16.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 15-16 (explaining that this group failed to look outside the data in the room and if
they had it would have been clear).
398. Id. at 16.
399. Id. at 70.
400. Id. at 30-31.
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hierarchies within organizations that protect various groups and
people from internalizing their actions.4 People have a tendency to
fail to recognize another's behavior as unethical when doing so would
in some way disadvantage the observer. 4 ' Further, people generally
feel less concerned about unethical behavior that is indirect as
opposed to direct.4 03  This is extremely problematic in a large
organization where decisions can be segmented by departments and it
is hard to get a bird's eye view or see the domino effect.
Another contributor is ethical fading. People become de-
sensitized to ethical transgressions as they are more exposed to them,
or do them.4 04 The notions of the "slippery slope" and "the devil is in
the details" appear to be true. For example, according to research
studies on lawyers reporting billable hours, some law firms have
required that their lawyers provide more detailed reports of their
time.405 Instead of having the intended benefit of increased
transparency and ethical behavior, such initiatives have the opposite
effect. 406 This is because, in order to provide more detailed reporting
of hours, the law firms have created "hundreds of codes for specific
activities that a legal professional might undertake for a client.,407
Because lawyers have to decide whether a specific act falls under one
of a hundred listed activities that they might undertake (in addition to
doing so in six-minute intervals), they start to have to guess. Once
they start to make small guesses, guessing becomes acceptable and
eventually turns into larger guesses; "and a system designed to
promote ethical behavior backfires." 408
A mandate to separate compliance from legal does little to
highlight the importance of ethical decision-making or to ensure that
compliance professionals understand and attempt to account for
ethics in a way that leads to more ethical behavior by employees.
401. BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 127, at 75.
402. Id. at 81. (explaining that people also have a tendency to re-create history and see their
actions as more ethical than they were); see id. at 62; id. at 73 (talking about people's tendency
to be "revisionist historians").
403. Id at 89-93 (labeling it "indirect blindness").
404. Id. at 76; sec generally Kirkland, Self-Deception and the Pursuit of Ethical Practice:
Challenges Faced by Large Law Firm General Counsel, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 593, 604 (2011).
405. BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 128, at 108; Killingsworth, supra note 354, at 2
("Factors such as conflicts of interest, overconfidence, in-group loyalty, conformity pressures,
motivated blindness, and attentional blindness-plus the disinhibiting effect of power-cloud
our judgment, make the first small step of misconduct easy to take and easier still to rationalize,
and lubricate the slippery slope. . . the key to understanding misconduct is not in its explosive
endings but in its quiet beginnings. Once context bends character on a small scale, escalation
may turn out to be easy if not inevitable.").
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id.
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3. Motivation
Standards set by the U.S. government and other organizations
have called for corporations to adopt "appropriate incentives" to
comply with the compliance and ethics program.4 0 However, the
question is, what incentives motivate compliance?
According to Daniel H. Pink,410 human beings are not entirely
rational41 1  and although people are motivated by external
incentives, 412 "intrinsic motivation is of great importance." 4 13 Further,studies show that economic incentives work to motivate people to
perform routine tasks. This is not necessarily the case when it comes
to more complex work or heuristic decision making that involves
using judgment, ethics, and creativity.414 Indeed, according to Pink,monetary incentives can take the good out of doing good.415
It is true that lots of compliance processes are routine, check-the-
box tasks. Therefore, it may be possible to motivate employees to
comply with these processes with monetary incentives or incentives
around promotion reviews.416 However, it is the decisions that come
409. U. S. SENTENCING COMM., GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (a) at 496 (2012).
410. DANIEL H. PINK, DRIVE: THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT WHAT MOTIVATES US
(reprt. ed. 2011).
411. Id. at 26.
412. Peter Drucker, Don't Change Corporate Culture-Use It!, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 1991,
at A14 ("Changing habits and behavior requires changing expectations and rewards. People in
organizations . .. tend to act in response to being recognized and rewards-everything else is
preaching."); Joseph Murphy, Using Incentives in Your Compliance and Ethics Program 26
(SOC'Y OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS (2011), available at http://www.corporate
compliance.org/Portals/1/PDF/Resources/IncentivesCEProgram-Murphy.pdf ("People tend to
do what gets rewarded.").
413. BRUNO S. FREY, NOT JUST FOR THE MONEY: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF PERSONAL
MOTIVATION 118-19 (reprt. ed. 1997) ("Intrinsic motivation is of great importance for all
economic activities. It is inconceivable that people are motivated solely or even mainly by
external incentives."). PINK, supra note 409, at 30 (making the same point).
414. PINK, supra note 409, at 30. ("lEixternal rewards and punishments -both carrots and
sticks-can work nicely for algorithmic tasks. But they can be devastating for heuristic ones.
Those sorts of challenges- solving novel problems or creating something the world didn't know
it was missing-depend heavily on Harlow's third drive.") (citing researcher Teresa Amabile
and explaining that "Amabile calls it the intrinsic motivation principle of creativity, which holds
in part: "intrinsic motivation is conducive to creativity; controlling extrinsic motivation is
detrimental to creativity. In other words, the central tenets of Motivation 2.0 may actually
impair performance of the heuristic, right-brain work on which modern economies depend.");
BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 128, at 104.
415. PINK, supra note 410, at 48 (explaining research study where offering money to people
to give blood decreased by half the number of people willing to give blood).
416. Murphy, supra note 412, at 28 (outlining the common arguments against incentives and
recommending the use of incentives including incentives tied to performance evaluations and
promotions and recommending using rewards and recognition like letters from the CEO,
articles in a newspaper recognizing good behavior, competitions and nominations, certificates,
lunches, time-off, and cash).
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close to the line, that involve ethics or morals and personal
preferences, that affect the culture of the corporation and that aren't
as easily motivated by economics. In these situations, it is not clear
that "if-then" rewards will work because according to leaders in the
field of motivation, "if-then" rewards "neglect[] the ingredients of
genuine motivation-autonomy, mastery, and purpose.
Moreover, compliance goals that are tied to sales or quarterly
returns are set by others as opposed to by the employee themselves.
Although having the goal in and of itself can be beneficial in the sense
that it sets expectations and provides a target, there is the risk that the
goal can act like horse blinders-narrowing off bigger picture and
future forward thinking. 418 Thus, as Pink points out, such goals "can
restrict our view of the broader dimensions of our behavior." 4 19
Often this point is made to support the idea that people can seek to
meet business targets and, in the process, fail to consider the ethical
components of their decisions.4 20 Thus, the risk is that an economic
incentive can induce people to choose the quicker road over the high
road.4 21
Research has also demonstrated that implementing a compliance
program with too much emphasis on penalties can increase unethical
or undesirable behavior.422 For example, studies on parents picking
up their children late from day-care have shown that when these
facilities implement fines for being late, parents are more likely to be
late. This is because once there is a fine in place, the parents are less
likely to view the decision of whether to pick up their child on time or
not as an ethical one. Instead, it is a practical choice, a cost-benefit
scenario, with no need to search to figure out "what is the right thing
to do." 42 3  As Paine points out, the compliance approach based on
417. PINK, supra note 410, at 49.
418. Id. at 51 (contending that business school professors suggest that goals "should come
with their own warning label: Goals may cause systematic problems for organizations due to
narrowed focus, unethical behavior, increased risk taking, decreased cooperation, and decreased
intrinsic motivation. Use care when applying goals in your organization.").
419. Id. at 50; BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 128, at 106.
420. Paine, supra note 5, at 107 (describing how this happened at Sears); Murphy, supra note
412, at 26-27; Murphy, supra note 41, at 26-27 (arguing that the stronger the incentives, the
stronger the controls need to be especially when the people setting the rewards are the people
that will benefit from them).
421. PINK, supra note 410, at 51.
422. BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 128, at 109. Research has also shown that
"[sItrict enforcement of the terms of a contract has the unintended consequence of emphasizing
the minimum amount of work required for an employee to satisfy his or her obligations and
avoid punishment." David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Trust: The Unwritten Contract in
Corporate Governance, in STANFORD CLOSER LOOK SERIES 1 (2013), available at
http://www.gsb.stanford.edulsites/default/files/documents/34 Trust.pdf (cxplaining that strict
enforcement of contracts can "reduce, rather than increase, productive effort").
423. BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 127, at 111-12 (giving other examples and
Winter 2014 163
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
deterrence and the threat of sanctions 42 4 envisions people as rational
maximizers of self-interest, responsive to the personal costs and
benefits of their choices, yet indifferent to the moral legitimacy of
those choices.425
People may rush to check-the-box and conform to compliance
requirements. However, they may do so without absorbing the
rationale and reasons behind the rule or considering the moral
implications. This is a common complaint against command-and-
control approaches to regulation and compliance.426 When
compliance rules and consequences exist, it takes the people off the
hook to determine ethical behavior and it may even undermine
intrinsic motivation.427 Unsurprisingly, studies have shown that
corporations that take a command-and-control approach-as
opposed to a more comprehensive approach based on integrity, ethics
or self-regulation-are less effective at enhancing compliance.4 28 And
importantly, there is not a "command" or "rule" for every choice-
many decisions fall into a gray area-where the rules are ambiguous.
And it is in the gray area where the role of culture is most
important.429 And it is the gray area that keeps compliance officers
up at night-those situations where employees are left to navigate,interpret, and make choices when options A, B, and C, are not
available.430
maintaining that this is true even when the sanctioning system was stronger and had more
teeth).
424. Hasnas, supra note 5, at 516 (describing the "command-and-control" approach which
attempts to "control employee behavior through intense monitoring and the threat of
punishment for misbehavior"); see infra notes 436-438 and accompanying text.
425. Paine, supra note 5, at 110.
426. See infra notes 436-438 and accompanying text.
427. PINK, supra note 409, at 56 ("Rewards ... can limit the breadth of our thinking. But
extrinsic motivators-especially tangible, "if-then" ones-can also reduce the depth of our
thinking. They can focus our sights on only what's immediately before us rather than what's off
in the distance."); see also Lisa D. Ordonez, Maurice E. Schweitzer, Adam D. Galinsky, and
Max H. Bazerman, Goals Gone Wild: The Systematic Side Effects of Over-Prescribing Goal
Setting 7 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 09-083, 2009) ("The very presence of goals
may lead employees to focus myopically on short-term gains and to lose sight of the potential
devastating long-term effects on the organization."); Hasnas, supra note 5, at 517.
428. Hasnas, supra note 5, at 516-17. Providing a recommendation about which type of
approach corporations should take towards compliance (whether it is a command-and-control,
integrity-based, or self-regulation approach) is outside the scope of this Article.
429. Edelman & Suchman, supra note 43, at 501-02; ("If all legal doctrine were substantive
and unequivocal and if all legal implementation were coercive and undeviating, then one could
imagine a simple feedback loop, in which organizations would adjust their behaviors exclusively
in response to existing laws ... . In the [institutional] account, however, the plot-line is much
messier than this."); see also Chambliss, Nirvana, supra note 110, at 138-39 (making similar
point).
430. Paine, supra note 5, at 107-08 (describing Sears problematic automotive policies and
explaining that "[mianagement] failed to clarify the line between unnecessary service and
164 Vol. 10:1
CULTURE OF COMPLIANCE
If neither sticks nor carrots are the solution, how can
corporations motivate and/or convince their employees to want to
comply-as opposed to incent them to simply comply. How can
corporations get at the intrinsic motivation? Research has shown that
when the organization and employees values are in sync and when
there is trust, employees view other employees' transgressions as a
personal affront-an offense against themselves.431 In that situation,
instead of checks and controls designed to monitor and detect
transgressions, employees self-monitor.43 2 As Pink explains, "When
the reward is the activity itself-deepening learning, delighting
customers, doing one's best-there are no shortcuts. The only route
to the destination is the high road. In some sense, it is impossible to
act unethically because the disadvantaged person is not a competitor,
but yourself." 4 33
C. PRELIMINARY PROPOSAL: CONCENTRATE ON INTERNAL
NORMS
The purpose of this Article is narrow-to analyze whether
corporations should preemptively comply with the government's
unofficial stance on compliance department structure. However, the
article would not be complete without at least some thoughts on what
the government and corporations should do in lieu of preemptive
reorganization.
The government's unofficial preference towards stand-alone
compliance departments that are completely independent from the
legal department does not account for the impact that internal
networks, ethics, and individual intrinsic motivation have on a
corporation's ability to effectuate an effective compliance program.434
Rather, it is a command-and-control approach that emphasizes the
importance of structural and formal exemplifications of a compliance
program without regard for the individual workings of the
corporation and participation by the corporate executives and
legitimate preventative maintenance coupled with consumer ignorance, left employees to chart
their own courses through a vast gray area, subject to a wide range of interpretations").
431. Hasnas, supra note 5, at 517. Larcker & Tayan, supra note 422, at 2 (contenting that "a
corporate governance system based on trust might be more cost-effective than one built on
elaborate controls and procedures").
432. Larcker & Tayan, supra note 422, at 2.
433. PINK, supra note 410, at 51; Paine, supra note 5, at 112 (indicating that personal
commitment is key to ethical conduct).
434. It may be true that the CEO has ultimate power and influence to create a culture of
integrity and that such a task is not a staff function. See supra notes 378 and 387. However,
even if the corporation has the "right" CEO for the task, the internal networks must be
addressed in order to effectuate a culture of integrity.
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employees in the decision-making.435 Such emphasis (in addition to
potentially creating negative consequences and a risk of false
complacency as discussed above) may cause corporations to follow
the government's lead and take a more command-and-control based
approach when implementing new compliance programs-which has
been found to be less effective than an integrity-based or self-
regulation approach that involve considerations around ethics, values,
and individual motivation. 436  Essentially, such a specific (and
reactive) requirement (as opposed to a more principles-based
approach) is not flexible 437 and does not require that the parties
understand the purpose or take responsibility for (or partake in)
interpreting and achieving the desired goal of departmentalization.438
Therefore, instead of emphasizing the importance of structural
changes and deciding ex ante that departmentalization is the remedy
for corporate noncompliance and government leniency, corporations
should look inward at the actual decision making processes of
individuals, 439 and at the informal values, culture, and networks that
are specific to each organization. 440 And regulators, sentencing
guidelines, compliance recommendations, and settlement
contingencies, should reward corporations that proactively do so.
Likely, the government does not have the time, resources, or the
capability to conduct a refined analysis for every allegedly malfeasant
company. Therefore, the government should offer liability mitigation
435. Granted, realism is hard to capture in rules.
436. Scc supra notes 428 and 92 and accompanying text. Cf Pearce & Wald, supra note 186,
at 534 (arguing that the cultural influence of command and control regulation (whether
governmental or internal corporate) is weak and that principles based regulation is stronger so
long as its implementation is participatory)
437. Richard B. Stewart, Administrativc Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 437,446 (2003).
438. Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 388 (1986) (explaining that
the principles-based approach "places the onus on the parties to work out and communicate
their intentions completely and thoroughly"); Dan Awrey, Regulating Financial Innovation: A
More Principles-Based Proposal?, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 273, 275 (2011)
(explaining that principles-based regulations support communication and interaction between
those drafting the rules and those required to implement the rules); Andrew Boon,
Professionalism under the Legal Services Act 2007, 17 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 195, 195 (2010)
(explaining that under a principles-based approach there is more communication around the
objectives of the principles leaving the practical application decisions to those subject to their
application). Ted Schnayer is known for his recommendation for a principle-based approach to
law firm regulation. See also Ted Schneyer, On Further Reflection: How "Professional Self-
Regulation" Should Promote Compliance with Broad Ethical Duties of Law Firm Management,
53 ARIZ. L. REV 577, 619-28 (2011) (recommending a principle-based approach to law firm
regulation) (For a description of Ted Schneyer's work and recommendations, see Pearce &
Wald, supra note 185 at 529-32.)
439. Cf BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 128, at 126 (making similar argument); id.
at 160-61.
440. CL id. (making a similar point).
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to those corporations that make changes (whether structural or
inherent) based on internal findings about how work is actually being
done within the company and the networks and ethical culture that
exists beneath the surface of the organization chart, the mission
statement, and the code of conduct. Specifically, in order to qualify
for the mitigation, corporations should conduct some type of network
analysis, like that recommended by Robert Cross and Andrew
Parker, to determine communication flow, critical stopgaps, and the
informal organization structure that exists based on the way that
people behave and interact.441 Corporations should be required to
demonstrate that there was a shared dialogue between executives and
employees and that they developed and implemented compliance
structure, programs, and principles based on the results of this
internal study along with input from other employees across the
organization.
After performing these recommendations, will the corporation
still decide to have a chief compliance officer? Likely. Will the
corporation still decide to departmentalize the compliance function so
that it does not report to legal? Maybe. Or perhaps, alternatively, it
will provide the chief compliance officer with dual reporting
obligations-to both the board and the general counsel. The answer
depends on the corporation and its internal picture. But without such
internal analysis, focus, and dialogue, a corporation (let alone the
government) cannot know whether departmentalization (or other
programs and policies) will support or distract from compliant culture
creation-and importantly-a corporation cannot ensure that a
culture of compliance is engrained in the corporate community.4 43
441. CROSS & PARKER, supra note 379. Note, this Article is not recommending that the
government require ethics audits or self-assessments despite recent research that suggests that
self-assessments may incent firms to improve their ethical infrastructure. See, e.g., Susan Saab
Fortney, The Role of Ethics Audits in Improving Ethical Conduct: An Empirical Study on Self-
Assessment and Managcment-Based Regulation of Law Firms 6-8 (Fordham Ethics Schmooze,
Draft 2013), available at http://law.fordham.edu/assets/SteinCenter/Fortney Susan.pdf
(describing the recent legislation in New South Wales that allows nonlawyers to own law firms);
see also, Tahlia Gordon et al., Regulating Law Firm Ethics Management: An Empirical
Asscssment of the Regulation of Incorporated Legal Practices, in 37 J. L. & Soc'Y 466 (2010).
37 J.L. & SoC'y. 466, (2010). This is because, as Hasnas points out, ethical audits that uncover
any suggestion of criminal activity may "trigger[I a duty to immediately report the potential
violation to the government and fully cooperate in any resulting investigation." Hasnas, supra
note 5, at 521.
442. CL Pearce & Wald, supra note 186, at 534 (recommending a relational regulatory
framework that, inter alia, "focuses on how law firms develop and implement their own ethical
identities and plans," that "ensures that junior attorneys and staff are part of the processes of
creating and implementing an ethical infrastructure" and that "law firms' regulatory objectives
should include aspiration" that would "emphasize that lawyers are more than Holmesian bad
men and women").
443. BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 128, at 163 ("Because informal values are
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VI. CONCLUSION
Do not hover always on the surface of things, nor take up
suddenly with mere appearances; but penetrate into the
depth of matters, as far as your time and circumstances
allow, especially in those things which relate to your
profession. 444
Since the fall of Enron, the issue of corporate compliance with
law has been a dominant focus of research, legislation, regulation, and
commentary. A key issue in the discussion is how to develop
voluntary corporate governance structures to enhance the degree of
compliance with law by corporations. Two schools of thought have
emerged: departmentalization (separating out the compliance
function from the legal department) and non-departmentalization
(housing the two departments under the general counsel).
This study contains a critical examination of both schools of
thought (and their evolution and implementation to date) and
concludes that non-departmentalization likely provides the better
route to bolster the level of corporate compliance with law and foster
a positive culture of compliance. However, as this article shows,regulatory efforts have tended in the direction of mandating a
departmentalized approach-a mistaken direction if this analysis is
correct. The purpose of this article is to caution against an uncritical
adoption of the departmentalization approach and to set forth the
case for use of a non-departmentalization structure as a management
strategy and, more importantly, to advocate an approach where
corporations delve beyond "the surface of things," 445 to the internal
beliefs, motivations, and hidden norms that affect culture and the
choices employees make. The appearance of compliance-whether it
is the formal ethics programs and codes of conduct,446 or the internal
corporate structure-have been touted as "the weakest link in an
organization's ethical infrastructure" and can be "far eclipsed by their
informal counterparts." 447  A mandate for departmentalization may
organization-specific, ethics "fixes" will depend on those values and be unique to each
organization . ... An organization can't simply "borrow' another organization's formal ethics
plan, as so many do; nor can the government mandate particular programs and expect
success.").
444. ISAAC WATIS, THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE MIND: OR, A SUPPLEMENT TO THE ART OF
LOGIC: CONTAINING A VARIETY OF REMARKS AND RULES FOR THE ATTAINMENT AND
COMMUNICATION OF USEFUL KNOWLEDGE, IN RELIGION, IN THE SCIENCES, AND IN COMMON
LIFE 13 (1784), available at http://archive.org/details/improvementofmin00wattuoft.
445. Id.
446. BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 128, at 3, 117, 163.
447. Id. at 118 (citing studies in support including one that shows that "formal controls of
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have little positive impact on corporate culture if it does not reflect
448the real values, norms, and ethics of the corporation.
Relying on secondary literature along with interviews of seventy
general counsels and compliance officers of S&P 500 corporations
across a variety of industries, this study describes the commonly cited
arguments for and against a departmentalization approach to
management of the compliance function. It then categorizes these
arguments into three types: 1) autonomy and independence; 2)
transparency and efficiency; and, 3) role arguments.449
Utilizing this typology, this article examines the strength of the
arguments for departmentalization from the public's perspective.
Through this examination, the article uncovers and focuses on the
drawbacks to departmentalization that have not been emphasized in
the literature and that appear to tip the scales away from
departmentalization such as disempowerment of the chief compliance
officer, lack of expertise in the compliance department, creation of
barriers to collaboration between departments, a decrease in
corporate transparency, and the potential rise of lawyers as amoral,
legal technicians.
This critical analysis leads to the conclusion that legislatures,
regulators, and corporations should not preemptively comply with
regulators' preference towards stand-alone compliance departments if
the goal is to promote an organization-wide culture of compliance.
Instead, a focus on and analysis of a corporation's informal norms
may have more potential to meet the objectives than a focus on
organizational structure. Without such analysis and focus, a
corporation (let alone the government) cannot know whether
departmentalization will support or distract from compliance and a
normative commitment to compliance and ethics.45 Therefore,
corporations should make changes to compliance procedures and
policies based on internal network studies to determine work and
communication flow as well as explore the ethical culture that exists
beneath the surface of the organization chart, the mission statement,
managers were inferior to the informal social controls imposed by coworkers"); sec supra note
373.
448. BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 128, at 119, 122; see supra note 443.
449. Unsurprisingly, these three types of arguments are commonly utilized in debates about
the ideology of the legal profession and the rules governing lawyers' conduct. Cf David B.
Wilkins, Evcryday Practice is the Troubling Case: Confronting context in Legal Ethics, in
EVERYDAY PRACTICES & TROUBLE CASES 68, 70-75 (Sarat et al. eds 1998) (analyzing
assumptions that underlie the image and ideology of the legal profession and how these
assumptions affect lawyers' conduct); see generally Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as
Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HuM. RTS. 1 (1975) (analyzing professional roles (including
the role of lawyer) on moral rights and obligations).
450. BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 127, at 119,122; see supra note 442.
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and the code of conduct. Moreover, the government should offer
liability mitigation to those corporations that do so.
In sum, this analysis suggests that the government's preference
for departmentalization and emphasis on the importance of
compliance professionals having autonomy and independence from
legal department may be a red herring. 451 The critical elements are
informal norms and networks, human ethics, and motivation.452 If this
is true, the job of a compliance officer is measurably more
complicated, and the level of influence and power along with the
personal, leadership, and communication skills of the compliance
officer become even more important. This conclusion, then, leads to
an unanswered but important question (one that is left for another
day and another article): Regardless of the organizational structure,
who should oversee compliance? What expertise and skills should
these compliance officers have? Should they have legal,
management, or other training? Lastly, what roles should compliance
officers fill to best execute the compliance function? These questions
are beyond the scope of this article, but will be addressed in future
articles.453
VII. APPENDICES: COMPLIANCE STUDY
METHODOLOGY: GENERATING HYPOTHESIS ABOUT
THE EFFECTS OF LAWYERS OVERSEEING COMPLIANCE
To explore the central questions of this article, self-reported,
hypothesis-generating perceptions of general counsels and chief
compliance officers of large publicly traded corporations were studied
to examine the compliance function. The study was approached in
two stages. Stage one consisted of thirty-six short interviews at the
end of longer interviews on a separate topic. Stage two consisted of
thirty-five longer interviews that concentrated on the topic of
compliance. In total, seventy-one interviews were conducted with
seventy professionals (i.e., one general counsel was interviewed in
451. The MacGuffin STAR WARS (1977) Region 2 DVD release (2004). Audio commentary,
00:14:44-00:15:00; (George Lucas describes R2-D2 as "the main driving force of the movie ...
what you say in the movie business is the MacGuffin . . . the object of everybody's search");
OXFORD ENGLISH DICilONARY (quoting Hitchcock from a lecture at Columbia University in
1939) ("[We] have a name in the studio, and we call it the 'MacGuffin.' It is the mechanical
element that usually crops up in any story. In crook stories it is almost always the necklace and
in spy stories it is most always the papers.").
452. In other words, the right question is not whether compliance should be independent
from the legal department.
453. See supra note 24.
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stage one and stage two). In both stages, a "snowball sample"
approach was used to find potential respondents.45 4
A. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
1. Interviews Stage 1
Stage one interviews occurred in 2006-2007 as part of a separate
research project at Harvard Law School to gain a better
understanding of how general counsels within large publicly traded
companies 455 purchase, monitor, and assess legal services. During the
interviews, interviewees were asked about the main topic but also
queried about compliance.456 The interviewees were not told that
they would be questioned about compliance and often, the subject of
compliance was a natural by-product of the conversation.457 Of the
total interview time (which was, on average, approximately seventy-
six minutes),458 time spent on compliance lasted on average eight
minutes. In sum, thirty-six short interviews with general counsels of
S&P 500 corporations in banking, pharmaceutical, and petroleum
companies were conducted.459
454. Snowball sampling essentially means that initial participants provide connections to
other people who meet the study criteria and might be willing to be interviewed by the
researcher. Id. For a more detailed description, see Leo A. Goodman, Snowball Sampling, 32
ANNALS MATHEMATICAL STAT. 148, 148-49 (1961) (defining snowball sampling); Charles
Kadushin, Power, Influence, and Social ircles: A New Methodokgy for Studying Opinion
Makers, 33 AM. Soc. REV. 685, 694-96 (1968) (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of
snowball sampling); sec also, Jean Faugier & Mary Sargeant, Sampling Hard to Reach
Populations, 26 J. ADVANCED NURSING 790 (1997); Sarah H. Ramsey & Robert F. Kelly, Using
Social Science Research in Family Law Analysis and Formation: Problems and Prospects, 3 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 631, 642 (1994). There are many legal research studies based on a
snowball sample approach. See, e.g., Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 110 (using a snowball
sample to study "the emerging role of compliance specialists in large law firms"); Kimberly
Kirkland, Ethics in Large Law Firms: The Principle of Pragmatism, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 631
(2004) (utilizing a snowball sample of twenty-two lawyers practicing in ten large law firms to
investigate "how bureaucratic legal workplaces shape lawyers' ethical consciousness").
455. This research study focused exclusively on banks, petroleum companies, and
pharmaceutical companies. For a description of the methodology, see, John C. Coates IV, et al.,
Hiring Teams from Rivals: Theory and Evidence on the Evolving Relationships in the
Corporate LegalMarket, 36 LAW & SOC. INOUIRY 999,1004-05 (2011).
456. To read a summary and analysis of this study, see Coates et al., supra note 455.
457. In some ways, these interviews may be even more valuable than the longer interviews
wherein the subjects knew the topic of the interview beforehand and could prepare for the
conversation.
458. Coates et al., supra note 455.
459. These interviews focused on general counsels working at S&P 500 companies that had
high demand for legal services. They were conducted as part of a larger research project funded
by Harvard Law School's Center for Lawyers and Professional Services, a subsidiary of
Harvard's Program on the Legal Profession. At that time, I was the Associate Research
Director of the Center and the lead researcher on the project. The Harvard Law School faculty
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2. Interviews Stage 2
Stage two interviews occurred in 2010-2012. To elicit
participation, the interviewees in this stage were contacted by email
on average one to two times. They were told that the topic was the
way in which compliance was handled and structured at large publicly
traded corporations. They were also assured that they and their
companies would remain anonymous.
A total of thirty-five interviews were conducted that averaged
approximately sixty minutes in length. All of the interviews in this
stage were over the phone and consisted of both closed and open
questions. Interviews were conducted across nine industries:
Financial Services, Petroleum, Pharmaceutical, Health Care,Consumer Products, Professional Services (marketing, outsourcing,and communications), Electric/Energy, Government, Transportation
& Logistics. The goal was to conduct 30-40 interviews: two to three
companies per industry, some general counsels and compliance
officers from the same company, some ex-general counsels from the
same industries in this sample, a few lower level compliance
employees, a couple compliance activists, and a couple senior people
that used to work in compliance at the SEC or OIG of public health.
In total, interviews were conducted with twelve general counsels,460nine chief compliance officers, five compliance officers, five former
general counsels,461 one chief ethics officer,462 one former compliance
officer for the SEC, and one from the DHHS, and one compliance
activist (a consultant that also serves as the leader of an organization
on compliance).463
B. METHODOLOGY LIMITATIONS AND CAVEATS
Admittedly, this methodology suffers from many deficiencies.
First, clearly it is impossible to generalize findings based on one
study. Second, with only thirty-six units in Stage one and thirty-five
units in stage two, the study also suffers from small sample size.
Third, given that it is the informal cultures that cannot be seen from
the outside that most affect compliance behavior by employees, it is
directors of the project were John Coates, David Wilkins, and Ashish Nanda. The director of
the American Bar Foundation, Robert L. Nelson, was also a key collaborator. For more
information about the larger research project see Coates et al., supra note 455.
460. One of these general counsels was an associate general counsel.
461. One of these former general counsels was a former associate general counsel. Also one
of these general counsels was also interviewed in stage one. Also, the compliance activist was
also a former general counsel-so this number could be reported as six.
462. This chief ethics officer reported to the chief compliance officer.
463. See the charts detailing sample characteristics in section C of this Appendix.
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hard as an interviewer to determine that which is merely "talk," and
that which is clearly the corporate culture, the internal norms and
pressures that affect how employees make decisions. To that end, a
codebook was developed that consisted of two parts.4 4 The first part
measures questions that were able to elicit specific answers in order
to systematically tabulate responses across interviewees. For the
most part, the topics were presented in an open-ended fashion and,
therefore, the second part of the codebook is an analysis of the
interview transcripts by question and topic. 46 5 Some of this coding is
used in the second article related to this study. Various law-student
research assistants were trained to code the data. Of course, the
findings are not statistically significant nor are they relied on to show
or prove any point empirically. As indicated by the sample size the
real nature of the approach is qualitative, not quantitative, in
character.
Finally, the compliance study is not comprised of a random
sample of all large publicly traded companies that have high demand
for legal services. Instead, it is self-reports by senior executives who
arguably have certain stories to tell. However, the primary goals of
this article are to understand how general counsel and chief
compliance officers of some large, publicly traded corporations
define, manage, and think about compliance and to initiate a
normative discussion about the government's unofficial stance that
compliance be separated from legal and all the assumptions that go
into such a stance (assumptions about the role of lawyers, the impact
organization structure has on communication, and how ethical or
"compliance" decisions are made). Essentially, this study represents
an attempt to merge what could be a purely conceptual and
normative exercise with descriptive interviews that provide a lens
through which to view the normative discussion. The interview
research is not designed or used to prove anything about general
counsels or compliance officers generally. It is quasi-empirical and
not set up to yield results that might be subjected to standard
statistical tests which would indicate variables of significance.
Instead, it (along with secondary material and other research on
compliance) informs the analysis and conclusions. In sum, the
464. This is an attempt at quasi-content analysis, which is a type of analysis often used for
analyzing transcripts, political speeches, advertisements, judicial opinions. See, e.g., KLAUS
KRIPPENDORFF, CONTENT ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCfiON TO ITS METHODOLOGY 26-29 (Sage
Publications 2004).
465. This approach is similar to that taken by Nelson & Nielsen, supra note, 183. However,
sample sizes and procedure differ. Id. at 460. Although both conducted interviews, Nelson and
Nielson "cross-checkled] their results by comparing randomly and nonrandomly selected
informants." Id. at 460-i.
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interviews are not use to depict a true picture of how the world is but
instead-as other qualitative interviewers have proposed-to paint a
picture of how "some professionals believe the world is or how it
ought to be or how they would like others to believe they see the
world."46 6
C. SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
1. Interviews Stage 1 by Industry
Industry Number of Recorded &
Interviews Transcribed?
Financial Services 29* 26
Petroleum 6 6
Pharmaceuticals 1 1
TOTAL 36 33
*One company had co-general counsels. The interview with the
two of them is counted as two interviews.
2. Interviews Stage 2 by Industry
Number of Recorded &
Interviews Transcribed?
Financial Services 8 3
Petroleum 1 1
Pharmaceuticals 4 3
Health Care 5 3
Consumer Products 5 4
Professional Services (including
marketing, communications, and 3 2
outsourcing)
Hospitality 1 0
Electric/Energy 2 1
Government 2 2
Transportation & Logistics 4 4
TOTAL 35 23
466. See Parker, supra note 1, at 341. Examination of narratives is a method used
successfully in other areas of study, e.g., critical legal studies literature. Further, the number of
interviews in this study meets or exceed the number of interviews considered in other
scholarship which uses similar methods to research this topic area and other topics in the legal
profession. See supra note 25 (describing other qualitative studies on compliance). Ideally, use
of a narrative methodology would be an intermediate step which would lead to the construction
of a more rigorous theory which might be then subject to modeling and testing. With this subject
matter, however, it is not clear such a next step is possible.
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Industry # of companies interviewed the GC and Compliance
officer from the same company in stage two
Financial Services 2
Pharmaceuticals 2
Health Care 1
Hospitality 1
Transportation & 1
Logistics
TOTAL 7
3. Interviews Stages 1 & 2 by Title and Reporting Structure
In total, 71 interviews were conducted of 70 general counsels and
compliance officers. One general counsel was interviewed in both
stage one and stage two.
Title Stage TTL Industry Code Who report
Name to?
General
Counsels*
1 1 Financial GC1 Chief Risk
Officer
(Associate 1 2 Financial GC2 General
General Counsel
Counsel)
1 3 Financial GC3 Chief
Executive
Officer
1 4 Financial GC4 Chief
Financial
Officer
1 5 Financial GC5 Chief Legal
Officer
1 6 Financial GC6 Chief
Executive
I_ Officer
1 7 Financial GC7 Chief
Executive
Officer
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Title Stage TTL Industry Code Who report
Name to?
1 9 Financial GC9 Chief
Executive
Officer
1 10 Financial GC10 Chief Legal
Officer
1 11 Financial GC11 Chief
Executive
Officer
(Associate 1 12 Financial GC12 General
General Counsel (who
Counsel) reports to
CEO)
1 13 Financial GC13 Chief
Executive
Officer
1 14 Financial GC14 Chief
Executive
Officer
1 15 Financial GC15 Chief
Executive
Officer
1 16 Financial GC16 Chief
Executive
Officer
1 17 Financial GC17 Chief
Executive
Officer
1 18 Financial GC18 Chief
Executive
Officer
1 19 Financial GC19 President
1 20 Financial GC20 Chief
Executive
Officer
1 21 Financial GC21 Chief
Executive
Officer
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Title Stage TTL Industry Code Who report
Name to?
1 23 Financial GC23 Chief
Executive
Officer
1 24 Financial GC24 Chief
Administrativ
e Officer
1 25 Financial GC25 Chief
Executive
Officer
1 26 Financial GC26 Chief
Administrativ
e Officer
1* 27-28 Financial GC27 Unknown
1 29 Financial GC28 Unknown
1 30 Financial GC29 Vice Chair of
legal
compliance,
PR, and
charitable
foundations
1 31 Financial GC30 N/A
1 32 Financial GC31 Chief
Executive
Officer
1 33 Petroleum GC33 Chief
Executive
Officer
1 34 Petroleum GC34 Chief
Executive
Officer
1 35 Financial GC35 N/A
2 36 Pharmaceutical GC1 Chief
Executive
Officer
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Title Stage TTL Industry Code Who report
Name to'?
2 38 Financial GC3 Unknown
2 39 Consumer GC4 Chief
Executive
Officer
2 40 Transportation GC5 Deputy
General
Counsel
2 41 Pharmaceutical GC6 Chief
Executive
Officer
2 42 Financial GC7 Chief
Executive
Officer
2 43 Health Care GC8 Chief
Executive
Officer
2 44 Hospitality GC9 Chief
Executive
Officer
2 45 Financial GC10 Chief
Operating
Officer and
Chief
Executive
Officer
2 46 Professional GC11 Chief
Services Executive
Officer
(Associate 2 47 GC12 General
General Counsel
Counsel)
Chief
Compliance
Officer
2 48 Pharmaceutical CCO1 Chief
Executive
Officer
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Title Stage TTL Industry Code Who report
Name to?
2 49 Pharmaceutical CCO2 Chief
Executive
Officer
2 50 Financial CCO3 Unclear if
CEO or
Board of
Directors
2 51 Financial CCO4 General
Counsel
2 52 Transportation CCO5 General
Counsel
2 53 Consumer CCO6 General
Counsel
2 54 Professional CCO7 Unknown
Services
2 55 Health Care CCO8 Quality
Compliance
and Ethics
Committee
for the Board
2 56 Transportation CCO1 General
4 Counsell
Compliance
Officer/Mana
ger
2 57 Consumer C09 Chair of
Audit
Committee
2 58 Hospitality CO10 General
Counsel
2 59 Financial CO11 Chief
Operating
Officer
2 60 Consumer C012 General
Counsel
2 61 Health Care C013 Global
Compliance
Officer
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Title Stage TTL Industry Code Who report
Name to?
Former
General
Counsel
1 62 Energy FGC1 Chief
Executive
Officer
1 & 63 Petroleum Stage Chief
2** 2 Executive
FGC2/ Officer
Stage
1
GC32
2 64 Financial FGC3. Unknown
2 65 Consumer FGC4 Unknown
(Former 2 66 Consumer FGC5 General
Assoc. GC) Counsel
'Compliance
Activist
(also an ex 2 67 Financial CA1 Varied
GC)
Former
Compliance
Government
Official
2 68 Government CGO1 Someone in
DHHS
2 69 Government CGO2 Someone in
SEC
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Uhiet tEthics
flfr;nr I I I I
5Two Interviews at the same time with co-general counsel
counted as two interviews.
** Interviewed in both stages but only counted once.
D. RESEARCH ON 63 COMPANIES IN TOP 100 OF FORTUNE 500467
467. This research was conducted based on publicly available information. However,
information could not be found for 37 of the 100 companies.
Companies with a CCO
E-o CO -6
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2013 Compliance Research on 63 Companies in Top 100 of
Fortune 500
Is the CCO also the GC?
